

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MAP ILLUSTRATING THE
TURKO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
AND THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
THE ALLIED POWERS.
R U S S I A
B L A C K
P E R S I A

THE

LIFE

OF

NICHOLAS I.

EMPEROR OF RUSSIA;

WITH A SHORT ACCOUNT

OF

RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS.

14.262

BY F. MAYNE.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.
1855.

[*The Author reserves the right of authorising a Translation of this Work.*]



LONDON:
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PREFACE.

THE volume now offered to the Public was commenced with the idea of giving the readers of a popular periodical a succinct account of the Emperor Nicholas, the vast territories under his sway, and the origin and progress of the war into which his "vaulting ambition," has forced the Western Powers. The work has grown under the Author's hands, and is now reprinted, considerably enlarged; in the belief that a work which brings, as it were, into a focus the multifarious views and opinions that are scattered throughout innumerable volumes on this deeply interesting subject, would prove extensively useful at the present time.

The value and extent of the authorities that have contributed towards the compilation of the work will be discovered on perusal. For the description of the harbour and fortifications of Sebastopol, the Author is indebted to a French paper on the subject; and the chapter on Revel and Cronstadt was supplied by a friend.

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LIFE

OF

NICHOLAS I.

EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

BOOK I.

NICHOLAS—HIS LIFE AND CHARACTER.

PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

NICHOLAS I. is the great-great-grandson of Peter the Great, the founder, he may indeed be termed, of the Russian Empire. Till the time of that great monarch, Russia had hardly been acknowledged at all as a European power. Indeed, it was but two centuries before he began his reign, that Muscovy or Russia was made known to our Government by some of our Arctic voyagers, when trying to find out the north-east passage, and a "Muscovy Company" was, in consequence, formed in London, in the reign of Elizabeth, to trade thither by the route of the White Sea.

Very ambitious must this same Peter the Great have been, and not less clever than ambitious. He saw himself surrounded by a vast territory, and

though it was half a desert, and the few inhabitants thereof more than half barbarians, yet he conceived a plan in his own mind for the civilisation of his country and for rendering it, as he imagined, the first of the European powers, if not the greatest power that had ever existed on earth. It appears that his successor, the present Czar, inherits these ambitious projects, though certainly he is not possessed either of the business habits, the power of concentration, or the varied talents of his ancestor.

Even if Peter the Great had not shown by his every action the spirit of ambition and his resolution to make Russia the mistress of the world, his will, as it has lately been placed before the public, will manifestly prove what were his wishes and ideas. We copy from the "Times" of April 13th, 1854:—

"The following translation has been made from a German work, entitled 'Geschichte Peters des Grossen. Von Eduard Pelz, Leipsic.' It is there stated to have been transmitted by the Chevalier d'Eon, French Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, to the French King in the year 1757, and to have been made public shortly afterwards.

"Various opinions have been expressed as to its authenticity and genuineness, which, at this period of time, it is difficult to clear up. Independently, however, of its authenticity, there is much intrinsic interest in the document, as embodying principles of action which have been

notoriously followed by Russia during the last hundred years, with such modifications as time and circumstances and the variations of European equilibrium have rendered necessary. The 13th rule is especially worthy of attention at the present moment.

"THE WILL OF PETER THE GREAT.

"'In the name of the holy and indivisible Trinity, we, Peter, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, &c., to all our successors on the throne, and in the government of the Russian nation;

"'Forasmuch as the great God, who is the Author and Giver of our life and crown, hath constantly illuminated us with His light, and upheld us with his support,'" &c.

"Here Peter sets out in detail that, according to his view, which he takes to be also that of Providence, he regards the Russian nation as destined hereafter to exercise supreme dominion over Europe. He bases his opinion on the fact that the European nations have, for the most part, fallen into a condition of decrepitude not far removed from collapse, whence he considers that they may easily be subjugated by a new and youthful race, as soon as the latter shall have attained its full vigour.

"The Russian monarch looks upon the coming influx of northerns into the east and west, as a periodical movement, which forms part of the scheme of Providence, which, in like manner, by the invasions of the barbarians, effected the regeneration of the Roman world. He compares these migrations of the Polar nations to the inundations of the Nile, which at certain seasons fertilizes the arid soil of Egypt. He adds, that Russia, which

he found a brook, and should leave a river, must, under his successors, grow to a mighty sea, destined to fertilise worn-out Europe, and that its waves would advance over all obstacles if his successors were only capable of guiding the stream. On this account he leaves behind him, for their use, the following rules, which he recommends to their attention and constant study, even as Moses consigned his tables of the law to the Jewish people:—

"'RULES.

"'1. The Russian nation must be constantly on a war footing, to keep the soldiers warlike and in good condition. No rest must be allowed, except for the purpose of relieving the State finances, recruiting the army, or biding the favourable moment for attack. By these means, peace is made subservient to war, and war to peace, in the interest of the aggrandisement and increasing prosperity of Russia.

"'2. Every possible means must be used to invite from the most cultivated European States, commanders in war, and philosophers in peace, to enable the Russian nation to participate in the advantages of other countries without losing any of its own.

"'3. No opportunity must be lost of taking part in the affairs and disputes of Europe, especially in those of Germany, which, from its vicinity, is of the most direct interest to us.

"'4. Poland must be divided by keeping up constant jealousies and confusions there. The authorities must be gained over with money, and the Assemblies corrupted so as to influence the election of the Kings. We must get

up a party of our own there, send Russian troops into the country, and let them sojourn there so long that they may ultimately find some pretext for remaining there for ever. Should the neighbouring States make difficulties, we must appease them for the moment by allowing them a share of the territory, until we can safely resume what we have thus given away.

"'5. We must take away as much territory as possible from Sweden, and contrive that they shall attack us first, so as to give us a pretext for their subjugation. With this object in view, we must keep Sweden in opposition to Denmark, and Denmark to Sweden, and sedulously foster their mutual jealousies.

"'6. The consorts of the Russian princes must always be chosen from among the German princesses, in order to multiply our family alliances with the Germans, and so unite our interests with theirs; and thus, by consolidating our influence in Germany, to cause it to attach itself spontaneously to our policy.

"'7. We must be careful to keep up our commercial alliance with England, for she is the Power which has most need of our products for her navy, and at the same time, may be of the greatest service to us in the development of our own. We must export wood and other articles in exchange for her gold, and establish permanent connexions between her merchants and seamen and our own.

"'8. We must keep steadily extending our frontiers—northward along the Baltic, and southward along the shores of the Black Sea.

"'9. We must progress as much as possible in the direction of Constantinople and India. He who can once get possession of these places, is the real ruler of the world. With this view we must provoke constant quarrels at one time with Turkey and at another with Persia. We must establish wharfs and docks in the Euxine, and by degrees make ourselves masters of that sea, as well as of the Baltic, which is a doubly important element in the success of our plan. We must hasten the downfall of Persia, push on into the Persian Gulf; if possible re-establish the ancient commercial intercourse with the Levant through Syria, and force our way into the Indies, which are the storehouses of the world. Once there, we can dispense with English gold.

"'10. Moreover, we must take pains to establish and maintain an intimate union with Austria, apparently countenancing her schemes for future aggrandisement in Germany, and all the while secretly rousing the jealousy of the minor States against her. In this way we must bring it to pass that one or the other party shall seek aid from Russia; and thus we shall exercise a sort of protectorate over the country, which will pave the way for future supremacy.

"'11. We must make the House of Austria interested in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and we must neutralise its jealousy at the capture of Constantinople either by preoccupying it with a war with the old European States, or by allowing it a share of the spoil, which we can afterwards resume at our leisure.

"'12. We must collect round our house, as round a centre, all the detached sections of Greeks which are

scattered abroad in Hungary, Turkey, and South Poland. We must make them look to us for support, and then, by establishing beforehand a sort of ecclesiastical supremacy, we shall pave the way for universal sovereignty.

"'13. When Sweden is ours, Persia vanquished, Poland subjugated, Turkey conquered—when our armies are united, and the Euxine and the Baltic are in the possession of our ships, then we must make separate and secret overtures, first to the Court of Versailles, and then to that of Vienna, to share with them the dominion of the world. If either of them accepts our propositions, which is certain to happen if their ambition and self-interest are properly worked upon, we must make use of this one to annihilate the other. This done, we have only to destroy the remaining one by finding a pretext for a quarrel, the issue of which cannot be doubtful, as Russia will then be already in the absolute possession of the East, and of the best part of Europe.

"'14. Should the improbable case happen of both rejecting the propositions of Russia, then our policy will be to set one against the other, and make them tear each other to pieces. Russia must then watch for and seize the favourable moment, and pour her already assembled hosts into Germany, while two immense fleets, laden with Asiatic hordes, and convoyed by the armed squadrons of the Euxine and the Baltic, set sail simultaneously from the Sea of Azoff and the harbour of Archangel. Sweeping along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, they will overrun France on the one side, while Germany is overpowered on the other. When these countries are fully conquered, the rest of Europe must fall easily and without

a struggle under our yoke. Thus Europe can and must be subjugated.'"

Such was the will, as it is asserted, of this astute and far-seeing monarch; and so entirely have his successors, especially the most clever and crafty among them, such as the two Empresses Catherine and especially the Emperor Nicholas, acted on its counsels, that, but for one very remarkable omission in it, we might almost have asserted it to have been penned during the last twenty years instead of nearly a century and a half ago. That omission is regarding Great Britain, which is nowhere spoken of in it as a mighty and warlike power, and likely to dispute with Russia the government of the world, or to take upon herself the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. The only mention of *England*—not Great Britain—is in Article 7., where her wealth, her commerce, and her navy are only incidentally alluded to as making her a nation whose commercial alliance would be useful to Russia. This omission, we think, seals the fact that the will was actually written in the time of, and therefore by the hand of, Peter the Great. He knew England only by her commerce and her navy; and none that knew her then could have prophesied her future greatness and exalted position in Europe.

CHAP. I.

THE EARLY LIFE OF NICHOLAS.

"NICHOLAS I., Emperor of All the Russias," was born in 1796; being the third son of Paul I., who was murdered by his officers — some assert with the privity of his sons — in 1801. The age, however, of Nicholas exonerates him from any share in the blame of this foul proceeding. And his elder brother, the late Emperor Alexander, though he was certainly aware of the conspiracy, is said to have given his consent only to his father's imprisonment, but not to his murder; and that only because he was aware that his father's continued liberty would have involved his own life-long imprisonment or even death. But to the end of his days, it is said, that Alexander was subject to fits of depression and remorse in the recollection of the part he had taken in this fearful tragedy. It is stated especially that on the anniversaries of his father's murder he was in the habit of shutting himself up for humiliation and penitence.

The fact asserted by Mr. Cole, in his "Russia and the Russians," that from Peter the Great to Alexander four of the intervening monarchs died an unnatural death *, tells a terrible tale of the still more than half-barbarous state of Russia. † Add to this, that Peter the Great, the talented and the civilising monarch of his country, is said to have murdered his only son with his own hand; and that Alexander I., the enlightened opponent of Napoleon, and the Christian philanthropist in his own land, would have fallen within a few weeks under the hand of the

* "1718. Alexis, son and heir of Peter the Great, executed by order of his father. 1730. Peter the Second, son of Alexis, "died suddenly, deposed and murdered:" with him ends the male branch of the house of Romanoff. 1740. Ivan Antonovitch, an infant, succeeded his aunt Anna in 1740; in a year he was deposed by his cousin, the Empress Elizabeth, who confined him in various prisons; and in 1764 he was made away with by Catherine the Second, during an insurrection. 1762. Peter the Third murdered by his wife, the Empress Catherine the Second. 1801. Paul, her son, murdered by a conspiracy of his nobles. 1825. Alexander, supposed for a time to have been made away with by the conspiracy which broke out on his death; but later discoveries — from Russian sources, however — throw doubts on this rumour."—*Cole.*

† The reply of a Russian ambassador at the Court of London to the remonstrance of one of our monarchs on this subject is remarkable:—"Ah! the bow-string is our magna charta: your people do not need it."

assassin, if he had not been carried off by the swifter mandate of the Almighty, while some even now assert that his sudden and rapid illness was caused by poison; and we have reason indeed to stir up ourselves and use every available means to hinder civilised Europe from being overrun by these worse than Gothic invaders.

In some respects there seems a strange and fatal similarity between the subject of our memoir and his unfortunate father, both of them having exhibited, in addition to the violence, the whimsicalities of insanity. Alison gives us as one of the causes of the father's miserable end, that "the form of a coat would subject even a Boyard to the knout or Siberia," and Mr. Cole describes freaks of the present sovereign as wild as anything recorded of his father. Such are the following:—

"The sledge of Count Razumousky, who had offended him, was, by the Emperor's order, broken into small pieces, while he stood by and directed the work. It happened to be of a blue colour, and the Count's servants wore red liveries. Upon which an ukase was immediately published, prohibiting, throughout the empire of all the Russias, the use of blue in ornamenting sledges, and of red liveries. In consequence of this sage decree, the British Ambassador and many others were compelled to change their equipages. One evening, at his theatre

in the palace of the Hermitage, a French piece was performed, in which the story of the English gunpowder plot was introduced. The Emperor was observed to listen to it with earnest attention, and as soon as it was over, he ordered all the vaults beneath the palace to be searched.

"His wild eccentricities would have been sometimes amusing, but that they were never divested of cruelty or mischief. Coming down the street called the Perspective, he perceived a nobleman who was taking his walk, and had stopped to look at some workmen who were planting trees by the monarch's order. 'What are you doing?' said the Emperor. 'Merely seeing the men work,' replied the nobleman. 'Oh, is that your employment? Take off his pelisse and give him a spade! There, now work yourself!'"

And again:—

"The present Emperor Nicholas, some time since, driving along in his droshky, observed an English gentleman move down another street, apparently, as he thought, to avoid him. He sent an officer to ask why he had done so when the Emperor was coming. The answer was, 'that he did not see his Imperial Majesty.'—'Then desire him to wear spectacles in future,' was the immediate command; with which the delinquent was forced to comply during the remainder of his residence in St. Petersburg, much to his own annoyance and the amusement of his friends, for he was a remarkably well-looking man, and piqued himself on his clear sight."

But leaving the Emperor Paul and his inheritance of mischievous idiosyncracy to his son for the present, let us turn to the early life of that young prince before he succeeded his brother on the throne of Russia.

The Grand Duke Nicholas was, as we have seen, little more than an infant at the time of his father's murder, being but five years of age. It is said that the Empress, hearing a noise, took her two youngest sons, Nicholas and Michael, from their beds, and fled with them for safety, as she thought, to the chamber where the bloody deed was being executed, the door of which was kept by the Count Pahlen, who, refusing her admittance, informed her that there was nothing for her to fear.

During his early life, Nicholas resided with his mother, by whose desire he received a liberal and enlightened education, being especially instructed in modern languages, music, and the art of war, towards all of which he showed a great predisposition. It is stated that very early, he took upon himself the dignified and haughty bearing of one who was to be the heir of the crown; and that neither with his companions, his tutors, nor even with his mother, did he relax from that calm, cold, and haughty demeanour which still characterises his intercourse with

all around him, even with the members of his own family, with the exception, at times, of a softer and more domestic bearing towards his Empress. Very different was he in this respect from his brother, the Emperor Alexander, who delighted in nothing more than approaching and being approached by his subjects with kindly familiarity.

On the general peace in 1814, the Grand Duke Nicholas started on a foreign tour, visiting the courts of Berlin, Vienna and others; St. James's among the number, though he remained but for a short time in England. He was absent from Russia about two years altogether. Shortly after his return, at the age of twenty-one, he married Maria. Charlotte, eldest daughter of the late, and sister of the present King of Prussia, as had previously been arranged between her father and the Emperor Alexander. From this circumstance it is supposed that even at that period, the Emperor Alexander proposed to make the Archduke Nicholas his successor, in preference to his elder brother Constantine.* The vio-

* That Alexander had resolved on this measure for many years previous to his own death is very certain. It was indeed in 1820, at which period Constantine's divorce from his first wife, and permission to take a left-handed wife, was granted by the Emperor, that this was finally determined on. Probably Alexander had had this on his mind from the time of

lent and unreasonable character of the elder brother, exhibited as it even then was on sundry occasions, probably caused this determination.

his meeting with the allied sovereigns in 1815, when it appears that he made arrangements for the alliance of Nicholas with the royal family of Prussia; for it is little likely that the Prussian monarch would have given his consent to the union of his daughter with one of a different faith, had it not been with the understanding that she would be the future Empress. Constantine's divorce and second union was therefore probably taken hold of by the reigning Czar, as a means to bring about the accomplishment of that which had been in his mind. Be that as it may, we cannot but admire the good faith of the Grand Duke Constantine, in keeping to his word so decidedly, though the opportunity of breaking it was offered him at his brother's death.

CHAP. II.

THE ACCESSION OF NICHOLAS TO THE THRONE.

IMMEDIATELY the intelligence of the death of the Emperor Alexander reached St. Petersburg, a sealed packet, which he had left in charge with the president of the council, endorsed, "Not to be opened till immediately after my death, before proceeding to any other act," was broken open and read. It contained the announcement that his brother Constantine having voluntarily renounced all pretensions to the empire, the Archduke Nicholas was to be his successor. Constantine's resignation was couched in the following terms: —

"Not recognising in myself either the disposition, talents, or energy necessary for the dignity of the sovereignty to which I am entitled by my birth, I beg V. M. I. to transfer this right to him who is entitled to it after me, and thus to insure for ever the stability of the empire. For myself, I shall add by this renunciation a new guarantee and a new strength to the engagement which I spontaneously and solemnly contracted on the occasion of the divorce of my first wife. All the circum-

stances of my present situation incline me more and more to this measure, thus proving to the empire and the world the sincerity of my sentiments.* "Deign, Sire, to receive with favour my prayer; deign to contribute to what our august mother wished to be adhered to; and sanction it by your Imperial mandate. In a sphere of private life I shall endeavour always to serve as an example to your faithful subjects, and to animate them with a love for our beloved country.

(Signed) "CONSTANTINE.

"To the Emperor, St. Petersburg, 14th (26th) January, 1822."

To this Alexander added his manifesto as follows:—

"The spontaneous act by which our brother, the Czarowitch and Grand Duke Constantine, renounces his right to the throne of All the Russias, is, and shall remain, fixed and unchangeable. The edict of renunciation, that the recognition of it may be ensured, shall be preserved at the great Cathedral of the Assumption, at Moscow, and at the three high governing offices of our empire—the Holy Synod, the Council of the Empire, and the Senate. In consequence of the dispositions, and conformably to the strict tenor of the act for the acces-

* Veritable affection for his second though left-handed wife, for whose sake he had made this sacrifice. Such is the power of real love even over a naturally violent and rough nature.

sion to the throne, our second brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, is acknowledged as our heir.

(Signed) "ALEXANDER."

The council, on reading these edicts, proceeded immediately to proclaim Nicholas as the Emperor. But he resolutely refused the dignity till his brother, the Czarowitch, had been communicated with; and stating that they complied only because he, their Emperor, commanded them, the council agreed at last to declare Constantine Emperor of All the Russias.

It is hard to look into the heart of man. Yes! not only hard, but impossible to any but Him who knoweth what is in man, and searcheth even his heart and reins. But certainly this seeming backwardness of Nicholas to accept the throne, appears irreconcilable with the acknowledged ambition of his character; unless, indeed, we are justified in saying that policy and dissimulation are even more predominant in it than ambition, or rather, that the two former are ever in abeyance, as means whereby the latter may be forwarded; and consequently that, well aware of his brother Constantine's naturally honourable, proud, reserved, retiring, and yet tenderly affectionate character, he felt that the giving him again the opportunity of renouncing the throne

would strengthen his own future power when he should be seated on it. Be that as it may, to use the words of our somewhat partial historian*, an "interregnum of three weeks ensued, during which the two brothers — a thing unheard of — were mutually declining and urging the empire on each other!"

On the 24th of December, 1825, twenty-eight days after the death of Alexander, Nicholas was at last proclaimed Emperor of All the Russias and Czar of Muscovy.

But he was scarcely seated, far less established, on the throne, when a storm which had been brewing for years, and had darkened to a portentous extent during the last weeks of Alexander's life,—the threat of which had, indeed, if we are to believe his physicians, hastened the end of that monarch,—burst over the head of Nicholas. We allude to the revolt of the army. To explain its cause we must briefly carry our readers back for some years.

As long ago as the period when the allied army of occupation was resident at Paris, were the seeds sown of the revolt which broke out in 1826,—seeds which first grew into a plant at the period we are writing of, but which we truly believe were then

* Alison.

merely scotched and not eradicated. These seeds are the seeds of the plant of liberty; a desire for a constitutional government and a hatred for that autocracy which puts a mortal man in the place of the Almighty.* Those Russian officers who had lived on terms of intimacy with English and German, to say nothing of French officers, during the three years that the allies occupied Paris, who had been familiar with the liberal press of their several countries, and had tasted of the sweets of personal and mental liberty, were not likely to return home without having imbibed, or without carrying with them, feelings and ideas little reconcilable with submission to one whose word is omnipotent, whose will is law. Wise as a serpent, though not harmless as a dove, was the old officer who, it is stated, said to the Emperor Alexander, "Rather than let these men

* Even in the time of Peter the Great, a wish for more liberty had been entertained by some of those who had travelled. One Mr. Jourqueneff settled down abroad, and said that he could not return till the following four Russian popular proverbs — still in vogue and repeated from mouth to mouth among the people — should cease to be true:—

1. *All is for God and the sovereign.*
2. A guilty being without guilt.
3. God is too high, and the Czar too distant.
4. Though contrary to your pleasure, be always ready to do what you are commanded.

re-enter Russia, I would, were I Emperor, throw them into the Baltic."

We have likened these liberal ideas to seeds; we might again liken them to leaven, so did they insinuate themselves and work here and there, unseen and quietly, till at last they broke out over the whole surface of Russian society. And that they will do this again, sooner or later, we have little hesitation in affirming. Secret societies, in imitation of those of Germany, were formed from the time of the return of the army; here was one and there was one, till at last a whole host of young Russia were continually growing themselves in liberality of sentiment, and spreading that feeling among their friends and acquaintances.

Gradually a regular conspiracy was formed, at the head of which was Prince Rouboutskoi — a nobleman of rank, talent, and energy, but little firmness of character — and the Prince Obolensky. In addition to these, and forming a second society, were a large number of officers of different regiments. Their design was to assassinate the Emperor, and their declared aim, to establish, by means of a general insurrection of all the armies within Russia and Poland, a constitutional monarchy. From spies, that terrible element of Russian autocracy, the

Emperor Alexander became acquainted with the names and designs of the conspirators. And it was the shock of receiving information as to how deep and wide-spread was the plot, that is said to have given a final shock to his constitution.

The unexpected death of Alexander, however, seems for a time to have disarranged the plans of the conspirators; but the succession of Nicholas instead of Constantine affording them what they thought a legitimate excuse for an insurrection, when that monarch was proclaimed, those of the conspirators who were then in St. Petersburg determined to refuse taking the oath of allegiance to him, and invited the soldiery to do the same and proclaim Constantine.*

* That many of the conspirators were inspired by a purely patriotic feeling, we may believe from the following anecdote of Alexander Bestoujif, one of the leaders of the revolt. He addressed the following prayer to the Almighty as he rose on the eventful day: "Oh God! if our enterprise is just, vouchsafe to us thy support; if not, thy will be done to us." It is difficult to know whether most to admire the courage and sincerity of the men who braved such dangers, as they conceived for their country's good, or to lament the blindness and infatuation which led them to strive to obtain for it institutions wholly unsuited for the people, and which could terminate in nothing but temporary anarchy and lasting military despotism.—*Schnitzler*, i. 221.

Intelligence of the revolt reached the new-made Emperor's ears, and he resolved to take the oath of allegiance from the regiments separately rather than receive it collectively, as usual, in the *Champ de Mars*. The household troops took it, as also many of the regiments of the guards, but when Nicholas passed on to the others he was met with cries of "Constantine for ever!" After repairing to the Imperial Chapel with the Empress, and invoking a blessing on his undertaking, Nicholas took his eldest son by the hand and stationed himself in front of his palace, where those regiments who were faithful to him were drawn up *vis-à-vis* to the revolters. Presenting his son to the soldiers, he said, "I trust him to you; it is for you to defend him." Nicholas knew the heart of man, and that the life of a child or a woman placed in such keeping will make the most irresolute determined. And so it was in this case. The soldiers took the beautiful boy, passed him on from rank to rank, and refused to give him up, even to his governor, till the Emperor came to reclaim him from their but half-civilised enthusiasm. The governor of St. Petersburg, the veteran Miloradovitch, rode forward to meet and reason with the rebels, but he was only met with cries of "hurrah Constantine!" while a pistol shot, discharged by

one of their leaders, wounded him mortally, and he fell from his horse. As a last resource, the Metropolitan Archbishop, with a large body of the clergy, bearing the sacred ensign, called on the rebels to submit, but again only "hurrah Constantine!" was to be heard. No peaceable efforts being availing, the Czar ordered the regiments which were faithful to him to fire. Still, however, the rebels stood firm, and continued to do so, till the imperial troops opened their ranks and a shower of grape from the cannon with which the palace was defended fell on the insurgents; the first shot being by the hand of the Grand Duke Michael himself, when the artillerymen held back from opening the murderous battery on their fellows. At the tenth round of this tremendous firing the rebels gave way; but they might almost as well have resisted even unto death, so terrible was the chastisement wherewith they were afterwards visited.

It was impossible, however, to punish every one who had engaged in the revolt. Seven hundred only were taken prisoners at first; of these about 130 suffered death, while the others were sent to Siberia.

A solemn thanksgiving was offered up by the Emperor and his family in the Church of the

Admiralty for their deliverance from this conspiracy; but not for six months after the great day of revolt, so great was the liability of its breaking forth afresh. In the meantime, the police had been at work, and every one who had had a part in, and many who only sympathised with it, had been either hanged or exiled to Siberia. And indeed, long after, here one and there one were suddenly and privately arrested, till all who were known or suspected to have been concerned in the conspiracy were privately made away with or sent to the mines.

Two months after the day of thanksgiving, the Emperor and Empress were crowned, with extraordinary pomp, at Moscow. The Grand Dukes Constantine and Michael were present at the ceremony, the former having arrived unexpectedly from Warsaw. He was received with much applause and was the first to render homage to the newly crowned Emperor.

The Emperor Nicholas's address to his people contained the following promise:—"To live solely for his beloved country; to reign as Alexander, of blessed memory, had reigned, in order to accomplish all that he had wished for the happiness of Russia; and, following his example, to obtain the blessing of God and the love of the people." How little he has lived

up to his path, either as to following the example of his brother by carrying out his wishes, or by studying the welfare of his people, the following history will show.

All authors agree in commending the energy and determination with which Nicholas acted on occasion of the revolt, the particulars of which we have shortly detailed. We cannot but own that we think their commendation somewhat exaggerated; for, indeed, few would have acted otherwise. To the personal bravery of the Grand Duke Michael rather, who exposed himself repeatedly during the few hours the conflict lasted, and to his resolution in opening the battery on the conspirators, the favourable result of it was entirely owing.

CHAP. III.

HIS FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE PERSIAN WAR.

FROM the moment of the accession of Nicholas I., we may look upon the head of the Russian Empire as resuming that game for the advancement of its dominions and its power which had been commenced by Peter the Great, and carried on by all his successors with more or less ability till the time of Alexander. That that monarch was free from the ambitious motives and the desire for personal and national aggrandisement felt both by his ancestors and his younger brother is evidenced by the words he uttered when he abstained from taking advantage of the Greek revolution to obtain that power and footing in Turkey which his successor has, ever since his accession, made the great object of his policy. "The time is past," said Alexander, in confidence to M. de Chateaubriand, "when there can be a French, Russian, Prussian, or Austrian policy; one only policy for the safety of all can be admitted in com-

mon by all people and all kings. It devolves on me to show myself the first to be convinced of the principles on which the Holy Alliance is founded. An opportunity presented itself on occasion of the insurrection of the Greeks. Nothing, certainly, could have been more for my interests, those of my people, and the opinion of my country, than a religious war against the Turks; but I discerned in the *troubles of the Peloponnesus the revolutionary mark. From that moment I kept aloof from them.* Nothing has been spared to turn me aside from the Alliance, but in vain. My self-love has been assailed, my prejudices appealed to, but in vain. What need have I of an extension of my empire? Providence has not put under my order eight hundred thousand soldiers to satisfy my ambition, but to protect religion, morality, and justice, and to establish the principles of order on which human society reposes." In pursuance of these principles, Count Nesselrode declared officially that "his" Imperial Majesty could not regard the enterprise of Ipsilanti, as anything but the effect of the exaltation which characterises the present epoch, as well as of the inexperience and levity of that young man, whose name is ordered to be erased from the Russian service." Orders were at the same time sent to the imperial forces on the Pruth

and in the Black Sea to observe the strictest neutrality.*

Nicholas was no sooner seated on the throne than he commenced that interference in the affairs of Turkey, from which his brother had so righteously abstained. Fearful that it would be so, immediately on his accession, the English had sent her most trustworthy subject, in person to negotiate with the newly-made Czar, and, if possible, to preserve peace and the balance of power as arranged at the Vienna conference, and adhered to by Alexander. But chivalrous rather than diplomatic, the Duke of Wellington took the word of honour of the Czar — the word of a *gentleman*, as it has been since and was then manifested! — that he would seek no advancement of power or territory for himself, and thereupon made a most unfortunate concession to him that Russia should have the power of arbitration between the Porte and her rebellious subjects, equally with, though separately from, Great Britain. And a political writer hints that the discovery of his mistake in permitting this concession to the power of Russia to be renewed in a treaty the following year, was the actual cause of the death of Mr. Canning. He, the soul of diplomacy, had made a diplomatic mistake, a false

* Alison's Europe.

move in the game of Europe, and he died of a broken heart.*

The Emperor Nicholas is not one to gain a move and not take advantage thereof. From the south of the Morea to the northernmost point where the Greeks were to be found, the whole Greek population had risen in arms against the Mussulman domination, and to quell the insurrection the Porte had sent an army into the outer-Danubian provinces against Ipsilanti, the Russian leader of the Grecian insurrection, — that same Ipsilanti whose name we have seen erased from the Russian service by order of Alexander, — as well as into the other parts of Greece. We cannot now enter into a discussion on the want of diplomatic foresight evinced by the several diplomatists of Europe, who had left to Russia the power of interference with Turkey as regards these same outer-Danubian provinces, so that Nicholas had it in his power to threaten Turkey with a war unless she should immediately withdraw the forces sent thither against the insurrectionists. This message from Russia reached the Porte just as the then Sultan had freed himself from the Janissaries and Janissary system, and was to enter on a new and more civilised manner of government, both

* See "Progress of Russia," by D. Urquhart.

as regarded civil and military matters. The new army was not yet disciplined nor hardly even raised. Turkey temporised, tried to fence off the question, and at last, finding she was not in a condition at that moment to resist, agreed to all the hard terms of Russia, though evidently, and as she afterwards acknowledged, with the full intention of breaking the ignominious treaty into which she was now forced, directly she should be in a condition so to do.

In the meantime, and while these negotiations were going on with Turkey, Russia found herself at war on another frontier of her dominions. Persia had long felt galled and grieved by the former encroachments of Russia on her territories in the neighbourhood of the Caspian Sea; and having raised and disciplined what the Shah of Persia, Fet-Ali Shah, and his son, the Prince Abbas Mirza, thought was an invincible army, resolved to regain a portion at least of its old possessions. But it was soon proved that the effeminate inhabitants of Persia were no match for the hardy and well-disciplined forces of Russia,—forces which go where they are bid and fight as they are bid, disciplined because they are machines, and brave because to fly is more dangerous than to advance. Even in the first campaign, in 1826, under General Yermaloff, the Persians

were worsted at all points, losing the battle of Elizabethpool, and being compelled to retreat across the Araxes, and evacuate the provinces they had occupied. No durable advantages, however, were the result of these operations. In 1827, therefore, Prince Paskievitch was appointed generalissimo of the army of the Caucasus, and, with an army of nearly 80,000 men and 86 guns, he invaded Persia.

The strong fortress of Erivan, the key of northern Persia, was the first object of the Russians, and while General Benkendorf moved towards it, Paskievitch himself besieged the fort of Abbasabad. Prince Abbas Mirza advanced at the head of 40,000 men to relieve it, but Paskievitch, leaving only a few battalions and guns to watch the fortress, passed the Araxes by a ford and encountered the enemy at Djevan Boulak. General Paskievitch then first adopted a system of tactics which he has since repeatedly used with success. He aimed all his power at the centre of the enemy's army, and, breaking into that, separated the wings, and thus effected a complete victory. The Persians lost 5,000 men, and nearly their whole artillery; and the Prince himself only escaped being made prisoner by the fleetness of his horse. Abbasabad surrendered within a fortnight.

It is difficult, from the fact that Russian accounts are scarcely reliable even now, far less were they so twenty years since, to follow the whole plan of the Persian campaign. Both armies seem to have become broken up into detachments. The next regular engagement recorded was between Prince Abbas Mirza and General Krazinsky, the latter of whom tried to raise the siege of Elschmiadzine, which the Prince was besieging. After a bloody battle the Russians were successful, the two parties losing respectively 2000 and 1200 men, and the Russian general being dangerously wounded. Paskievitch hastened up to support his lieutenant, besieged and took Sardarabad and then laid siege in person to Erivan; while Abbas Mirza retired again behind the Araxes. The garrison made a brave resistance; but the inhabitants, struck with a panic, insisted on capitulation, and the garrison were made prisoners of war. Prince Eristoff with a detachment took Ourdabad, on which the whole Russian army marched on towards Tauris. This town, containing the chief magazines of war, was shamefully deserted by its garrison, who surrendered without a blow. And Abbas Mirza, finding that there was now no hope of making head against the Russians, was compelled to make peace on most humiliating terms; conceding

to the Russians the whole of their conquests, including the fortress and province of Erivan, the very key to the Empire of Persia.

Prince Paskievitch concluded his campaign with an address to his soldiers, in imitation of the bulletins of Napoleon — "Brave comrades! you have conquered in this campaign two provinces, taken 8 standards, 50 guns, 2 sirdars, 20 khans, 6000 prisoners in arms, 10,000 who had cast them away, and great stores of provision: such are your trophies!"

The Czar rewarded Paskievitch for his services in the Persian war with the title of Count Erivan, and the gift of a million of roubles.

CHAP. IV.

THE STATE, OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE, OF RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

We now come to that portion of the history of Nicholas which will most interest our readers at the present moment, namely, the war of 1828 and 1829, between Russia and Turkey. But before entering on the actual campaigns themselves, it behoves us to look a little into the physical and moral features of the two countries, both generally and politically. Russia, then, be it remembered by our readers, is a large over-grown country, at once powerful and weak by reason of its vast extent. There is no anomaly in this description, for such is often the case with human nature, and even animal nature, when overgrown. A large, strong, powerfully built man has not the most stamina to endure fatigue or stand up against prolonged trial, whether of exercise or sickness. In like manner, the finest, handsomest, and strongest horse will very often be beat in a prolonged contest by a small, compact, and yet active

pony. So with Russia. It is at once, as we have said, strong and weak by reason of its extent. It is strong to resist, weak to invade; strong in its defensive, weak in its offensive, powers. So, again, in its resources. Its revenues — the very nerves of war — are not to be compared with those of other nations, to equip and re-equip, to form rapidly and renew in case of losses; but, inasmuch as human beings are nought in a land of serfs, its powers of replenishing the human material would be available long after it had been impossible to meet a similar want in other countries. Levies can be enforced in Russia as long as a man exists in the country; such could not be the case either in England or France. In the latter country even the conscription of the great Napoleon failed after a while.

How then, our readers will feel inclined to ask, — how then, has it come to pass that if Russia is mainly calculated to act on the defensive and not on the offensive, she has within the last half-century so extended her borders, lengthened her cords and strengthened her stakes, stretched forward her frontiers to the north and west and south, and, in short, in every direction where she is not hemmed in by that uncompressible element, the sea? Finland, Poland, the territories between the Dnieper and the

Pruth in Europe; the Crimea, the Caucasus, Georgia, and a portion of Armenia, formerly Persian provinces in Asia, are all now allowed to appertain to Russia, even though in the latter countries some hardy mountain tribes may still claim more or less of personal freedom; while the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea have been acknowledged and sealed by treaty as Russian lakes, impervious to the entry of the navies of other countries? Far more, we answer to these queries, by diplomacy than by arms. Far more by the mistakes and the indolence of other nations, and the power of perseverance or rather persistency in herself, taking here a little and there a little, and advancing step by step, than by mere force of arms. Far more by civil than by military strategy; though the latter has not been neglected, but has been made available to aid the former. So much, then, for Russia, whose watchword is "Advance!"—advance by all means, whether lawful or unlawful, whether by diplomacy or by arms.

Let us now turn to Turkey, and consider the manner in which she has been able to meet the advancing steps of Russia generally, and in particular in 1828-29. It is usually the custom to speak of the Turkish empire as on the eve of a dissolution, and of its power as gradually on the decline. After

a careful perusal of all available sources of information, this certainly appears not to be the case. Even our great modern European historian*, while stating that such is the case in broad terms, yet in his details, or rather by the evidence he brings forward, contradicts and disproves his own assertions. The Turkish empire, like the Russian, has elements both of strength and weakness, though these elements are entirely dissimilar from those of her rival. The one great source of weakness in Turkey is that the governing, though numerically weaker power, holds a false religion, and with that religion for many years, did hold observances and customs totally at variance with the advance of civilisation. These customs have, however, of late years been much modified and are gradually modifying. It only remains to bring the Turks to the acknowledgment that Jesus, our Head and Lawgiver, was both Prophet and Priest and Saviour to them as to us, and that their Mahomet assumed that which was not due to him,—in short, to make the Turkish a Christian dynasty, which appears very far from hopeless,—and the great problem of European diplomacy will be solved. One half of the work was effected when, at the destruction of the old system, the new and

* Alison.

more enlightened and civilised system was entered on. It was just at this period, and when the new modes both of government and warfare were yet but in their infancy, that the Russian war of 1828-29 was entered on. Yet, in spite of the disadvantage of their armies being formed of but newly-raised levies, and not only half-disciplined troops, but troops clothed and armed in a manner entirely at variance with their former habits and prejudices, and perhaps, too, with arms, clothes, and discipline rather strangely compounded from the habits of the various Christian nations, whose officers, guns, and appointments were put into requisition by the Sultan,—in spite, we say, of all this; and in spite of treachery in their own camp, caused by the lust of gold and a skilful use of the late internal causes of discontent by the Russians; in spite of the fact that their navy had been annihilated by the joint treachery of Christian nations — that "*crime politique*" of Europe — yet the Turkish army held their own for two long and well-contested campaigns; and had not English and French diplomatists blindly played into the hands of Russian craftiness, the Russian army would probably have fared, in their homeward retreat from Adrianople at the end of these campaigns, no better than did that of the French from Moscow.

Great valour, great skill in arms, a power of concentrating their forces on given points, and immense advantages of situation, are the strong points in the moral side of the Turkish question.

But the physical advantages on the side of Turkey, both in Europe and Asia, in any war with Russia, are greater still. Let us look for a moment at the relative positions of the two empires. Russia stretches its "long length" from north to south; and ere an army, raised and disciplined at the head or heart of the Empire (St. Petersburg or Moscow respectively), can reach even the borders of the enemy's country, long months must have been employed in its march. Turkey, on the contrary, lies compact together, and its two divisions in Europe and Asia have the advantage of a water highway. Again, the borders both of Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia, are defended from the attacks of Russia by natural barriers. In Europe by the rich and fertile, though fever-stricken plains of Moldavia and Wallachia, backed by the broad and sluggish river Danube, running almost level with the land on its northern shores; but defended by a steep and often rugged bank on the Turkish side. On this stream,—which takes a curve northwards both to the east and west, thereby enabling the Turks to take

an invading army in flank, either by harassing all his movements, as Omar Pasha has done in the present war, on his right wing, while with still greater wisdom, he allowed the left the fancied advantage of crossing the Danube, thus exposing it to the marshes, marsh fevers, and dysenteries of the Dobrudschâ,—stands a line of fortified towns, Widdin, Nicopolis, Rustchuk, Turtukai, and Silistria, commanding respectively on the opposite shores, by reason of the elevation we have mentioned, Khalafât, Turna, Giurgevo, Oltenitza, and Kalarasche. In 1828 the towns on both sides appertained to Turkey, and were only occupied by the Russians after vigorous fighting; in 1853 such was no longer the case as regards the northern towns, the Turks having, by the Treaty of Adrianople, agreed not to retain any military position north of the Danube. Stretching east and west behind the line of the Danube lies the Balkan range, across which are only three roads accessible to the movements of an army. Towards the east the Balkan throws out a spur northwards half way to Silistria on the Danube; and at the point of this spur, embedded amid rugged rocks and tangled brushwood, lies the fortified camp of Schumla, which has been, both in 1828–29, and 1853-54, the stronghold and pivot of the Turkish army-movements, — a spot

stronger, it is said, than the celebrated fortifications of Torres Vedra. Alison says: —

"This celebrated stronghold has borne so important a part in all the last wars between the Turks and Russians, that a description of it is indispensable to the understanding of the last and most important of them. It is a considerable town, containing thirty thousand inhabitants, lying upon the northern declivity of the Balkan, and, seen from the plains of Bulgaria, as you approach it from the northward, resembles a triangular sheet spread upon the mountains, as Algiers does, when seen from the blue waters of the Mediterranean. It is not regularly fortified like the fortresses in Flanders, but still it is very strong, and cannot be reduced but by a very large army. A promontory of the Balkan, in the form of a horse-shoe, surrounds its sides and rear, which is covered with thick and thorny brushwood, extremely difficult of passage, and affording an admirable shelter to the skilled Turkish marksmen. The town itself is surrounded by a deep ditch and high wall, flanked by the square towers for musketeers, which are peculiar to the Turkish fortresses. It forms the centre of the intrenched camp, which shuts it in on every side. Its great extent, the steep declivities, the wooded heights, and rocky precipices which surround it, render it extremely strong; and the nature of the adjoining hills, impassable for artillery, secure it from the dangers of bombardment. A stream of pure and perennial water flows through its centre, amply sufficient for a garrison of any amount. All the roads from the north over the Balkan, whether from Rouds-

chuck, Silistria, or Ismael, intersect each other in this fortress, which thus becomes a strategetical point of the very highest importance; and garrisoned by thirty thousand janizaries, it is equally impossible to pass, and difficult to reduce."

The inaccessibility of the Balkan mountains does not so much consist in their height as in their ruggedness; and in the fact that they are intersected by deep gullies formed by the mountain torrents, and covered with a dense brushwood.

To the south of the Balkan lies a level plain to the very walls of Constantinople. But even in 1828-29, the defences of that town were not to be despised; and the first work of the allied armies in 1854, was to form a line of fortifications to guard it against an advancing army if it should, as in 1829, succeed in passing the Balkan.

Between Turkey in Asia, or Anatolia and the Russian dominions, lies the mountainous region of the Caucasus, inhabited by the wild and untameable tribes of Circassia, and traversed only by three great military roads belonging to Russia, and fortified by strong posts, situated at short and convenient distances along their whole length.* It

* "Few passes accessible to troops or wheel-carriages traverse this terrific barrier. The principal one, through which

so happened that, both in 1828 and in 1853, Russia had a large and well disciplined army, better disciplined and more inured to war certainly than that on its western frontier, ready to fall on the Turks. In 1828, the war between Russia and Persia was but just concluded; and from that period up to the present, war has never ceased in the Caucasus. However profoundly at peace might be Russia on her other frontiers, yet the border provinces of Georgia and Circassia have, from year to year, proved the burying-place of thousands of

the great military road to Georgia passes, is that of Vladi-Caucase, or Dariel, which is defended by fortified block-houses at all the stations, and which, at its highest point of elevation at the mountain of the Holy Cross, is 1,329 toises, or 7,974 feet above the level of the sea; being about the height of the Great St. Bernard in Switzerland. The pass in approaching that summit, forms the *Pilæ Caucassiæ* of the ancients, and is called by the Persians 'The Iron Gate.' The next in point of importance, and which forms the great Russian line of communication to the eastern parts of Georgia, is that which goes by the shore of the Caspian, through the famous *Gates of Derbend.* This celebrated pass, the *Pilæ Albaniæ* of the ancients, is formed by the meeting of a perpendicular precipice, 1,400 feet in elevation, the last face of the Caucasus, and the waves of the Caspian. It is called now the 'Gates of Derbend,' which signifies narrow passage. The Turks call it Demir-Kapi, or the 'Gates of Iron.' It is strongly fortified, and forms the western end of this great natural barrier."—*Alison.*

Russian troops, ordered there by the inexorable decrees of the Autocrat, sometimes as a personal chastisement when the legions of his government found not sufficient victims; or, if criminals enough could not be found, still sent, because the ranks of the Caucasian army must be filled up.

But more than nature, more than military skill, the chief defence the Turks will have ever to depend on against an invading army in Europe, is the nature of the climate. The luxuriant herbage, the luscious fruits, caused by and aggravating the effects to those unused to them of the hot sun and heavy night dews, more chilling than the heaviest rains, cut off far more than the sword of war. In 1828-29, out of 200,000 Russians who entered the provinces at various times, not 13,000 were in an effective state at the time the treaty of Adrianople was signed, and not a tenth ever returned to Russia.* In 1853, ere

* "When the Russians invaded Turkey in 1828, they lost 50,000 men by sickness alone, by want of the necessaries of life, and neglect in the commissariat department: 50,000 Russians died on the plains of Turkey, not one man of whom was killed in battle, for their advance was not resisted by the Turks. In the next year (1829) the Russians lost 60,000 men between the Pruth and the city of Adrianople. Some of these, however, were legitimately slain in battle. When they arrived at Adrianople the troops were in so wretched a condition from

the 150,000 men of the invading army has been six months in occupation of the provinces, and but two engaged in warfare, above 35,000 were dead, the greater part from fever. And we need not to remind our readers, of the still deadly nature of the soil, the air, or the vegetation,—we know not which, probably all combined,—as our reports lately have teemed with accounts of the loss of the allied armies,

sickness and want of food, that not 7000 were able to bear arms. How many thousands of horses and mules perished in these two years is not known. The Turkish Government was totally ignorant of this deplorable state of affairs at Adrianople till some time afterwards, when the intelligence came too late. If the Turks had known what was going on, not one single Russian would again have seen his native land; even as it was, out of 120,000 men, not 6000 ever recrossed the Russian frontier alive. Since the days of Cain, the first murderer, among all nations, and among all religions, he who kills his fellow creatures without just cause is looked upon with horror and disgust, and is pursued by the avenging curse of God and man. What then shall be thought of that individual, who, without reason, without the slightest show of justice, right, or justifiable pretence, from his own caprice, to satisfy his own feelings and lust of pride and arrogance, destroys for his amusement, in two years, more than 100,000 of his fellow creatures? Shall not their blood cry out for vengeance? Had not each of these men a soul, immortal as their butchers? Had not many of them, many thousands of them perhaps, more faith, more trust in God, higher talents, than their destroyer? Better had it been for that man had he never been born!'— *Curzon's Armenia.*

by cholera, dysentery, and fevers, especially in that portion of the French army which marched towards the Dobrudscha. That isolated district, surrounded on two sides by the Danube — indeed a portion of it is almost a delta formed by the Danube,— is divided into a reeking marsh, where the subsoil is granite, and an arid plain, where it is a porous limestone. Through the first, no amount of water, whether from the stream itself or the rain of heaven, can escape; through the latter every drop of moisture pours as through a filter. The consequence is, a rank and unwholesome vegetation in the one portion, and in the other an almost desolate wilderness; and yet this is the country that the Russian generals, both, in 1828-29, and 1853-54*, have occupied in utter

* The following letter from the Russian camp gives an account of the condition of the army in the Dobrudscha: — "June 10. 1854.—All the hospitals and infirmaries on the right bank of the river are over-filled, and ague, catarrhal affections, rheumatism, dysentery, scurvy, 'hospital mortification,' rage so terribly that it is a question whether more of our brave fellows fall victims to the sword or to disease. From Tultscha up to Hirsova, from Basardschik up to Chernavoda, there is not a single station which is not crowded with sick and wounded, waiting to be transported across the river, or to their last homes. The want of drinkable water and the piercingly cold nights produce such a pernicious effect, that all the care of our commissariat, which is this time well arranged, is of no avail. The

disregard to the life and health of their troops. But then the men, the common soldiers themselves, are

long fasts which took place just before the army crossed the river had exhausted the soldiers, who had already been weakened by forced marches, miserable winter-quarters, and overfilled stations. Still these troops display the most remarkable courage, and it is not the fault of the common soldiers if Rassova and Silistria have until now been bombarded and stormed in vain. The wounds of the men, almost all dangerous, are inflicted by the musket or the sword, and on the front of the body. Most of the men lost in the various expeditions are drowned, as we are in great want of good vessels and men to man them. How many brave fellows have found their death in the river or in the bogs during our nocturnal enterprises! Between Bucharest, Budeschti, Slabosics, Kikinez, Odaja, and Brailow—Brailow and Vezirkoi, Martinetschti, Golatschau — and Brailow and Fokschani — there are twenty-three larger or smaller hospitals. Along the line from Fokschani to Jassy the sick, wounded, and those men who for the moment are incapable of service, are transported. The consignation of provisions to the right bank of the river (to the Dobrudscha) still takes place from Brailow. In consequence of the retreat of the troops from the Schyl and the Aluta, the prices of provisions are three times as high as they were formerly, and some articles, such as fowls and eggs, are not to be had at all. In Brailow and Galatz, which are the great depôts, there are, however, vast stores of salted meat of all kinds, bread, flour, cheese, and salt-fish. By the foreign papers, which we now and then get with parts cut out, we often learn things which are occurring in our immediate neighbourhood. As I wrote to you in December last, the passage of the river at Silistria and Rustchuk will be forced, cost what it may. The great masses of troops sent to Klarasch,

nought in the eyes of the Autocrat or the ministers of his will.

Extraordinary to narrate, after all the experience of the inevitable consequences of occupying the Dobrudscha which the Russian authorities have had, it is rumoured that again in September 1854, Russian troops have crossed the river, and are occupying it in considerable force.

Oltenitza, and Giurgevo, and the uninterrupted reinforcements going from Reni and Fokschani, leave no doubt as to the resolve to go forwards; but the precautionary measures noticed in my last letter, forwarded about three weeks since, prove that the line of retreat has been cared for. Since the 'Job's news' from the Black Sea has reached us, we feel ourselves more and more isolated, and it is evident that the whole population is more averse to us since the retreat from Little Wallachia and our fruitless attempts on Silistria have become known, and rumours of the mighty succour which the enemy is about to receive have been in circulation. Finally, the 'pitched battles' of which your papers speak, as having been fought in the Dobrudscha and at Trajan's Wall, were nothing but most sanguinary skirmishes. Thousands fell in the attacks on the fortified places and in the continual landings."— *Examiner.*

CHAP. V.

THE TURKO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1828-29, CARRIED ON IN ASIA.

WE now return to the history proper of Russia and its acts, having merely digressed for the purpose of showing our readers its strength for warfare, and the power and means of defence of the enemy with whom it was now to be engaged.

Our readers will remember that in 1826 the Turks had submitted to a humiliating treaty (styled the convocation of Akkerman), whereby many privileges were conceded to Russia, because they were at that time not only engaged in a fierce contest with the revolutionary Greeks, but were actually in a transition state from the old-fashioned mode of government and warfare to one more in accordance with the advance of civilisation and science; though, as we also stated, Turkey confessedly made this treaty with the intention of breaking her bonds as opportunity should offer. That the first infringement of it was, however, on the part of the Russians, is

evidenced by the battle of Navarino, in which the fleet of Russia bore a part. The Turkish government, however, was not to be intimidated by even such a calamity as the total destruction of its navy. The diplomatic ministers of the allies received, but three weeks after the battle, this reply from the Sultan to their reiterated demands for peace between Turkey and Greece: — "My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will as regards them even to the day of last judgment."

Russia evidently had made up her mind for war, long before it was actually declared. In September 1826, the year before the battle of Navarino, a levy throughout Russia of two out of every 500 males, in which even the Jews were for the first time included, was made; and immediately after that battle Nicholas sent his aide-de-camp, the Count Capo d'Istria, to take the presidency of the Greek Republic. That he was not allowed to retain it by the allies, who, fearful of the power of Russia, finally placed on the throne of Greece an independent German Prince, does not at all acquit Nicholas of the fact that he aided the insurrection against his own express treaty, as well as against the law of nations.

At the commencement of 1828 Russia had made preparations on all sides, both naval and military, for a furious attack on Turkey.

General Paskievitch was, as we left him in Chapter III., on the borders of the Turkish dominions in Asia, with a large and victorious army; 100,000 men were ready to cross the Pruth; and every harbour in the Black Sea was crowded with vessels prepared to convey magazines of war to the support of the Russian forces.

For a moment Persia thought that there was yet a chance for her if she resumed the war, and was supported by Turkey. She accordingly refused to ratify the conditions of peace made in the autumn of 1827. But Paskievitch, with a large and well-disciplined army, was ready for movement upon the Araxes; and he quickly compelled the Persians to sue for peace, even on more humiliating terms than before; and the Russian forces were left on the borders of Asiatic Turkey, ready to take the initiative against that power, and led by an accomplished and victorious general. On the other hand, the Turkish Seraskier, or governor of that portion of Asia, was far from remarkable for his military abilities, and the frontier towns of Turkey were all undefensible as regards military operations. In addition to this, the

Seraskier, unaware of the coming war, had allowed magazines of provisions to pass into Georgia for the use of the Russian army; thus actually feeding his enemies with his own supplies.

The war on the Asiatic side of Turkey began by the taking of Anapa by the Russian fleet of twenty-six sail, under Admiral Greig, carrying a body of 6,000 soldiers, commanded by Colonel Petrowski. After a vigorous resistance it was forced to capitulate.

At very nearly the same time, General Paskievitch entered the Turkish dominions, and laid siege to Kars. His own force consisted of about 30,000 men, while about 16,000 men were in reserve on his right and left flanks, guarding the two other passes from Georgia into Asiatic Turkey. After a protracted siege, and notwithstanding great acts of valour on the part of the Turks, Kars fell into the hands of Russia, and was followed by the fortresses of Akhalkahali and Herwitz, and the Russians laid siege to Akhaltsikh. This important town and stronghold was commanded by a position in the mountains, and when the Russians advanced, this position was occupied by a portion of the Seraskier's army. With great want of military ability, the Seraskier, instead of concentrating his forces on this

important spot, had divided them into four bodies, situated on four different sides of the town. The Russian general immediately perceiving this mistake, and the advantage that might be taken of it, after first trying a night attack, in which he failed, made a feint on another body, and then threw his whole strength against the strong point and took it. The Turkish army was obliged to retreat, the defences of the town were cannonaded; and, after an actual hand-to-hand fight in the streets of Akhaltsikh, when the Russians followed the barbarous system of throwing hand-grenades down the chimneys of private houses, the Turks were obliged to capitulate, though not till their magazines of gunpowder had blown up.

This ended the Russo-Turkish Asiatic campaign of 1828, leaving the Russians possessed, indeed, of three important and two smaller fortresses, and a base on which to carry on future operations; but, on the other hand, plainly proving the desperate valour of the Turks that no further advantage had been gained against them, taken as they had been unawares, inefficiently commanded, and both their army and the defenders of their fortresses merely the old-fashioned militia of the country, and not by any means regular forces, either of the old or new systems.

Let us turn to the Russo-Turkish European campaign, in which the contest, as to numbers, was still less equal, while the result was far more favourable to the Mussulmans.

CHAP. VI.

THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN OF 1828, BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

It was not till May, 1828, that the Russian force, 120,000 strong, with upwards of 300 guns, entered the Danubian provinces under the command of Count Wittgenstein, sustained by another army of at least an equal amount, if not larger, under the experienced General Diebitch, which occupied Bessarabia and the banks of the Pruth. To oppose this overwhelming number the whole Turkish force did not reach 80,000 men even nominally, and of these little more than 40,000 were available for the defence of the Danube and the Balkan. But they were animated by a deep-seated hatred of the Russians, and a religious enthusiasm increased by the martial conduct of their Sultan, who encouraged them as they departed from the capital by these spirit-stirring words: "Behave bravely — I shall speedily follow." The rest of the Turkish forces were retained in the neighbourhood of Constanti-

nople, evidently with the expectation that the Russians, now completely in command of the sea, might land an army in the neighbourhood of that metropolis.

Meantime, the 40,000 Turkish forces were necessarily to act on the defensive, and within the numerous strongholds that commanded the two lines of defence already described in our pages. Brailow, Hirsova, Silistria, Rustchuk, Rassova, and Widdin, with several smaller towns and fortresses on the line of the Danube, with Varna, Schumla, Tirnova, and Pravadi, on the Balkan range, must all be either taken, or held in check by the Russians, before an invading force could march into the plains of Adrianople for the conquest of the capital.

The Russian forces were divided at first into two separate corps, the one to march on Widdin and the western line of defence; the other, hereafter to be again subdivided, to proceed due south on the eastern shores of Turkey against Brailow, Silistria, Schumla, Varna, &c. The town of Galatz, the covering harbour of the Danube, was taken by the Russians after but a slight resistance on the part of the Turks. Directly this was effected the Grand Duke Michael, at the head of one of these subdivisions, pushed on to besiege Brailow or Brahilov, with orders to pass

on to Schumla and Silistria; while the other body invested Isaktchi with the intention of advancing through the Dobrudscha to Varna. This latter force would be necessarily dependent upon supplies received from the sea for its subsistence. The town of Isaktchi was the first to fall, exposed as it was, not only to a vigorous attack from a large land force, but to a fire of grape from a number of gunboats which had been despatched up the Danube from the Russian fleet; but it did not do so till after it had made a brave and vigorous resistance.

Kustendji, at the point where Trajan's wall touches the sea, attacked both by sea and land, shortly after entered into a capitulation, and its small garrison marched out with the honours of war to Pravadi. In the meantime Brailow held out from the 11th of May, when it was first invested, until the 18th of June, on which day, after great feats of valour on the part of the besieged, and many vigorous and successful sallies — successful, at least, as far as regards the fall of many of their assailants — the place being no longer tenable, the governor capitulated, and the garrison, with their arms and field pieces, marched out with all the honours of war to Silistria. On the fall of Brailow, Hirsova, Matchin, Fuldscha and Kustendji (as we have seen), all capi-

tulated simultaneously; the three first, not without giving great cause for suspicion that other influences than the mere force of arms were brought to bear on the several commandants.

Meantime, a Turkish army under the command of the Seraskier (or provincial commandant), Hussein Pasha, had assembled at Bazarjik, and the first engagement, in the open field, between the contending forces took place there on July 8th. In this battle the Turks were completely successful, by reason of the superiority of their cavalry over that of their foes. The Russians lost 1200 men in this affair; and the Turks acquired a confidence in the new discipline of their forces and the change in their arms, which was of as much advantage to them as a far more decisive victory. The Emperor Nicholas was himself present at this engagement.

But, though successful, the Turkish forces were far too weak to hold their ground against the increasing numbers poured in of the Russians. After waiting a week for reinforcements, Nicholas proceeded onward to Jenibazar, in the direction of Schumla. And there, on July 15th, another engagement took place, equally successful on the part of the Turks, with the loss of above 600 men by the Russians. Again the Russians brought forward

more reinforcements, and the two divisions of the army, which had separated while prosecuting the sieges we have mentioned, were reunited under General Diebitch, and pushed on to Schumla. On July 20th, they encountered 10,000 magnificent Ottoman horsemen, who handled them very roughly, but who, being unable to withstand the Russian park of artillery, 100 guns strong, and their indomitable infantry, at last withdrew into Schumla, and the Russian army sat down before it, determined to take it either by force of arms or by blockade. The former was soon found to be hopeless. Schumla is a strongly fortified entrenched camp, though not at all like Silistria, and the Turkish army to the number of 40,000 men, regulars and irregulars, were entrenched about it. Leaving, therefore, an equal number of Russian troops to hold the Turks in check, the Emperor advanced to lay siege to Varna, the possession of which, with the consequent power of supplying provisions by sea, could alone enable his army to march onwards to Constantinople. Another large detachment of the Russians simultaneously laid siege to Silistria. But to carry on all these offensive operations against a brave and determined foe, more men were requisite, and to bring more men more money also must be commanded. Nicholas was

obliged to contract a loan of 1,800,000*l.* at Amsterdam; and 120,000 fresh men were marched into the provinces, and the door of the Euxine was blockaded by sea, so that no supplies could enter Constantinople by the usual route.

Still the Turks did not lose heart; a great council was assembled, the Grand Vizier marched with a large body of recruits into the war districts, the magnetic horsetails were displayed, and less than ever were the Turks inclined to submit to their imperious and Imperial foe. Meantime the plague, fevers, and other sicknesses occasioned by the hot suns, the steaming marshes of the Dobrudscha, the cold heavy night-dews, with a deficiency of forage and provisions, rendered the loss of the Russians greater than could be remedied by any number of reinforcements which could be brought up. Added to this was a nocturnal surprise from the entrenched camp at Schumla, in resisting which large numbers of the Russians fell.

On August 26th, the Turks made another attack on the advanced guard of the Russians at Esti-Stamboul, and a third on Prince Eugene's corps at Ichangalich, by which more than 1500 men, and General Wrede, were killed, and eight guns lost, which greatly crippled the Russian forces. Supplies

were thrown into Schumla, and General Wittgenstein, the Russian commandant, withdrew his troops to the north of the fortress; thus virtually raising the siege, and remaining thenceforth inactive as an army of observation.

Whilst the Russian affairs were thus proceeding with very varying success, in the neighbourhood of Schumla, the division under Prince Menschikoff, supported by Admiral Greig at sea with eight sail of the line, and as many frigates, was vigorously prosecuting the siege of Varna, the garrison of which was as vigorously resisting. Prince Menschikoff was dangerously wounded in an attack of the place, which was bravely repulsed, and Count Woronzow succeeded to the command. The Russian redoubts and works were repeatedly stormed and taken by the Turks, who as resolutely stood their ground when they in their turn were attacked. After bringing up reinforcement upon reinforcement, both by land and sea, it became very evident that Varna could not be taken by force of arms. But gold, if not stronger, is more effectual than iron, and a well-filled purse than cannon-balls or shells. Notwithstanding two battles lost by the Russians to Omer Vrione, who was advancing to the relief of the place, Jussuf Pasha, *the second in command,* surrendered Varna

unconditionally to the enemy, and received for his personal reward a safe conduct to Odessa; and, finally, a large estate was bestowed upon him by the Emperor Nicholas in the Crimea. The chief governor, the Capitan Pasha, indignant at these proceedings, shut himself up with 300 brave men in the citadel, which he held till Nicholas agreed to a capitulation, and allowed him to march out with the honours of war, and join the Turkish forces at Kamtjik. This took place on the 12th of October.

The Russians, encouraged by the fall of Varna, were now in hopes of taking Silistria before the campaign was over. A severe action took place under its walls on October 11th, in which the Russians claimed the victory; but as they immediately after commenced a precipitate retreat, the impartial historian must judge more by the succeeding events, than by the claims of the Imperialists. On the 15th of October the three divisions of the eastern corps of the Russian army began their retreat simultaneously from the neighbourhood of Silistria, Schumla, and Varna, leaving, however, a sufficient force to hold the latter town, which, with Brailow, were the only really valuable acquisitions of the campaign. For some days the Turks were not aware of the retreat of the enemies' forces. But

directly they were informed of it, they followed them up closely, day by day, gaining many advantages, harassing them in their retreat, killing stragglers, cutting off supplies, and occasionally attacking large corps with great success. Sir A. Alison thus speaks of this retreat: —

"As the weather every day became worse, the retrograde movement became eminently disastrous. Eye-witnesses of both compared it to the Moscow retreat. The Turkish roads, bad at all times, had been rendered all but impassable by the ceaseless passage of artillery and carriages over them during the summer, and the heavy rains of autumn. Caissons and baggage were abandoned at every step; the stragglers nearly all fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they were instantly massacred; and Wittgenstein experienced in his turn the disasters which he had inflicted on Napoleon's army, during the retreat from Witepsk to the Beresina, in 1812. At length, after having undergone innumerable hardships, and sustained a very severe loss, his wearied columns reached the Danube, which they immediately crossed, and spread themselves in winter quarters over Wallachia. The Turks made preparations for an attack upon Varna in the beginning of December, and approached the fortress in considerable strength; but they found the Russians too strongly posted to hazard the attempt. This ended in Europe the campaign of 1828, in which the Russians, with the exception of the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were aban-

doned without resistance, and the reduction of Brahilov and Varna, had made no sensible progress."*

Both parties, after it was over, found themselves on the banks of the Danube, both mutually exhausted by their great efforts. The Russians, by their own admission, had lost more than half the troops engaged; for out of 258,000, which during the campaign had crossed the Pruth, only 80,000 remained in November in the fortresses they had subdued, and in winter quarters.

Having followed the fortunes of the eastern division of the Russian army we must now turn our attention to that portion of it which marched westward, under General Geismar, towards Widdin. Very little was done by this corps till the middle of August, the Seraskier of Widdin having contented himself with holding them in check at Crajova till his own forces were increased by reinforcements, when he suddenly advanced on the Russian army, and forced it to retire rapidly to Slatina, abandoning all their magazines and baggage. But the Russians also having received reinforcements from beyond the Pruth, General Geismar again advanced. A battle ensued, in which the Russians were worsted on the first day; but, following it up by a night attack, the

* Alison's Europe.

Turks were surprised and fled to Widdin, abandoning in their haste even the opposite fortress of Kalafat, which was taken possession of by the Russians. This took place on October 25th; and the Russians were left masters of this portion of Wallachia. During the winter Nicopolis was taken, and this division of the Russian forces went into winter quarters at Kalafat and Nicopolis.

We cannot sum up the account of the Russo-Turkish campaign in 1828 better than by quoting the Postscript to an article on the state of Russia, in the "Quarterly Review" for January, 1829.

"We are just in time to state the disastrous *finale*, which we have received from an authentic source, of the rash and precipitous invasion of the Turkish territory by Russia—that alarming invasion, which, in the opinion of Lieut.-Col. Evans, demanded an immediate armed intervention of all the powers of Europe, to stay the overwhelming career of the autocrat, who aimed at little else than universal dominion. The Turks, however, have done it effectually of themselves, single-handed, without the assistance of any one power, European or Asiatic; and the sublime Sultan may now boast, with the Roman warrior:—

> . . . 'like an eagle in a dovecote, I
> Fluttered your Russians in Bulgaria;
> *Alone* I did it!'

Fluttered, indeed, with a vengeance! The rout was complete, resembling, on a smaller scale, that of the

French from Moscow. We are told that not a living creature, save one man, escaped out of this horrible Bulgaria; and he, bare and destitute of everything that constitutes a soldier,—without arms, without accoutrements, without baggage, and, as the French would say, completely demoralised. All the draft horses, and cattle of every kind; all those of the cavalry and artillery—dead. All the guns, carriages, waggons, ammunition, and provisions, left behind as spoils for the Turks. The extent of these disasters is endeavoured to be concealed at Petersburg, where the war, from the first, was unpopular; but now men shake their heads, by which, like the shake of Burleigh's in the play, 'they mean a great deal, though they say nothing;' and they are afraid to write, as all letters are inspected at the post-office." — *Quarterly Review.*

CHAP. VII.

THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN OF 1829, BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

THOUGH the greater part of the Russian army had withdrawn, weakened to less than one-fourth its effective power, in the autumn of 1828, yet several detached portions were left throughout the winter in Wallachia and Moldavia, which in the course of it were strengthened and increased from the immense resources of that vast empire, whose innumerable hosts were now gradually advancing towards the south, becoming daily more and more available for the reinforcement of the army acting against Turkey. In the course of February, the western division of the army had, as we have seen, succeeded in taking Nicopolis and Kalafat, so that the Pacha of Widdin was retained in that town, and unable to assist the Grand Vizier, who in the course of the winter established himself at Schumla. Moreover, the Russian fleet, outnumbering, as we have before remarked, that of the Turks by 20 to 1 since the battle of

Navarino, not only blockaded the entrance to the sea of Marmora, both on the side of the Euxine, and the Archipelago, but the former had by a *coup-de-main*, taken Sizepolis, a small but very strong fortress on the coast of the Euxine, between the Balkan and Constantinople, so that now the Russian forces had more than one *point-d'appui* should they succeed in passing that barrier, and, what was of more importance, supplies both of food and ammunition could be brought to them by sea. Alarmed at this loss, which was occasioned entirely by the treachery of the Armenian garrison, who marched out without striking a blow, the Sultan ordered the Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, immediately to retake the fortress. But Turkish troops are not so easily collected and put in motion during the winter months. After seven weeks of diligent levying, a sufficient force was got together to advance against it; but after the first vigorous attack, which gave them a momentary advantage, the Turks were repulsed, and the Russians remained in possession of Sizepolis, till peace was concluded between the two nations. Meantime fresh levies were being made in Russia, and continual reinforcements poured upon the confines of Turkey, till once again the Russian army in Wallachia was 150,000 strong, supported by 600 pieces of effective artillery

Far from a similar accession to their forces being the case with the Turks, during the winter almost the whole of their effective force had disappeared, and although, as spring returned, they rejoined the banners of the Sultan, yet vast numbers held back, either of their own accord, or by the commands of their respective pashas, in consequence of the reforms of 1826-27, and with the idea that, by withholding supplies, they might force the Sultan to restore the old Janissary system. With all these disadvantages, but little more than 40,000 regular troops, and 100 guns, were ready to defend the lines of the Danube and Balkan from Rustchuck to the sea.

The campaign was commenced in the middle of May, by the reinvestment of Silistria by Count Diebitch, who had now succeeded Count Wittgenstein as the Russian commander-in-chief, with an army of 25,000, supported by one of 60,000 men. To oppose this Silistria contained but 10,000 regular soldiers: while it inclosed within its walls male inhabitants to the number of 30,000 more: which with their families rather encumbered than helped the besieged.

It was not till towards the middle of May that the invading army passed the Danube in two bodies simultaneously, both at Hirsova and Kalafat. A

fierce cavalry engagement took place on the 17th, but the Turks, unable to stand against the enemy's artillery, retreated under the walls of Silistria. Shortly after, the Turks under the Grand Vizier marched out of the entrenched camp at Schumla, and attacked the advanced guard of the 2nd division of the Russian army, which was encamped at Pravadi, this advanced guard being stationed at Eski-Arnautter, to keep up communications with Varna. Here again the valour of the Turks, and the fury of their charge, took effect, and the Russians were driven back and dispersed at every point. But, as is the case with all half-disciplined forces, the Turks carried their success too far, and reinforcements coming up, the Russians were enabled to keep the field while the Turkish forces retreated again to Schumla. Some 2000 were killed on each side. This affair took place also on the 17th.

On the 28th the Grand Vizier made another desperate effort to stay the advance of this portion of the Russian army. He marched out from Schumla, with a force 36,000 strong, direct on Pravadi. General Roth having thrown a sufficient force into Pravadi, to hold it for a time against the enemy, retreated to Kolodschi, on the road to Silistria, sending a messenger, who was to ride day and night

with intelligence of the movements of the Turkish army to Count Diebitch, who was lying, with the other division of the army, before Silistria. Diebitch immediately broke up his camp, and leaving but 20,000 men under General Krasowsky, to watch Silistria, with orders to keep up an appearance as if the whole body were still there, advanced and threw himself on the line of communication between the Grand Vizier and Schumla, at the wall of Madura; here he was joined by General Roth, and the Grand Vizier found himself cut off from his entrenched camp — that fortress on which the whole fortunes of a Turkish invasion are supposed to rest — by an army of 35,000 and 150 guns. The Grand Vizier, totally unaware of the advantage of Diebitch, and fancying he had only Roth's division to meet with; instantly attacked it. During the first part of the day the Turks were successful, but when the attack was renewed, and the whole 110 Russian guns brought to bear upon them, to meet which the Turks had but 50 guns drawn by oxen, according to their custom — the Turks thinking it shameful to harness the noble horse to such inglorious service — they were at last dispersed, after fighting gallantly, and driven off the field. This was not the case,

however, till the whole of their powder had been blown up by the fire of the enemy's guns.

Had Diebitch immediately turned and attacked Schumla, with its now feeble garrison, he had probably taken it; but he did not, and the Grand Vizier reached it the next day, by the narrow mountain passes, at the head of but 12,000 men, the poor remains of his army; though some other detached portions, which had been scattered here and there, gradually came in, as is usual with the Turks after a defeat; their plan being to disperse for a time and rejoin their general as opportunity offers. Meanwhile the Russians had not gained this advantage, great as it was, without loss; when Diebitch retreated to Silistria he left behind him 3000 men dead on the field of battle. Another month he spent before that fortress, when a practicable breach having been effected by means of a mine, the Pashas in command agreed to surrender the place. Three thousand troops were made prisoners of war, and the inhabitants required to surrender their arms.

General Diebitch was now in a position to pass onwards. The Grand Vizier still indeed held Schumla with some 18,000 troops; but the Balkan passes were defended by scarcely a handful of men. It never seems to have entered the Grand Vizier's head

that Diebitch could pass the Balkan, leaving the camp at Schumla still in the possession of an enemy in his rear. Not so, however. Diebitch had determined to pass on at all risks. His army was gradually melting away under the unhealthiness of a Turkish summer, and he knew that he must do one of two things,— either advance and run the chances between alarming the Sultan into a peace, and the total destruction of his army; or on the other hand, expend precious time in besieging Schumla, and probably finally have to retreat, as last year, with the certainty of being disgraced for his failure. He took the first course and advanced, having first deceived the enemy by an ostentatious pretence of sitting down before Schumla for a regular siege. The Grand Vizier was taken in. The Balkan passes were left unoccupied, though a thousand men could have held the whole Russian force at bay, and on the 24th July the Russian army had passed the Balkan in three divisions. The first, under Diebitch, by Kouprikiss, and those under Generals Roth and Rudiger, by Missivri and Kemtjik respectively. Too late, the Grand Vizier heard of what was going on, and passing out of Schumla, hung on Diebitch's rear. But this rather accelerated than hindered his onward march. To

Kion first, and then on to Adrianople, which the governor, scared by a panic, surrendered without a blow, and finally on to Soulah Bourgas, to hasten the negotiations which had been opened at Adrianople.

But, leaving him on his march with a dying army, daily mowed down by plague and fevers, actually on the brink of ruin*, while an army of 30,000 strong hang on his left wing, commanded by the Pasha of Scodra, who had hitherto held back in hopes of forcing the Sultan to restore the old system, and with another and far stronger Turkish force in front under the walls of Constantinople than he himself could by any means muster; though upheld by the prestige of having passed the Balkan range, of having out-generaled his adversary, and of being within seventy miles of Constantinople; let us pass on, ere we consider the ignominious peace, forced on the Turks more by their so-called allies than by the force or position of their enemies, to the history of the war transacting in Asiatic Turkey, between Count Paskievitch and the Turkish army.

* An English officer states, that at a grand review, held by Diebitch at Adrianople, "there were not 13,000 men, of all arms, in the field."

CHAP. VIII.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH ASIATIC CAMPAIGN OF 1829.

BOTH the Russians and Turks in Asia as well as Europe, had spent the winter of 1828-29 in preparations for a vigorous prosecution of the war in the following spring. The Russians in Asia lie under the immense disadvantage of distance, as well as the still greater one of having to march their armies over the Caucasus, and through a country but partially subjugated, or more properly, not subjugated at all, as is actually the case with Circassia. In some measure to obviate this difficulty, Paskievitch very wisely adopted a common eastern custom — one indeed which has been partially adopted in all half-civilised communities in time of war. He resolved on raising a Nizam of native troops in the Russian service. When this was carried into effect, no troops in the Russian army were more effective. He thus met Mussulman valour with Mussulman valour, the latter directed, too, as it was on the Russian side, by great experience as a general and

tactician. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the Russian army, "with all appliances and means to boot," was more than a match for the Turkish, led, as the lattef was, only by Saleh Pasha and the inexperienced new-made Seraskier of the district; the old Seraskier had been disgraced for his bad success in the previous campaign. But neither were the Turks idle during the winter season. They gathered together reinforcements, formed a park of artillery, and did wonders for the short time that was allowed them, and with so little to work upon. We ourselves would, we imagine, — brave as we Britons think ourselves, — rather shrink from a contest with a regular Russian army if we had but new-made levies and raw militiamen to fight for us; yet just such was the Asiatic Mussulman force during the two campaigns of 1828 and 1829: 10,000 regular troops out of the last year's army then first raised, 10,000 men newly levied and the militia of the several districts, which, with all the freedom of eastern warfare, were available or not according to their home exigencies and the fancies of their commanders: nominally they may have numbered altogether 80,000 men, with sixty-six pieces of cannon, but actually the half of that number was never forthcoming. Saleh Pacha,

placed this army in a strong position at the foot of the Saganlugh, to guard the road to Erzeroum, the chief city of this part of the Turkish dominions, and at the same time to be ready to advance on Akhaltzikh, which had, as we have seen, been taken the previous year by the Russians.

A favourable opportunity occurred for this movement on the part of the Turks, while the attention of General Paskievitch was turned towards Persia. The Russian minister at Teheran had been assassinated; and fearful that it was a prelude to the breaking out of another war with Persia, that general had concentrated his forces on Irvan in Armenia. Meantime the Seraskier advanced suddenly with a portion of his forces, and suddenly invested Akhaltzikh. It is difficult to say which party behaved with most valour — the Turks as besiegers, or the Russians, under Prince Bebutoff, as defenders. The contest lasted fourteen days, when the besieged were relieved by a Russian force despatched by Prince Paskievitch under General Burtsdorff. The Turks, attacked in front and rear, by the besieged and by their allies, were defeated and obliged to fly, or rather, as a Turkish force ever does to disperse, that they might collect together under happier circumstances. With more regular

troops who strive to retreat in order, a defeat is too often irremediable; with the Turkish irregulars a defeat and a victory have very much the same effect. In both cases the army disperses, in the one to re-form at some rallying point in the rear as soon as that can be safely reached by some circuitous route; in the other, to secure the fruits of their victory, and deposit any spoil they may have obtained in some safe locality ere they again join themselves to their commander.

The Russian victory at Akhaltzikh had, however, two great advantages for the Russians; it enabled them to stand their ground, and it caused the wavering policy of the Persians to result in a settled peace with them. This set Paskievitch at liberty, with a regular and effective force of 25,000 men and 76 guns, to turn his whole attention to the war with Turkey. Leaving his left wing under General Pankratieff to defend Kars, Paskievitch sent orders to General Burtsdorff, who was still at Akhaltzikh, to join him, as he had determined to advance first against Hadji Pasha, who was still threatening Akhaltzikh, ere he tried to attack the Seraskier, who with the bulk of his army was posted in a strong position at a place called Hassan Kale, from whence he defended Erzeroum and evidently meditated an

attack on Kars. Attacked in front and flank, and commanded by a very inexperienced general, if he was worthy even of that title, the Turks rapidly dispersed, leaving the Russians masters of the field.

The Seraskier alone now remained to oppose Paskievitch. He was strongly entrenched, and had more regular troops under him than had as yet met the Russians. The Russian commander, therefore, determined to employ strategy in attacking him. By a rapid march over the narrow defiles of the Saganlugh, he threw the main body of his forces into the rear of the Seraskier, between him and Erzeroum, and ordering General Pankratieff to advance at the same time, he attacked the Turkish army both in front and rear. Paskievitch's object was to defeat the Seraskier before he could be rejoined by the force now again collected together under Hadji Pasha.

The first attack by the Turks was irresistible; the Russians gave way at all points; Hadji Pasha was rapidly advancing to take them in the rear, and a total defeat seemed inevitable. But the quick eye of Paskievitch discerned a weak point in his enemy's line of battle. The centre had been left too weak to enable the wings to make their first furious onset. Paskievitch gathered together his wavering troops and made a furious charge on the centre, which was

successful; the Turks' right wing and centre, finding themselves in two isolated bodies, as usual dispersed; while the Russian artillery, under Pankratieff, having now come up, completed the success. The whole Russian force were now in a state to attack the reserve and left wing, which had almost cut up General Burtsdorff's division. That very evening Paskieyitch renewed the attack; and, taken by surprise, the Turks, who, however valiant when in action, yet in Asia at least, and too often in Europe also, must have their siesta and their pipe when the fatigues of the day are over, were totally overthrown, and dispersed according to their custom.

Hadji Pasha's force was all that now remained to be disposed of; and Paskievitch lost no time in advancing against it. Here, again, he was successful. The force was dispersed, the artillery taken, and Hadji Pasha made prisoner. The position of the Seraskier was for the present almost desperate. His whole army almost was dispersed. He accordingly abandoned Hassan Kale and withdrew to Erzeroum. To this place he was followed by Paskievitch, who quickly invested it. The Turks, intimidated by their late ill success, refused to resist, and the Seraskier was obliged to capitulate.

Here the Russian army arrested its steps for a time, awaiting reinforcements. Its first onward movement was against Baibout, some seventy miles on towards the sea-coast, which was treacherously given up into their hands and taken possession of by Paskievitch. Meantime General Burtsdorff's division having been defeated before Kars, and General Sacken at Adjur by bodies of the Turkish militia, Paskievitch, notwithstanding his successes, found himself obliged to retreat. To cover this movement from the enemy, he made a feint to pass onwards with a strong body, by a rapid march as far as Karakaban, within view of the sea, and then turning back he evacuated Baibout altogether, and retired on Erzeroum. How much further he might have found it necessary to retreat cannot exactly be ascertained. In spite of several boasted successes, it is certain Paskievitch had it in contemplation to leave garrisons in the fortresses, and retire into Georgia for the winter. The probability is that the Asiatic Russian force was, at this period, actually as hard pressed, and as near to a total dispersion, as the Russian force in Europe under General Diebitch. Luckily for Count Paskievitch, as well as for his brother generals, despatches arrived just at this period to the effect that hostilities were to cease, in view of the

conclusion of a general peace at Adrianople; and Paskievitch, leaving garrisons in the conquered towns, retired into winter quarters in Georgia, having received from the emperor a field-marshal's bâton.

CHAP. IX.

THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE AND ITS RESULTS.

We now come to that part of the history of the life of Nicholas which is the most humiliating of all to England especially, but also to all the civilised part of Europe. To England especially, because every other nation from 1829 up to the present moment, has been actually engaged in quelling the revolutionary spirit engendered in their own dominions, while the politicians of Great Britain during a time of profound peace both abroad and at home, and of eminent internal prosperity, have allowed themselves to be outwitted time after time by the astute policy of a semi-barbarian, and to lose move after move in the game of Europe with blind indifference to the necessary consequences of allowing a proud ambitious man to carry on an advancing policy unopposed. That the prospects and hopes of peace might have been realised,—that the present war need never have taken place, had this country been governed by ministers who had attended to the welfare

of mankind, and to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe,—in short, to their duty to their country in its foreign relations, instead of thinking only of how they could obtain an advantage over their political adversaries at home, is a truth that cannot too often be placed before the eyes of the people of Great Britain. Had it not been for the good sense of the people of this country, the probability even is that Great Britain had remained as inactive in 1854 as it did in 1828 and 1829; and another "peace of Adrianople," only with a step in advance on the part of Russia, had been forced on a brave and struggling people again, as much by the falseness or blindness of so-called friends, as by the power of its opponents.

Let us return, however, without further discussion to this same peace of Adrianople. It was settled by the plenipotentiaries of England and France, in conjunction with General Diebitch, and wrung from the reluctant consent of a brave and true-hearted monarch, who is said to have shed the bitterest of all tears — the tears of disappointed manhood! — at the degrading conditions to which he was affixing his signature.

They were briefly as follows: — That on condition of receiving 750,000*l.* indemnity for possible private

losses in the war, and 5,000,000*l.* for public losses, the Russian armies should withdraw from the Turkish territories by degrees as the several instalments of the two sums were paid, retaining no additional territories, except in Europe the fortress of Brahilov and the islands which command the mouth of the Danube, and in Asia the fortresses of Anapa and Poti on the Black Sea, the territory of Akhaltzikh, and a portion of the Asiatic coast of the Euxine. The provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, hitherto appertaining entirely to Turkey, were henceforth to be free governments, paying indeed a small tribute to that country, but totally independent of it, while Russia was to be their protector. The Turks were to retain no fortresses on the north coast of the Danube, nor was any Mussulman ever hereafter to hold possessions in those territories.

Eventually one half of the government indemnity was settled by the further cession on the part of the Turks of certain provinces in Asia, thus giving the Russian Government undisturbed communications between that country and Akhaltzikh, at least as undisturbed as such can be through a region principally inhabited by a warlike people, who are determined to submit to no one, as is the case with the warlike tribes of the Caucasus. In addition

to these cessions, Turkey had to grant an entire amnesty to all political offenders in all parts of her dominions. Ten years were allowed for the indemnity money to be paid, during which Russia was to hold the two Danubian provinces, these provinces during that period being exempted from paying tribute to Turkey.

As the whole of this ten years, indeed till 1850, forms a part of the treaty of Adrianople, we think we may fairly take a step in advance in the life of Nicholas, and tell how again England abandoned "her old and faithful ally the Porte" to the tender mercies of Russia in 1833, when the necessities of Turkey from the revolt of Egypt, still suffering as she was from the loss of her marine at the battle of Navarino, obliged her to receive that protection and aid from Russia which Great Britain ought to have accorded her, and to enter with it into another treaty, offensive and defensive. By this, termed the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, both parties were to help each other in case of attack, while Turkey was bound to close the Dardanelles against any power with which Russia should be at war, and indeed against the war vessels of every other country.

Again, in May, 1849, the whole indemnity having been paid in money or land, another treaty, at Bulta

Liman, was concluded between the two governments, whereby the Russians were to withdraw from the Wallachian territories, and were not again to enter them unless they were also entered at the same time by a Turkish army of similar strength. But even after this treaty, it was not till Great Britain had strongly remonstrated that the Russian troops were at last withdrawn.

Were we writing a history of Europe, or even of Turkey, we should relate how quickly, after the incubus of having to support the Russian forces was taken from off their shoulders, these fertile Danubian provinces in one year exported to Great Britain as much as a million and a half of quarters of wheat. What effect this had, by thus interrupting his own country's trade with Great Britain, in quickening the rapacious feelings of the Northern Despot, and causing him so rapidly to reoccupy the provinces, is a query rather for the politician than the historian.

Meantime, let us quote again the words of the historian, showing that "the treaty of Adrianople" affords a striking instance of that astute but ceaselessly encroaching policy which has so long characterised the court of St. Petersburg.

"They disclaimed all idea of territorial aggrandisement at the commencement of the war; but they closed it by requiring the cession of a valuable territory on the Black Sea, and in Georgia, including the strongest frontier fortresses of Turkey in Asia Minor. They did not openly claim the command of the navigation of the Danube; but they compelled the cession of the islands at its mouth, which effectually gave it them. They made a great show of moderation in consenting to relinquish the Principalities which they had overrun; but they agreed to do so only on payment of £5,000,000 public, and £750,000 of private indemnities—a sum equal to five-sixths of the whole revenue of Turkey, and which it seemed impossible it could ever defray. In the meantime, they stipulated the destruction of all the fortresses the Turks held on the left bank of the river, including Giurgevo and Brahilov, and the sale of all the Mussulman property in the two provinces within eighteen months—steps obviously pointing to their transference to a Christian government. They professed to respect the independence of Turkey, but they compelled its government to recognise a right of interference in behalf of its Christian subjects, especially in Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, inconsistent with anything like independence in a sovereign state, and the internal government of which provinces was made quite independent of Turkish rule. These clauses might at any time give the means of renewing war on plausible pretexts. Finally, by stipulating for an absolute and universal amnesty for all the subjects of the Porte who had been engaged in re-

bellion, they openly proclaimed to all the world that they were the protectors of the disaffected in the Sultan's dominions, and that they were to look to St. Petersburg for a shield against the violence or injustice of their own government."*

* Alison.

CHAP. X.

THE POLISH INSURRECTION OF 1830-31.

It has been remarked in more cases than one that it takes long to move the minds of a people, and that too often, after extreme labour on the part of those who wish to effect such a movement, they succeed in their endeavour just when the moment for success is over.

Such was the case with Poland in 1830-31. During the whole of the war of 1828-29 between the Russians and the Turks, Polish patriots and their supporters in other countries had been trying to get up a co-operating movement in Poland, that that nation might throw off its fetters while the Czar and his forces were otherwise engaged. It was not, however, till the autumn of 1830, when his whole army was not only at liberty, but just in that state of effectiveness which is engendered by a late war, that the Polish nation was ripe for revolt. The effective state of the Russian forces was doubtless increased by the fact whispered among diplomatists,

and hinted at by historians, and hereafter to be more fully acknowledged when the secret history of the times shall in the natural course of things come before the public, that the Czar had no sooner successfully concluded the war with Turkey, than he had resolved on a war with France, and probably on an attack on Hungary. The revolution of 1830 in the former country, during which the Bourbons had been expelled, and Louis Philippe established on the throne, had stirred up all Nicholas's antipathy to revolutionary feeling. He sent a curt answer to the letter addressed to him by the king of the French, and had evidently made all the necessary preparations both of money and forces for a great western war when the Polish revolution broke out.*

Many circumstances had combined to render effective the agitation of the Polish patriots and of others. The spirit of revolution was rife through-

* When the state papers of the Grand Duke Constantine were seized during the Polish revolution, the whole details of the meditated war were discovered; with an announcement from Lubuki, one of the Czar's ministers, to that monarch, that in answer to his orders to collect funds for such a war, he had at the imperial disposal eight millions of Polish florins in the treasury, and a million of dollars in the bank at Berlin. The same seizure of papers discovered a military plan for the seizure and occupation of Hungary; making it evident that Nicholas intended as much treachery against Austria as against France.

out Europe, even among those who had not, as had the Poles, the one great fact to complain of, that their country had been dismembered, and a foreign sovereignty forced on them instead of the freedom of election, in which formerly they had rejoiced. More than these, too, there was the fact that the Viceroy of Poland — the Cesarowitch Constantine, brother to the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas — too often maddened the people by his tyranny, his rapacity, and his almost insane rage when matters did not go according to his will. Even during the reign of the mild and Christian Alexander, though he had engaged, and we believe verily intended to keep his engagement, to reign over Poland as a constitutional monarch,—a king of Poland who was to govern in conjunction with its senate, and according to its own laws and constitution, — Constantine, his viceroy, was too often successful in acting according to his own tyrannical nature, rather than the wishes of the Emperor. And it may be that Alexander's ear was the less open to an appeal against a brother whom he intended to deprive of the succession to his own crown. Be that as it may, if Poland suffered under the viceroy of the mild and gentle Alexander, much more did it suffer when he became the viceroy of the imperious autocrat, Nicholas. The

conspiracy that had occurred among the military at the commencement of his reign, was the excuse for the withdrawal of the Polish constitution. Poland must be kept under the same iron despotism with which the rest of Russia was ruled, and she was gradually deprived of all her national privileges. The palatinate was debarred its representation, the chambers were no longer allowed to vote supplies, new burdens were imposed, public education was interrupted, the Polish language was suppressed, individual liberty violated, and the prisons filled with suspected persons, while a continual stream of the nobility were drawn off and exiled to Siberia.

Then as now, Prussia was under the influence of Russia, and added her quota to the sufferings of this brave and noble people. Thousands of Polish refugees, who had desired to escape from the insane tyranny of the government, and had either taken refuge in Prussia or used it as a passage to more peaceful lands, were delivered over to the tender mercies of a ruthless government. The following extract, from a German paper, of the period, which we quote from a contemporary biography*, will give some idea of the sufferings of this chivalric people.

* The Life of Nicholas. By the Rev. H. Christmas.

"Berlin, 25th January, 1830.

"What were represented to us, with as much boldness as gravity, as so many French inventions, are more than confirmed. We have at last beheld the frightful opening scene of the drama which is being acted in Poland. The oppression is the most terrible that ever weighed on any nation—such is the tragedy in two words. So it was said, but it was not believed. But we have seen them —those poor children—fastened together, two-and-two, led with chains, led on by guards, who treat them like bands of galley-slaves, led through Poland in numerous companies, and dragged, dying of fatigue, into the heart of Russia. We have seen them thus traversing the plains of Podolia, going on their way, far from their families and their country, towards the military establishments of the empire. Thus, these little ones, torn from their mothers, are forced to submit to Russian discipline—that is to say, the knout—to Russian manners, prejudices, and ideas, and to the Russian belief. And in their books of education in Poland, they efface the words tyrant and liberty; every noble and generous sentiment. The nation is literally fettered and guarded at every point by Russian jailors; the heads of the government department are Russian officers; the censors are Russian colonels, who erase as much as they can on pain of being severely punished themselves if they do not.

"The peasants who refuse to go and serve in the interior of Russia, are traced, hunted, and captured like wild beasts. The recruits are raised in winter, and are

made to perform marches of a hundred leagues over roads which these drovers of human beings strew with dying and half-naked bodies."

As a climax to the whole, the Grand Duke Constantine took offence with the young men at the military school at Warsaw, because, at a public dinner, they had drank to the memory of Kosciusko and other Polish patriots. He ordered an inquiry, and though the commissioners acquitted the youths of any treasonable views, Constantine ordered a part to be flogged and the rest sent to prison. This was like setting a torch to a train already laid; the students took arms, and were joined by the Polish regiments; the Russian guards were overpowered and driven out of Warsaw, and Constantine was obliged to flee for his life, and shortly afterwards to leave Poland altogether.

A council was immediately formed, who, acting in the name of the Emperor as King of Poland, undertook the government of the country, and sent their complaints to the Czar. They wished him, they said, to come and judge between them and his viceroy. While waiting for an answer to their representations, and for the time when the chambers they had summoned could meet, they appointed a dictator, who, in a speech on the opening of the

chambers, observed, "the king himself will be forced to admit the justice of our cause, when he comes to know the extent to which he was abused."

But they knew little of the character of Nicholas. That haughty monarch refused to see or even listen to what the commissioners had to say. He issued proclamations, in which he threatened the Poles with severe punishment "for their horrid treason;" he demanded unconditional submission from them, and finally prepared to maintain his supremacy by his armies. On hearing of this the Polish Chambers formally deposed Nicholas from the sovereignty of Poland, and prepared for war to the knife.

The Polish army—the pet hobby of Constantine—already prepared at the commencement of the insurrection, is said to have consisted of 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, to which levies raised during the winter had been added, in addition to the national guard which was enrolled at Warsaw. The Russian armies, in the meantime, were almost innumerable, as, in the spring of 1831, they emerged from different points on this devoted country, commanded by Marshal Diebitsch, the successful general against the Turks. With him was the Grand Duke Constantine, urging him on to violence and cruelty.

As the Russian forces advanced in February, 1831,

the Poles gradually withdrew to the neighbourhood of Warsaw, and at last took up their ground at Praga, where a battle was fought which lasted two days; the Poles contesting every inch of ground, and fighting with such unheard-of bravery, that it was only by bringing up continual reinforcements that Diebitsch could keep his ground. He, however, claimed the victory, though he was obliged to remain inactive till another division of his army moved up, when he renewed his attack, and at last obliged the Polish general, Skrynecki, to retire across the Vistula towards Warsaw. This backward movement was, however, in great part owing to the Polish general's fears lest the breaking up of the ice on the Vistula should cut him off from his resources. In these engagements the Poles lost at least 9000 men, and the Russians certainly not fewer. The advance of the spring thaw rendering further operations impracticable for the present, Diebitsch now drew back the main body of his army to receive farther reinforcements, leaving strong divisions at Praga and Wawer to watch Warsaw and coop up the Polish army.

The Polish commander-in-chief, however, was not to be thus shut in; he employed this period in marching against the scattered divisions of the Rus-

sian army. The forces under General Geisman, both at Wawer and Praga, were surprised and defeated in night attacks, their cannon taken and carried back to Warsaw; General Reser was also obliged to abandon Nuisk, and fall back upon the main body, while the Polish positions were advanced as far as the river Bug.

Skrynecki, the General of the insurrectionists, was in hopes of finding co-operation in the several provinces which had from the time of Catherine been incorporated with Russia; and such was partially the case. In Lithuania, for instance, as well as Volhynia and Podolia, bodies of insurgents appeared which were supported by divisions sent from the insurrectionist army; but this rather weakened than strengthened the Polish cause, inasmuch as the Russian armies were ever ready to march against these small bodies with overwhelming numbers, either to annihilate or drive them into Austria or Prussia, where they were obliged by the authorities to lay down their arms and pass into remote countries.

It was not till the 28th of April that Diebitsch again advanced towards Warsaw, and even then, he was forced once more to retire for want of provisions, when he was followed in his retreat by the Polish army. From May 18th to the 21st a continual

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running engagement was kept up, in which the Poles had the advantage. But as it had been in the war with the Turks, so it was now. No advantages obtained against the Russians had any real effect in arresting their progress, inasmuch as the lives of his soldiers were nought to the Autocrat: one half might die over and over again, and again and again their places would be filled up without let or hesitation. On this last day, therefore, having concentrated his forces and added thereto large reinforcements, Diebitsch repassed the Bug with his whole army, and bore down upon the Poles. Skrynecki retreated to Ostrolinka, intending to cross the Narew. Before he could effect this movement with his whole army, Diebitsch attacked his rear-guard in full force, and following up the retreating foe, gained possession of the bridge ere it had been destroyed. This was on the 26th; during the remainder of the day and on the 27th a fierce battle ensued, the Russians resolving to cross the Narew, the Poles striving to stop them. With the loss of 5000 men, Skrynecki claimed the victory, but was obliged to retreat to Praga. This was the last battle ever fought by Field-Marshal Diebitsch. On the 10th of June he was seized with the cholera, and

died in a few hours.* Count Paskievitch, the successful commander in the Asiatic Russo-Turkish campaigns, was appointed to succeed him.

Marshal Diebitsch was quickly followed to the grave by the Archduke Constantine, who fell also by the same dire disease—cholera, on June 30th.

Paskievitch commenced his command by sending strong divisions against the several insurrectionist bodies in the various Russo-Polish provinces. His policy was, ere he attacked Skrynecki, either to annihilate them altogether or to drive them into the neighbouring provinces, where they were compelled to lay down their arms; thus carrying out still more completely the views of his predecessor. This done, he passed on himself to the neighbourhood of Warsaw, and, here departing from the tactics of Diebitsch, who had striven to win that town by means of the Praga bridge, he passed the Vistula some miles down, and marched up its western bank towards the city in three divisions. Night and day the populace were employed in forming intrenchments

* It is said that Marshal Paskievitch had been already nominated to supersede Diebitsch; and that it was wounded vanity, and distress of mind from this disgrace and his numerous defeats, which helped to subject that hitherto unchecked commander to the disease under which he sank.

and strong fortifications on the side of the city which was thus, for the first time, threatened. But two far more terrible foes than even Count Paskievitch had already taken possession of the city. These were the cholera in its most virulent form, and worse than that, disorder and division among the Poles themselves. The populace were discontented at the result of the provincial insurrections, still more that Skrynecki did not lay all his plans before them. They insisted on a council of war. At this juncture Paskievitch with 60,000 men, and General Rudiger with nearly as many more, had reached the city. The internal discontent increased; General Skrynecki resigned the command, and was succeeded by General Dembinski. On the 13th of August Paskievitch was but three miles from Warsaw; after waiting nearly three weeks in the vain hopes of a capitulation, on September 6th he attacked the Polish lines. Terrible and bloody combats ensued; but by the evening of the next day the Russians were in possession of the entrenchments, and on the 8th the Russian army entered the town. Meantime the Polish army had marched out, and rather than submit to their oppressors they crossed the frontier into Prussia, laid down their arms, and became refugees in foreign lands.

The other foe we have spoken of — a foe to both conqueror and conquered, — completed the desolation of the country. The cholera, which had been gaining ground ever since the spring, now advanced like a strong man with rapid strides. First in Moscow; and gradually spreading westward, it raged with terrific violence in Poland, and especially in Warsaw, carrying off thousands in its relentless grasp, and desolating the whole face of the country. The Archduke Constantine had fallen an early victim to it; and for a while both parties were arrested by its progress. But autumn came, and the plague was stayed. Scarcely was this the case, ere the terrible hand of Russian vengeance fell on the unfortunate Poles. The Czar is not one who can lightly pass by any opposition to his authority. A mandate was issued that the Polish nation no longer existed. All the privileges hitherto accorded them, both public and private, were withdrawn; the Polish army was to be incorporated with that of Russia; the Polish insignia of royalty were broken and carried to Warsaw; 5000 of the chief Polish families were removed from their native land, and carried bodily to the steppes of Asia; and the tenants of the Polish religious houses compelled to adopt the tenets of the Greek Church.

CHAP. XI.

THE CAUCASIAN STRUGGLE.

ONCE and again, both in ancient and modern history, have hardy mountaineers bravely struggled and worthily endured for the sake of liberty, and liberty has been the result. Witness the liberty of the little republics of Greece, which so long resisted all the arms and the power of Persia; the deliverance of Scotland from the English usurpation in the time of our first Edwards; the emancipation of Switzerland from the terrible yoke of the Germans; and others that we might name. What Themistocles was to the Greeks, and Wallace and Tell to their respective nationalities, such is Schamyl to the brave and independent warriors of the Caucasus.

Our readers are of course aware that the Caucasus, with Russia to the north, and Armenia to the south, occupies the narrow neck of land between the Black and Caspian Seas. This region is mountainous and inaccessible, and yet amply provided with the necessaries of life grown in the fertile valleys which are inter-

spersed between the rocky defiles of their snow-capped mountains. The inhabitants unite all the independence and love of their country which ever distinguish the natives of a mountain district, a thorough knowledge of arms, to good horsemanship, which they have inherited from their ancestors, the remnants of our European Crusaders. There is but little doubt, both from the light complexion of the inhabitants of these regions, and from many of their customs — the use of horsemanship, for instance, a perfect anomaly in a mountain district — as well as from the energy and activity of their deportment, that the various tribes of the Caucasus have little Asiatic blood in their veins. Witness, too, the fact, that though the general religion of the inhabitants is outwardly Mohammedan, yet that there is a general expectation of the coming of the Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, to supersede and take the kingdom from the believers in Mahomet the Prophet of God.

These same hardy mountaineers have been as pricks in the sides, and thorns in the path of the Russians, ever since they have attempted to make to themselves a name and an empire. And the great aim and intent of each Russian autocrat, from Peter the Great down to Nicholas, not even excepting the

amiable, enlightened, and otherwise unambitious Alexander, has been to obtain the mastery over these unconquered, and as yet unconquerable Circassians. By diplomacy, by arms, by craft, by flattery, in short by every means defensible and indefensible, have each of the Russian Emperors in succession striven after this great end.

It was in the reign of Paul I. that Georgia was united to the empire of Russia as a fief or dependent state. In that of the Empress Catherine, the last Georgian monarch bequeathed it altogether to the Russian monarch; and it is only lately, in the course of this last summer, that the Czarovitch, Elias Georgievitch, son of the last legitimate sovereign of Georgia, has died at Moscow.

When Nicholas came to the throne, he appointed General Paskievitch to the command in Caucasia, with orders to follow up the policy of his predecessor, General Germaloff, and gradually bring into subjection the various tribes of the Caucasus, by building forts on all the passes and along the coasts of the Black and the Caspian Seas, so as to starve the inhabitants into submission. Paskievitch's attention was for a time drawn away from the contest with the native tribes by the other wars of which we have spoken, first against Persia, and then against Turkey;

but perhaps even during these, he was doing more actually to overcome the independence of the Caucasian tribes, than if he had remained openly in arms against them. In the first place, he obtained a settlement in Armenia, having succeeded in conquering the greater part of that province, which from that period remained in the hands of the Russians, thus hemming in the independent tribes between the Cossacks on the north, and this conquered country of Armenia, the granary of the whole surrounding districts, on the south; and in the second, he threw them off their guard by enlisting as many of them as he could induce to join the Russian standard in a local Nizam, to bear arms for the Russians against the Turks. The Christian inhabitants of these districts were those on whom his wiles had most effect in this enlistment.

The war, however, with Turkey being terminated by the peace of Adrianople, Paskievitch had time to turn his attention more completely to the yet unconquered tribes who refused even to pay tribute to his sovereign. His first expedition was against the Abchasians in 1831; but it was attended with trifling results, inasmuch as he was quickly called away by Nicholas to attend to the Polish war, which had been so badly conducted by his predecessor Marshal Diebitsch.

On General Pankratieff, the second in command,

now fell the sole superintendence of the Caucasian war. He undertook several expeditions against different tribes with but very little success. With the Caucasians, as with other Eastern irregular forces, neither defeat nor victory seem to cause any great change in their condition. In both cases they disperse after a battle.

About this time appeared Schamyl, the Circassian leader and prophet. Giving out that he has a mission from on high, and personal communication, if not with the Almighty himself, at least with his prophet, Schamyl also assumes to be invincible in arms, and invulnerable as to wounds.

Kasi Mullah on the one hand, and Schamyl on the other, both appeared at the head of different bodies of armed men; so that when General Rosen, Paskievitch's regularly appointed successor, arrived, he found the whole of the Daghestan in a state of warfare, the fortresses of Tarka and Derbend on the Caspian in the hands of the mountaineers, and the whole country plundered as far as Kesliar. General Rosen marched immediately at the head of all the forces he could collect to Himri, the stronghold of Daghestan, and the emporium of the ammunition and arms of the Caucasians, and laid vigorous siege to it. Kasi Mullah and Schamyl both threw them-

selves into it, but in vain. By dint of numbers, leaving ten Russians dead in the ditch for every single Caucasian killed, Himri was at last taken by storm, Kasi Mullah was killed, and Schamyl wounded both by bullet and bayonet. But fighting his way through the enemy, the prophet at last escaped, and more than ever confirmed his followers in the idea that he bore a charmed life. It was to General Wiliamineff that the glory of the taking of Himri belonged.

For a time it was believed that the war in the Caucasus was at an end. But far from it. Schamyl still remained at the head of a sufficient number of armed men to free the passes, and secure to themselves supplies whenever such were needed; while in the meantime the native tribes abode in their inaccessible fortresses, refusing all tribute or any kind of submission to their invaders, who were obliged to entrench themselves behind walls, and who could not even leave them for exercise or water, except in numbers sufficient to guard against surprise. In short, from that day to this, while the Russians remain nominally in possession of the Caucasus, the actual truth is that a large Russian army is only maintained there, in forts, on the great lines of roads made by them through the country, veritably afraid to go beyond the reach of their own cannon, except

in overwhelming numbers; while the Caucasians live at ease in their mountain villages and defiles, enjoying the fruits of their rich valleys, and now and then descending into the plains to carry off the harvests of those provinces which actually acknowledge Russia as their master.

Kasi Mullah, the chieftain, was quickly succeeded by Hamsed Beg, who remained equally with his predecessor on the best of terms with Schamyl. In 1834, General Lanskoi undertook another expedition against Himri, which had recovered from its attack by Wiliamineff. The Russians again took it, and this time utterly destroyed it. But to no purpose. In two years time it was again rebuilt, and no traces left of desolation. In 1837, the Russians marched against Ashiltach, which they took after a vigorous defence on the part of the inhabitants, and a still greater loss on that of the victors. But Schamyl having assembled a large force, and marching on them, the Russians were precipitately obliged to retreat without gaining even a foot of ground beyond their military road. During the year 1837, the Emperor Nicholas himself visited the Caucasus, in the hopes of striking terror into the minds of the inhabitants; but with little effect, even though he sent forth a proclamation among them that he had

powder sufficient to blow up even their mountains, should he so please. In this visit, however, Nicholas discovered that the army of the Caucasus was not free from corruption any more than the other institutions of his kingdom; and, in consequence in 1838, General Rosen was, by his command, superseded by General Golovine. Fresh reinforcements were sent to the Caucasus; and his army being raised to 75,000 men, General Golovine determined to take vigorous measures; and accordingly laid siege to Achulko, Schamyl's strongest hold in the mountains. In this siege, as usual, by dint of numbers, the Russians were successful, but with the loss of nearly one-half of the troops employed in the expedition.

In 1840, Schamyl and his followers took the initiative, and attacking the Russian line, took the largest Russian fortress, Nicolägevski, and destroyed others. General Aurep was sent to revenge these indignities, but was obliged to retire with loss. In 1841, General Golovine himself marched against Icherkeg, which he succeeded in taking. But while he was thus engaged, Schamyl descended upon the Russian quarters, and did far more damage to the enemy than his followers had received from Golovine, defeating indeed in detail two large bodies which had been detached against him, and carrying off an

immense amount of booty. To punish Schamyl for this success, in 1842 General Grabbe was detached against Durgo, one of Schamyl's strongholds, but he was obliged to return unsuccessful, more than half his officers having fallen either from fatigue, or the arms of their enemy.

After so much ill success, both Generals Grabbe and Golovine were recalled, though the Emperor acknowledged that their failures had arisen more, as he said, from the fault of the elements than the commanders, thus ascribing nothing to the military skill and valour of Schamyl and his followers. General Niedhardt was appointed to succeed Grabbe; and Prince Woronzoff, in the following year, had more unlimited powers granted him, as the successor of Golovine, than had ever been allowed to any of his predecessors. He was even made irresponsible to the minister at war. But these changes in command were of little avail. In 1844, Schamyl took the Russian forts of Ansorilla and Kluge once Klugavonatt, and desolated the province of Avaria. Niedhardt took the field against him; but being unsuccessful, and Schamyl having escaped to his strongholds with all his booty, Niedhardt was recalled and died of chagrin.

Just at this juncture Count (afterwards Prince)

Woronzoff arrived with an augmentation to the army which raised it to 150,000 men. Since the time of Catherine II. and her favourite Potemkin, no Russian subject had ever been invested with such unlimited authority. Uncontrolled authority was granted to him over all the countries and their supplies, from the Pruth to the Araxes, with the power to reward and punish at his will, and to bring all officers and officials to a court-martial. Woronzoff's only absolute orders were to take Durgo, where was the mountain residence and palace of Schamyl, at any price, and finding he was resolved on it, Schamyl left it almost undefended; but as the Russian army was on its retreat, secure from having been unopposed, Schamyl threw himself upon it with such impetuosity that Woronzoff and his forces were almost entirely annihilated, only the generals and 4000 men escaping from the battle; and these being only saved by the arrival of General Trietag with a reinforcement. The Emperor raised Woronzoff to the rank of Prince immediately after this engagement; but whether as a mark of confidence, or on the principle of his late claims to victory at Odessa, it is impossible to say.

In a conference with Nicholas at Sebastopol during the year 1845, Woronzoff announced his

intention of changing the system of warfare with the Circassians. Instead of making great expeditions against the heads of the tribes, Woronzoff proposed to weary them out by delays and exhaustion, gradually detaching, if possible, the smaller tribes by bribery and corruption, and so to obtain that standing in the country by stratagem, which hitherto they had been unable to effect by force. The Kabardians, inhabitants of the plains to the north of the Caucasus, were the first to submit to pay a nominal tribute to the Russians. To punish them for their defection and throw terror into future tribes, in 1846 Schamyl collecting all the forces under his command, raised a body of 20,000 horsemen, and making a forced march across the mountains, took the Kabardians by surprise, ravaged the country, carried off a number of prisoners and much booty, and returned to his stronghold ere the Russian forces could fall in with them. The following year he was less successful. Having been persuaded by a Russian deserter to try the same plan, and attack fort Golovine, he was betrayed to the enemy, and obliged to retreat rapidly with much loss. A few months later, however, Schamyl made a successful attack on the enemy's centre, and though he was forced to disperse his forces on his retreat, yet he

effected it with little or no loss, having captured much booty, and done much damage to the Russians.

In 1850, the Czarovitch, the eldest son of the Emperor, took part in the Caucasian war, and reanimated the sinking courage of the Russian forces. In 1852, Prince Burietinsky, with a body of 1,500 men, marched rapidly on an aoul of the enemy, by name Rankaleh, through the "Devil's Pass," leaving as many more to defend that position. On their return, having cut to pieces all whom they could meet with, they found the rear-guard engaged with the foe, and it was with difficulty that they could cut their way back to the main body. In 1853, Schamyl made an attack on the forts of the Black Sea, from Redout Kaleh to Naroguiskoi with some success. And throughout the autumn of that year, and the commencement of this, the Circassians have been more than usually active in consequence of the Russians having other foes on hand. But we shall tell more of his performances during this period, in our account of the Turko-Asiatic war with Russia. Schamyl, it is stated, has announced to the Turks that he is ready to help them, or their allies, with 20,000 men, and it remains to be seen whether he and the united French and English forces will permit the Russians

to retain any hold at all on the Caucasus.* Our English fleet has destroyed those forts which have not been voluntarily abandoned by the Russians, and Schamyl has now an unlimited range from one side of the isthmus to the other. Only fort Anapa, the largest and strongest of the Russian forts, remained to them; and this, by the last accounts, has been abandoned, that its garrison might be sent to swell the army of Prince Menschikoff in the Crimea.

There is, at any rate, but little doubt that it is our wisdom to supply the native inhabitants of the Caucasus with the means to free themselves of the presence of Russian forces from one end of the country to another. The Caucasus is a natural rampart against the designs of this enterprising nation, and the inhabitants thereof are the natural and most able defenders of the same. The civilised and regular forces of Western Europe would find themselves at no little loss if compelled themselves to carry

* Since writing the above our newspapers have given to us the accounts of Schamyl's descent upon the Russian territories in Armenia, in August last, at the head of 20,000 of his mountain warriors, and of an entire victory gained by him over the Russians, when the latter lost 4000 men and all their artillery, tents, and baggage; thus creating a powerful diversion in favour of the Turks, of which they have taken full advantage, as will be further detailed in our chapter on the present war.

on a war, either offensive or defensive, in the mountain fastnesses of the Caucasus; the result might very probably be such a catastrophe as that which took place in the mountains about Cabul; whereas the mountain warriors of the district, with their cat-like horses, accustomed to rocks and passes which make the traveller giddy even to look at, only require the help of a diversion to prevent them from being wearied out and overpowered by numbers, to keep their ground successfully, and become a nationality as much to be depended on as their brother mountaineers in the European Alps.

As to the Russian Caucasian warriors, too much can scarcely be said of their bravery and fortitude amid continual reverses and losses by sickness, which would have dispirited every other army in the world. But the Russian army is an automaton. If told to go forward and effect this or that, it goes; and if it cannot effect the object as bid, troop after troop risk their lives in the attempt. Perhaps no army, except a Russian one, would have stood so undauntedly against the prestige of such a warrior-prophet as Schamyl. Let us listen for a moment to his war-inspiring words as he urges on his Circassians to resistance.

"Do not believe that God favours the greatest number! God is on the side of good men, and these are always less numerous than the godless. Look around you, and you will everywhere find a confirmation of what I say. Are there not fewer roses than weeds? Is there not more dirt than pearls — more vermin than useful animals? Is not gold rarer than the ignoble metals? And are we not much nobler than gold and roses, than pearls and horses, and every useful animal put together, for all the treasures of the world are transitory, while eternal life is promised to us?

"But if there are more weeds than roses, shall we then, instead of rooting out the former, wait till they have quite overgrown and choked the noble flowers? and if our enemies are more numerous than we, is it wise for us to suffer ourselves to be caught in their nets?

"Do not say our enemies have taken Tcherkey, besieged Achulko, and conquered all Avaria! If the lightning strike a tree, do all the other trees bow their heads before it — do they fall down through fear of being struck also? O ye of little faith, follow the example given you by the trees of the forest, which would put you to shame if they had tongues to speak. And if a worm devours the fruit, does the other fruit also rot through fear of being attacked in the same way?

"Do not alarm yourselves because the infidels increase so quickly, and continually send fresh warriors to the battle-field, in the place of those whom we destroyed. For I tell you, that a thousand poisonous fungi spring out of the earth before a single good tree reaches ma-

turity. I am the root of the tree of liberty, my Murids are the trunk, and you are the branches. But do you believe that the rottenness of *one* branch must entail the destruction of the entire tree? God will lop off the rotten branches, and cast them into the eternal fire. Return, therefore, penitently, and enrol yourselves among the number of those who fight for our faith, and you will gain my favour, and I will be your protector.

"But if you persist in giving more belief to the seductive speeches of the Christian dogs than to my exhortations, then I will carry out what Kasi Mullah formerly threatened you with. My bands will burst upon your souls like a thunder-cloud, and obtain by force what you refuse to friendly persuasion. I will wade in blood; desolation and terror shall follow me; for what the power of eloquence cannot obtain, must be acquired by the edge of the sword."—*Schamyl, the Sultan of the Caucasus.*

But Schamyl is not only an enthusiast; he is an astute politician and a rigid disciplinarian. When his own mother introduced to him a messenger who proposed a dishonourable peace, after shutting himself up alone in his temple, he declared it to be the will of the Almighty that she should be scourged; and on her sinking under the blows, he subjected himself to the terrible punishment in her place, bearing it as if he did not even feel the terrible infliction. In the tribes under his command, every ten houses is obliged

to furnish and maintain one mounted and armed warrior; and these warriors, like those at Branksome Hall, are bound not to quit

"Their armour bright
Neither by day nor yet by night."

Beside these, he has also under the chieftain Hamsed Beg, a corps of Russian and Polish troops, who have deserted from the army, and a small park of artillery, also taken from the Russians. However, as our theme is Nicholas and the Russians, and not Schamyl and the Circassians, we must leave these interesting mountaineers, and return to consider the domestic policy of Nicholas during the comparative peace he has enjoyed or perhaps borne with in his European dominions, from the termination of the Polish insurrection of 1832 to the commencement of the present war, first with Turkey, and now with the powers of Western Europe also, which commenced in the summer of 1853.

CHAP. XII.

EVENTS, POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC, FROM 1832 TO 1852.

ERE we proceed to the consideration of the present war and the relations of the Czar immediately connected therewith, we have to pass in review the twenty years of comparative peace and inaction which occurred throughout Europe, and even Russia itself in a measure; though, as we have seen, during the whole of that period, a continued warfare was being carried on by it in the Caucasus. Rather, however, than being obliged to look upon the Circassian war as any detriment to the power and general prosperity of Russia, we may consider it, as did the Czar himself, as his nursery for the education and training of his soldiers, as his *Botany Bay* for the punishment of criminals, and also, and still more, as an outlet or safety-valve for the employment of discontented spirits, which will exist even in Russia.

During the whole of this period we must regard the Czar as considering himself as the champion of the cause of *legitimacy* against *revolution*, and of *conser-*

vatism against *republicanism* and *socialism.* At least such was his profession.

The first European undertaking in which we find Russia engaged, after the suppression of the Polish insurrection, was in protecting Turkey in a war between the Sultan and his subordinate, Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt, and his son Ibrahim Pasha. At this period again Turkey had been abandoned by her faithful ally Great Britain to the tender mercies of her rebellious subjects and her treacherous neighbour,—abandoned too, be it remembered, in her hour of weakness, ere she had recovered from the loss of her right hand, Greece, by the permission if not determination of the Western Powers, and the crippling of her own internal strength by the entire destruction of her fleet, as we have seen, at the battle of Salamis.

In the spring of 1833 a fleet from Sebastopol anchored in the Bosphorus, and propositions were set on foot for a treaty with Mehemet Ali. They, however, came to nothing at that time, and in the course of the summer 15,000 soldiers were landed at Scutari to keep a check on Ibrahim Pasha, who had advanced through Palestine as far as the Taurus. When, however, the Western Powers found that Russia had interfered, they also took their parts in

the discussions, and even in the actual war with Ibrahim Pasha; and, at last, in 1841, a peace was effected, and the Russian troops and forces withdrawn; though not till that country had secured to itself the special privilege that the Dardanelles should, as long as the two nations were at peace, be closed by the Porte to the ships of war of every nation except Russia. This stipulation was confirmed by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, a treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and Turkey, which was concluded in 1834.* Then the Black Sea was made, as we found it at the commencement of the present war, a Russian lake; and Russia was left to prosecute without check her schemes for enlarging her navy, for strengthening her defences, and for gradually closing up the mouth of the Danube, and, consequently, the whole commerce hitherto carried on in grain and other products from the south of Hungary and the Wallachian Principalities.

In 1835, the Czar met the King of Prussia at Kalisch, on the pretence of a grand review, but in reality with a view to the discussion of the subject of the republic of Cracow, which was then still existing as an independent state. On his return

* See Chapter IX.

from this expedition the authorities of Warsaw requested an audience, with a view, as may well be supposed, to obtain some amelioration of the manner in which they had been treated ever since the suppression of the insurrection in 1831. Though Nicholas granted them an interview, he would not allow them to address him, but made them the following speech which rang through all Europe, and which, but for the fact that every nation had its own real or fancied grievances to redress, would have raised a crusade in favour of Poland. As it was, active spirits from that time up to 1848 were engaged in raising up a Polish party throughout that unfortunate land and Russia, which but for intervening circumstances might ere this have terminated in the freedom of Poland.

"You have desired to see me, gentlemen. Well then, I receive you. You have wished to make me a speech; but in order to spare you a lie, I have not thought fit that this speech should be addressed to me. Yes, gentlemen, to spare you a lie; for I know your sentiments are not such as you would have me believe, and most of you, if placed again in the same position, would be ready again to begin the revolution. Are you not the same persons, who, five years ago, spoke to me of loyalty and devotedness, and gave me the fairest assurances of your attachment: a few days after, you broke your oaths, and committed

atrocious deeds. The Emperor Alexander,—who did more for you than any Emperor of Russia ought to have done, (I say it because I think so,)—who loaded you with benefits, and favoured you more than his own subjects,—who made you the happiest and most prosperous nation,—the Emperor Alexander was rewarded by you with the grossest ingratitude . . . Actions are required, not words; repentance must come from the heart. You see that I speak to you without anger; you see me calm, without rancour. I have long pardoned your offences to myself and my family. My sole desire is to return you good for evil, to make you happy in spite of yourselves, for so I have sworn before God, and my oaths are sacred . . . . Gentlemen, you have two ways before you; you may either persist in your illusions of an independent Poland, or continue to live in tranquillity as faithful subjects under my government. If you choose to persist in cherishing your dreams, your illusions of nationality, of an independent Poland, and such other phantasms, you can only bring upon yourselves great misfortunes. I have caused the Alexander citadel to be erected here, and I declare to you that on the smallest insurrection, I will have the city cannonaded. I will destroy Warsaw, and certainly it will not be rebuilt by me. It is very painful to me to speak to you in this manner; it is always hard for a sovereign to treat his subjects in such a manner; but I say it for your good. It depends upon you, gentlemen, to deserve that what is passed be forgotten. It is only by your conduct, by showing yourselves faithful to the government, that you can attain this object. No

police in the world can hinder secret intercourses with foreign countries. But you yourselves must exercise the police to prevent the evil.

"In the midst of so many troubles that agitate Europe, in spite of all the doctrines which shake the social edifice, you have the good fortune to live in peace under the eyes of Russia, who remains strong and untouched, and watches for you. Believe me, gentlemen, it is a real blessing to belong to Russia, to enjoy its protection. If you conduct yourselves well, if you perform all your duties, my care will extend to you all, and in spite of everything that has passed, my government will constantly be interested in your prosperity and happiness."

At the commencement of 1836 the Emperor of Russia, in conjunction with the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, surprised the little republic of Cracow by a requisition that all political refugees should be expelled from that city in eight days, or their recognition of its independence would be withdrawn. The senate of Cracow begged for delay; but Russian and Austrian forces marched in, the refugees were sent off to America, the militia disarmed, and the President of Cracow forcibly obliged to resign, and a new one nominated by the Powers. A decree was passed to the effect that no foreigner should henceforth be admitted except furnished with a passport from one of the three Powers; and foreign

troops took up their permanent abode in the town. And so the last remnant of independence in the once constitutional state of Poland was crushed.

And now what remained for the Czar to wish for except for that same Turkey on which he and his ancestors, had so long set their heart? But the Western Powers, and Great Britain especially, had ever taken Turkey under their nominal protection; at any rate, they would not quietly sit by and see Russia seize upon that key to the thronedom of the world without a word. Certainly not, unless, to use an eastern simile, dust could be thrown in their eyes that they should not be aware of what was going on. Other crowned heads had lately set the example of paying friendly visits to their neighbours. Why should not the Emperor Nicholas pay a visit of gallantry and courtesy to the young and fair British Queen? Could there be a better opportunity than when the Duke of Wellington, who had been so trustful and yielding in 1826, was one of the leading members of the Cabinet, and when Lord Aberdeen, so many years a personal friend of the Czar, was another? The visit was resolved on by the politic Emperor, who, accordingly, arrived in London in the beginning of June, 1844, and remained only a few days indeed, but long enough for him to have more

than one private discussion, as it appears, with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen.

The result of the diplomacy effected by this visit was set forth in a Memorandum drawn up by Count Nesselrode in 1844, shortly after the Czar's visit. This Memorandum has been lately made known to the world in conjunction with the opening out of the Emperor's views, as manifested in his conversations with Sir H. Seymour, related in the despatches of that astute and able diplomatist to Lord Clarendon in the spring of 1853. Count Nesselrode thus sums up his own statement: —

"The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner: —

1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that political combination shall be possible.

2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and, in conjunction with each other, to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states, and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

"For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburgh, London, and Vienna. Conflict between the Great Powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with her Britannic Majesty's ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed."

Meanwhile Russia, internally, was not as quiet as might have been supposed by a mere casual observer, or as was continually stated by its monarch. The secret societies and aspirations after liberty, which had been commenced in the reign of Alexander, had been scotched indeed, but not destroyed, by the executions and other punishments consequent on the rebellion at the Czar's accession and the revolution in Poland. Young Russia, keeping pace with, though behind, the socialistic movements of the rest of Europe, was through all this period panting after liberty on one side. On another the ancient Boyards were plotting against a monarch who had interfered with their

ancient and exclusive rights to nobility and the privileges attached thereto; moreover they dreaded the occasional ukases put forth by the Czar in favour of the serfs. Again, the new nobility,—the Tschin, were continually holding secret meetings to uphold their own rights, and to obtain an extension thereof. While a fourth party were the educated serfs, working in towns at different trades and occupations, who thirsted to free themselves from the danger of being recalled to their serfdom by their possessors. Very serious indeed to the Emperor, it is said, would have been these several parties and conspiracies, but that the revolutions and socialistic movements which occurred in the rest of Europe towards the end of the first half of this century frightened those who only aimed at mere liberty, or at most at a constitutional monarchy, and did not wish for the excitement of socialism, or the dangerous freedom of republicanism.

That spirit which was the demolition of other crowned rights was the safeguard of those of Nicholas: and in the fear of too much liberty, all these parties succumbed to still more intense submission to their Autocrat.

Perhaps it was in the dread of what might be coming on himself and his kingdom, that in 1846 and 1847, the Czar invested large sums of money, as much as forty

or fifty millions of pounds, in the English and French public funds. To obtain this, however, great exactions were made in all parts of his dominions; large quantities of corn, especially, were purchased at a fixed cheap rate by the government, and exported at a higher price, though the scarcity which caused a ready market in other countries had extended to Russia itself. In consequence of this, all classes of his subjects suffered; but the serfs especially died by thousands.

In 1848, while the revolutions above alluded to were going on in other nations, the Czar concentrated his forces on the western frontiers of his dominions, that he might strengthen legitimacy, and threaten the aspirers after liberty. With this view also, and that he might demonstrate his own opinions, he put forth the following manifesto: —

"After the benefits of a long peace, the West of Europe finds itself suddenly given over to perturbations which threaten with their overthrow all legal powers and the whole social system.

"Insurrection and anarchy, the offspring of France, soon crossed the German frontier, and have spread themselves in every direction with an audacity which has gained new force in proportion to the concessions of the government. This devastating plague has attacked our allies, the Emperor of Austria and King of

Prussia, and to-day, in its blind fury, menaces even our Russia, that Russia which God has confided to our care.

"But God forbid that this should be! Faithful to the example handed down to us by our ancestors, having first invoked the aid of the Omnipotent, we are ready to encounter our enemies from whatever side they may present themselves, and without sparing even our person we will know how, indissolubly united to our holy country, to defend the honour of the Russian name, and the inviolability of our territory. We are convinced that every Russian will respond with joy to the call of his sovereign. Our ancient war-cry, 'for our faith, our sovereign, and our country,' will once again lead us in the paths of victory, and then with sentiments of humble gratitude, as now with feelings of holy hope, we will all cry with one voice, 'God is on our side, understand this ye people, and submit, for God is on our side.'"

It was in this same 1848 that the war in Hungary had commenced — a war purporting to be carried on between a provisional government, established by the diet of that nation, and the Empire of Austria. It is not our place to point out how little those weigh matters in a proper balance who would liken the case of Hungary to that of Poland. As regards the former, the crown thereof had peacefully been hereditary in the house of Austria for more than three centuries; whereas the throne of Poland had been illegally seized on by the Russians.

Finding, however, in the spring of 1849, that the Hungarian patriots were actually succeeding against the Austrians, and fearing the consequences in Poland, the Czar stepped in to the assistance of his brother Emperor. To excuse the interference of Russia in this matter, Count Nesselrode sent the following circular to the different Courts of Europe where Russian embassies existed.

"April 27. 1849.

"The insurrection in Hungary has of late made so much progress that Russia cannot possibly remain inactive. The Magyar movement has been adulterated by the presence of Polish emigrants, forming whole corps of the Hungarian army, and by the influence of certain persons, as Bem and Dembinski, who make plans of attack and defence, and it has come to be a general insurrection, especially of Poland. Such a state of things endangers our dearest interests, and prudence compels us to anticipate the difficulties it prepares for us. The Austrian Government being unable for the moment to oppose a sufficient power to the insurgents, it has humbly requested his Majesty the Emperor to assist in the repression of a rebellion which endangers the tranquillity of the two Empires. We trust other governments will not misunderstand it."— *Nesselrode.*

It should be stated that some months prior to the putting forth of this circular, General Luders, the commander of the Russian forces in the Danubian

Principalities, had been applied to for aid by the Austrian commander; and that his application had been speedily complied with. In the beginning of February, accordingly, General Luders entered Hungary with 30,000 men, and took up his quarters in Hermanstadt and Kronstadt. At that time, Count Nesselrode excused this proceeding in a note to Baron Brunow, on the plea that the Czar "was solely influenced by motives of humanity," and intended merely to guard the people of Hermanstadt against the cruelties of the Magyars; and "that it had no other political importance than that which ill-will would wish to attach to it."

The Russians, however, were received by these same inhabitants of those districts they came to defend sword in hand. And General Bem having passed the Austrian quarters by a forced march, quickly broke into the Russian quarters, and drove them not only out of Hermanstadt and Kronstadt, but across the frontiers into the Principalities with much loss. Such having been the fate of his first interference on behalf of his brother Emperor, the Czar determined to send more effectual help.

And accordingly in May Russian troops, to the number of 150,000, entered the eastern borders of Hungary. Hitherto the Hungarians had been suc-

cessful in almost every engagement, but from the time that this overwhelming force arrived, further chance of success was hopeless. After in vain endeavouring to encounter and crush the Austrian army before it could form a junction with the Russians; and having again failed in uniting himself to the two other smaller Hungarian armies under Generals Bem and Dembinski respectively, and losing many men in the attempt, General Gorgey, the commander-in-chief, capitulated to the Russians on the sole condition that the Czar should use his influence with Austria "in behalf of Hungary, its armies and generals." This was accorded, and Gorgey with 30,000 men, and 138 pieces of artillery, laid down their arms and surrendered at discretion to the Russian general, Count Rudiger.

The Russian general delivered over all the prisoners, except Gorgey himself, to the Austrians. Gorgey was pardoned.

On hearing of this surrender, all the leaders of the revolution who were not with Gorgey's army fled into Turkey. Russia and Austria demanded of the Porte to deliver them up, and were resolutely refused; and a suspension of relations between the two Emperors and the Sultan ensued. The Turkish vizier, Ali Pasha, "hoped it would not be of long

duration," and sent an envoy to St. Petersburg to offer amicable explanations; on the receipt of which the two Emperors were satisfied, and withdrew their demands.

In 1853, Lord Aberdeen being again in office, the Czar reopened the question of the state of Turkey in a conversation with the English Minister, Sir. H. Seymour. The Czar commenced it by expressing his pleasure that so old a friend as Lord Aberdeen, a friend of forty years' standing, should be placed at the head of the British Government. He proceeded to declare his entire concord with Great Britain, and freedom from anxiety as regarded the West of Europe; but, added he, "as to Turkey, that is another question; that country is in a critical state, and may give us a great deal of trouble." . . . . "The affairs of Turkey, (he explained) are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces. The fall will be a great misfortune; and it is important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs," &c. Turkey, he added again, was "a sick man — a very sick man; and it would be a very great misfortune if he should slip away before all necessary arrangements were made." This conversation took place January 9. 1853. Sir H. Seymour responded

that he did not see that Turkey was in any immediate danger. Again, January 14., Sir H. Seymour was sent for by the Czar, who reiterated his fears about the state of Turkey, and again expressed his desire to come to an understanding with the British Government as to what should be done in case of its dissolution.

"'Now,' observed the Czar, 'I desire to speak to you as a friend and a *gentleman*. If England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly; for my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor, that is to say; for as trustee, I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople.'" — *Despatches of Sir H. Seymour.*

Sir H. Seymour replied that he did not think Her Majesty's Government would be disposed to make any arrangements as regarded the downfall of Turkey, lest a catastrophe so greatly to be deprecated should be thereby hastened. In this he was supported by a dispatch from Lord John Russell, which states that—

"It would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the Sultan, which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction; nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing an European war.' Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by His Imperial Majesty. It is to be inferred, that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the Great Powers of Europe. An agreement thus made and thus communicated, would not be very long secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflicts. They would fight with the conviction that they must ultimately triumph, while the Sultan's generals and troops would feel no immediate success could save their cause from final overthrow. Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which is now feared, and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause of his death."

On being informed of this dispatch, the Czar reiterated his wishes for an arrangement as regarded Turkey, and again stated what he would not permit:—

"'There are several things which I never will tolerate,' said he; 'I will begin by ourselves.' I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians: having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state; still less, will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe; rather than submit to any of these arrangements, I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on. These,' the Emperor said, 'are at once some ideas; now give me some in return.'"

In return, Sir Hamilton Seymour suggested that Turkey might remain as it were under seals, until some arrangement should be made. But that, the Emperor said, would be difficult. Sir Hamilton said, his Majesty looked to the fall of Turkey, while England looked to Turkey's remaining where she is, and to preventing her condition from becoming worse. "Ah," replied the Emperor, "that is what the Chancellor is perpetually telling me."

His Imperial Majesty spoke of France. "God forbid," he said, "that I should accuse any one wrongfully, but there are circumstances, both at Constantinople and Montenegro, which are extremely

suspicious: it looks very much as if the French Government were endeavouring to embroil us all in the East, hoping in this way to arrive better at their own objects, one of which, no doubt, is the possession of Tunis."

The Emperor proceeded to say, that for his own part, he cared very little what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs, and that little more than a month ago he had apprised the Sultan that if his assistance was required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan!

In a word, the Emperor continued: —

"As I before told you, all I want is a good understanding between England, and this not as to what shall, but as to what shall not be done; this point arrived at, the English Government and I,—I and the English Government, having entire confidence in one another's views, I care nothing about the rest."—*Ibid.*

Yet in spite of these assurances from the Czar, that he cared nothing at all for France, no sooner did he find that the English Cabinet entirely rejected his propositions for the division of Turkey ere it had fallen or was likely to fall into their hands, than he repeated the same propositions to the Court of France, with the same attestations of friendliness and reliance

on that court, which had been lavished on the English Minister. They were received, however, by France as coldly as they had been by England. But, meanwhile, *the sick man* was not passing away as rapidly as his loving neighbour could wish. Something must be done to hasten his dissolution. A quarrel must be thrust upon him, and war declared. The chances were against any active interference on the part of Great Britain and France, at any rate till such time as his armies should have passed the Balkan and safely established themselves in Constantinople. And then once in possession, it would be difficult enough to dispossess him. So doubtless reasoned the Czar. We shall see how "the wolf picked a quarrel with the lamb," in our next chapter.

CHAP. XIII.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1853-54.

IT is said that the Great Duke prophesied that the next great European war would be "a war for religious opinions." Such, however, is only ostensibly, not actually, the case. That Nicholas, the Czar, affects to have commenced, and to be carrying on, the present war for the security of the Greek faith and its followers, is very true; but who that has followed him through the wiles of his politics, or even only partially glanced at his diplomatic conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour, and seen through the very flimsy veil which he hung over his cormorant eyes, and earnest longings that "the sick man" should be smothered by his affectionate assistants, can doubt that the territory of the Greek Patriarchate, and not the protection of the patriarch's followers and faith, was that at which he aimed? Let us look a little more particularly into the imperious and Imperial negotiations that preceded the re-occupation of the Principalities. And let our

readers remember that it was only in 1849 that the Russian forces were finally withdrawn from them, and that by the intervention of Great Britain, which was determined that such should be the case. Let them remember, too, that the superincumbent weight being lifted off, these fertile provinces were able immediately to supply England alone with no less than a million and a half of quarters of wheat, thereby considerably interfering with the Russian monopoly from Odessa. Truly we think that the Autocrat's religion was patriotism, or a desire that Russia might be benefited and his own power enlarged, though his pretext was the settlement of the disputes that had arisen in the Holy Land between the Greek and Latin Churches.

It was late in February 1853 when Prince Menschikoff,—he who now commands the army of the Crimea, and was then the general of the Odessa division of the Russian forces—reached Constantinople. But four days after he commenced his series of insults to the Porte by appearing in plain clothes at his first official visit; and went on, after sending a succession of insulting notes, to demand, on the part of his sovereign, that a convention should be signed giving him the protectorate over all the Greek Christians in the Sultan's dominions, whether

they were Russian subjects or otherwise. To this he peremptorily required an answer in five days, under the threat that any delay would be considered as "such a mark of want of respect towards his government that it would impose upon him most painful obligations." To this demand, on the appointed day, May 10th, the Porte returned a calm, dignified, though absolute refusal; to the effect that though the Sublime Porte had "the firm intention of conducting itself conformably to the relation required of it as a good neighbour, and to the bonds of a sincere and faithful friendship, and therefore would be willing to agree to any demands from Russia which would not bring wrong, or damage, or danger" to itself; and as also "his Imperial Majesty had always considered it his most sacred duty to maintain the privileges of his Greek subjects, and all the other classes of subjects in his dominions, so that it was his intention never to destroy their religious privileges;" yet that such a proposition as that made by Russia would "annul and destroy the independence of the Sublime Porte, that it would be an act contrary to the rights of nations and would entirely efface all principles of independence." In the meantime the armies of Russia were moving towards the Principalities, while the fleets in the Black Sea were

making themselves ready for service; and the fleets of Great Britain and France, whose commanders had both been consulted by the Porte, had moved up to the entrance of the Dardanelles to be ready in any case of emergency.

To this refusal of the Porte Menschikoff sent a still more peremptory demand, requiring a decided answer within three days. To render his conduct towards that court still more insufferable, he refused to meet the ministers of the Sultan; but, going to that sovereign's palace, insisted on a personal interview, even though it was on Friday, the Mahommedan Sabbath, and the Sultan was still in retirement in consequence of the death of his mother, which had occurred less than a fortnight before.

But the ministers of the Sultan were not to be so treated: they threw up their office, and the Sultan was compelled to form a new ministry. Their successors offered to renew the negotiations in five days, when they should have had time to consider the different relations in which the parties stood. But meantime Menschikoff announced that his mission had terminated, and he quitted Constantinople on the 21st of May. On this the Sultan sent a message to the ambassadors of the four Western Powers to the effect, that though he had refused to sign the

Russian Convention, yet that it was his intention to uphold and confirm all the privileges of his Christian subjects; but meantime that he was under the necessity of making preparations for war.

The personal insolence of Menschikoff was followed up by a letter from Count Nesselrode to the Sultan, dated St. Petersburg, May 31., in which he insisted on the demands made by the late ambassador, commented on "the moderation and justice of the demands of Russia, and the very great offence given to the Emperor by the opposition to his amicable and generous intentions. A mistrust without motive, and refusal without excuse." He put also before the Sultan his Emperor's "profound regret in looking forward to events which must happen, and the heavy responsibility upon those who provoked them." He concluded by putting Prince Menschikoff's note again into the hands of the Sultan, desiring him to hasten "to sign it without alteration and transmit it to the ambassador at Odessa, where he still was." This letter also informed the Sultan that "in a few weeks' time Russian troops would receive orders to cross the frontiers, not to make war on a sovereign whom the Czar had always looked upon as a sincere ally, but to ensure a material guarantee that the demands made by Russia should be conceded."

This letter was, on the 11th of June, followed by a circular to the Russian agents and ambassadors at the different European courts to the effect that the Czar did not wish to interfere with the existing *statu quo* of Europe, or to aim at the destruction of the Turkish Empire, or indeed to obtain anything except the acknowledgment of that by a convention, which was already conceded by the Sultan in fact. In short, he required an act giving him authority and protection over all the professors of the Greek religion in Turkey, whether Russian subjects or otherwise,—an act which would be tantamount to the Emperor of the French requiring the protectorate over our English Roman Catholic subjects in Turkey, or our own sovereign insisting on having it over all the professors of the Protestant faith in the Sultan's dominions. This circular concluded by an announcement that eight more days were granted to the Porte in which to give its final answer.

On June 16th the Turkish Minister returned as calm and dignified a response to the demands of Count Nesselrode as that which had been returned to those of Prince Menschikoff. It asserted the Sultan's determination to uphold the privileges of his Christian subjects, referring to a Khatti-cherif, issued by him (June 4th) since the commencement of these nego-

tiations, and addressed to the different sovereigns of Europe, but still absolutely refused to sign the Convention. With regard to the threat contained in Nesselrode's notes of "the Russian troops passing the frontiers," he says, "This declaration is incompatible with the assurances of peace and of goodwill of the Emperor. It is, in truth, so contrary to what they (*on*) had a right to expect on the part of a friendly Power, that the Porte knew not how to receive it." He then went on to say that the warlike preparations making by the Porte, were rendered necessary by the large armaments assembled in Russia. He concluded by offering to send an ambassador extraordinary to St. Petersburg, to concert with the ministers of the Emperor an accommodation that should be at once agreeable to his Majesty, and such as the Sultan could accept without detriment to his independence.

This letter was only answered by a manifesto, signed by Nicholas, dated June 26th from Peterhoff, to the effect that, "having exhausted all the efforts of persuasion, and every means to obtain the satisfaction due to his just demands, he had judged it indispensable to cause his troops to enter the Danubian Provinces, in order to show to the Porte the result of its obstinacy. "At the same time," he

adds, "it is not our intention to begin the war; by the occupation of the Principalities we wish to have in our hands a guarantee that shall assure to us the re-establishment of our rights. We do not seek conquests: Russia has no need of them. We only demand satisfaction as to our legitimate rights so openly infringed. We are ready to stop the movement of our troops, if the Ottoman Porte engages to observe religiously the integrity of the privileges of the Orthodox Church. But if obstinacy and blindness lead her absolutely to take a contrary part, then, calling God to our aid, we shall put it to Him to decide our differences, and in entire hope in his all-powerful hand, we shall march to the defence of the orthodox faith." Though this manifesto was signed June 26th, yet it was not published till July 11th; and in the meantime, the Russians had passed the Pruth on the 3rd of July, commanded by Prince Gortschakoff, having previously addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia.

News of this occupation of the Principalities had no sooner reached Constantinople than measures were immediately taken for the defence of the Empire. Selim Pasha was nominated the commander of the Russian forces in Anatolia, and Omer Pasha in Europe. But before we proceed to the military

history of the war, we must follow up the course of the diplomatic negotiations till such time as war was absolutely declared. For, strange to say, in these enlightened days, acts of war were committed, an enemy's country was invaded, battles were fought, fleets destroyed, and towns bombarded, while still all parties openly avowed themselves at peace.

The occupation of the Principalities was quickly followed by a protest from the Porte, dated July 14th, against the entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia, so contrary to the protestations of Russia and to the faith of treaties which had secured that it should not be entered by either of the two Powers except simultaneously. After rehearsing the whole matter from the commencement, the Turkish protest went on to state that it must consider this aggressive movement on the part of Russia as nothing less than a declaration of war, giving to the Sublime Porte the right to resist by means of military force, though it was far from wishing to push its rights to extremity. As a proof to all the world that its desires were peaceable, and with a view still to a peaceable result, it resolved to abstain from all hostile acts;—it should consider Moldavia and Wallachia as houses without a master, though it protested against their occupation by the Russian troops; and meantime it

was ready to redress any religious grievances alleged by the Czar.

But before this Protest came out, a second circular had been issued by Count Nesselrode, to the effect that the occupation of the Provinces had been resolved on in consequence of the removal of the British and French fleets into Besika Bay. This circular was answered by a note addressed by the English and French ministers to their respective ambassadors at St. Petersburg, plainly proving that the order to advance into the Principalities must have been given before the news of the advance of the fleets could have reached St. Petersburg, the order to occupy the Principalities having been dated June 11th, the orders to the fleet to proceed to Besika Bay having been issued June 8th.

It might have been considered that from this time war was virtually commenced. But not so. The Court of Vienna had been bestirring herself to avert a European war. It had concocted a most wily — a truly Austrian note — which it had submitted to the independent sovereigns of Europe, as also to the Czar. The latter had agreed to accept it, and it only now required the acceptance of the Sultan. After a careful consideration the Sultan agreed to receive it with the alteration of two sentences as thus:—

VIENNA NOTE.	TURKISH AMENDMENT.
- - - the Sovereigns of	- - - - - - - - - - -
Russia have testified their	- - - - - - - - - - -
active solicitude *for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused to consecrate them anew by solemn acts which attested their ancient and constant watchfulness* as regards	- - - - - - - *for the worship of the orthodox Greek Church, the Sultan has never ceased to watch over the immunities and privileges of this worship, and of this Church in the Ottoman Empire, and to consecrate anew by solemn acts* which attest &c.
their Christian subjects."	- - - - - - - - - -
The undersigned received	- - - - - - - - - -
orders to declare, that "his	- - - - - - - - - -
Majesty the Sultan would	- - - - - - - - - -
remain faithful to the letter	- - - - - - - - - -
and stipulations *of the Treaty of Kainardji and of Adrianople, relating* to	- - - - - - - - *of the treaty of Kainardji confirmed by that of Adrianople relating, &c.*
the protection of the Christian religion, *and that his Majesty regards* it as due	- - - - - *and to make known that his Majesty regards, &c.* - - - - -
to his honour, &c. . . .	- - - - - - - - - -
and with that which is	- - - - - - - - - -
right, to allow the Greeks	- - - - - - - - - -
to participate in the advantages conceded to the other Christian communities by conventions or particular treaties.	*to participate in the advantages granted, or which shall be granted, to the other communities of Ottoman subjects.*

The Czar refused the note with the above modifications, accompanied with explanations which proved that he desired the protectorate over the whole of the Sultan's Christian subjects amounting to not less than twelve millions.

On the 26th of August, Omer Pasha, General-in-chief of the Turkish forces on the Danube, was commanded to announce to Prince Gortschakoff that hostilities would be commenced by the Turks if the Russians did not abandon the Principalities in fifteen days. On the 1st of September an additional levy of 80,000 men was made by the Porte; on the 10th, the British and French ambassadors, on their own responsibility, ordered up three frigates of each nation to the mouth of the Bosphorus. A last hope was entertained that the interview between the Czar and the Emperor of Austria at Warsaw, and Olmutz, the end of September, might still produce peace; but it was not the case, and the war between Turkey and Russia was at last commenced by a final declaration thereof by Turkey, dated and published the 4th of October. This was read in all the mosques, and contained a statement of the motives by which the Sultan and his ministers had been actuated, and an expression of reliance on the friendship of the four Western Powers. A note from Omer Pasha to

Prince Gortschakoff repeated briefly, the substance of the Sultan's manifesto, but gave another interval of fifteen days for the Russians to abandon the Principalities. To this Prince Gortschakoff replied, that "Russia was not at war with Turkey; and that in any season he should be prepared to evacuate the Principalities as soon as the Czar had obtained the moral satisfaction he demanded; but that in case he were attacked, he should defend himself."

No sooner had the Turkish manifesto reached Petersburg, than it was answered by one from Nicholas, to the effect that "all his efforts to recall the Porte, by means of amicable persuasions, to sentiments of equity and the faithful observance of treaties had remained useless, and consequently he had deemed it indispensable to occupy the Principalities. That the chief Powers of Europe even had sought in vain, by their exhortations, to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman Government. That it had responded to the pacific efforts of Europe, and to his own long-sufferance, with lying accusations against Russia. That at length, having enrolled in the ranks of its armies revolutionary exiles from all Europe, it had commenced hostilities. Russia was challenged to the combat, and had no other course left than, putting her trust in God, to have recourse to the force of

arms." This declaration concludes thus,—"We are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects will join their prayers to those which we address to the Almighty, beseeching him to bless with His hand our arms in this just and holy cause, which has always found ardent defenders in our ancestors. In thee, O Lord, do I hope. NICHOLAS." This was dated the 1st November, 1853. At the same time the Russian Minister, Nesselrode, addressed another circular letter to the Russian diplomatic agents at the several courts of Europe, stating that his Master had had the war thrust upon him, and that he was still determined to wait the course of events and not to take the initiative.

The war commenced in Asia on the 20th of October by an engagement between the Russian forces under General Bebutoff, and the Turks under Selim Pacha in the frontiers of Georgia, in which the latter had the advantage. The first blow struck in Europe was at Isatchi, near the mouth of the Danube.

Still, however, Europe in general could not believe that the barbarities of war were to be reproduced in these civilised and enlightened days; and diplomatic notes to and from the several Powers, and negotiations of different kinds, were carried on for another

six months ere the Czar had quite wearied out the patience of Europe, and brought upon himself a declaration of war by the two great Western Powers.

On the 15th of December a note was addressed to the Porte, signed by the four Western ambassadors, proposing a new negotiation, based on the following grounds; — that, first, the Principalities should be evacuated by the Russians as speedily as possible; secondly, that the old treaties should be renewed; thirdly, the Porte should communicate its firman as regarded its Christian subjects to all the several Powers, with suitable assurances to each of the welfare of their co-religionists; fourthly, that it should declare its willingness to the Four Powers to name a Plenipotentiary to establish a peace on the basis of the three first articles."

To this note the Sublime Porte returned in every respect a satisfactory response. But no progress was made with the Czar towards a peace, though he professed to send Count Orloff to Vienna and the other Courts to open negotiations.

On the 3rd of January, the English and French fleets entered the Black Sea, orders having been sent out to that effect immediately the news of the catastrophe of Sinope had reached England.

On the 29th of January, the Emperor of the

French indited a letter to the Czar, entreating him to listen to reason, and not draw the whole of Europe into a war, the termination of which none could foresee. We give it in full.

"Palace of the Tuileries, 1854.

"SIRE,—The difference which has arisen between your Majesty and the Ottoman Porte, has arrived at such a point of gravity, that I consider it my duty to myself to explain directly to your Majesty the part which France has taken in this question, and the means which I conceive to be calculated to avert the dangers which menace the repose of Europe.

"The note which your Majesty has just presented to my government, and to that of Queen Victoria, endeavours to establish that 'the system of pressure adopted from the outset, by the two maritime Powers, has alone envenomed the question.' But the matter would, on the contrary, it appears to me, have still continued a Cabinet question, had not the occupation of the Principalities transported it all at once from the domain of discussion to that of facts. However, once that the troops of your Majesty had entered Wallachia, we not the less recommended the Porte not to consider that occupation as a *casus belli*, thereby giving proof of our extreme desire for conciliatory measures. After having concerted with England, Austria, and Prussia, I proposed to your Majesty a note calculated to give a common satisfaction; your Majesty accepted it; but scarcely were we informed of that good intelligence, when your minister, by expla-

natory commentaries, destroyed all its conciliatory effect, and prevented us thereby from insisting at Constantinople on its adoption without any alteration. On its side, the Porte had proposed in the note certain modifications which the Four Powers represented at Vienna, considered of a nature to be accepted, but the changes in question did not meet with your Majesty's approbation. Then the Porte, wounded in its dignity, menaced in its independence, and straitened by the efforts already made to raise an army in opposition to that of your Majesty, preferred declaring war to remaining in that state of uncertainty and abasement. The Porte had applied for our support; its cause appeared to us just; and the English and French squadrons received orders to anchor in the Bosphorus. Our attitude with respect to Turkey was protecting, but passive. We did not encourage it to make war, but, on the contrary, incessantly gave to the Sultan counsels of peace and moderation, persuaded that that was the only means of arriving at an arrangement; and the Four Powers came to an understanding to submit to your Majesty other propositions. Your Majesty, on your side, displaying the calm which originates in the consciousness of force, had confined yourself to repelling, on the left bank of the Danube as in Asia, the attacks of the Turks; and with a moderation worthy of the head of a great empire, had declared that you would remain on the defensive: up to that point we were, therefore, I must declare, interested spectators, but still nothing but spectators, of the contest; when all at once the affair at Sinope occurred, and forced us to assume a more decided attitude.

France and England had not considered it advisable to send troops to be landed for the assistance of Turkey, and their flag consequently was not engaged in the conflicts which had taken place on land. But by sea the case was different. There was at the mouth of the Bosphorus 3000 pieces of cannon, the presence of which declared plainly enough to Turkey that the two first naval Powers would not allow any attack to be made by sea. The affair of Sinope was for us as offensive as it was unexpected; for it is a matter of little importance whether the Turks intended or not to land stores and ammunition on the Russian territory. In fact, the Russian ships of the line came and attacked Turkish vessels of a smaller force in the waters of Turkey, and while tranquilly anchored in a Turkish port; and they destroyed them, notwithstanding the assurance given not to wage an aggressive war, and notwithstanding the vicinity of our squadrons. It was no longer our policy which there received a check, it was our military honour. The cannon-shots of Sinope produced a deep feeling in the hearts of all who in England and France have a lively sentiment of the national dignity. With a common accord the cry arose everywhere, that 'wherever our cannon can reach, our allies must be respected.' Thence emanated the order given to our squadrons to enter the Black Sea, and to prevent by force, if necessary, the recurrence of such an event; and thence, too, the collective notification sent to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, to the effect that if we prevented the Turks from carrying on aggressive war on the coasts belonging to Russia, we would protect the sending of stores

and ammunition to the troops on their own territory. As to the Russian fleet, in interdicting it from navigating the Black Sea, we placed it in different conditions, because it was important during the continuance of the war to preserve a pledge which might be an equivalent for the parts of the Turkish territory which were occupied, and might facilitate the conclusion of peace by becoming an object in an exchange which was so much to be desired.

"Such, Sire, is the manner in which events have followed each other, and been connected together; and it is clear that having arrived at this point, they must promptly lead either to a definite understanding, or to a decisive rupture.

"Your Majesty has given so many proofs of your solicitude for the repose of Europe, and contributed so powerfully by your beneficent influences to put down the spirit of disorder, that I cannot entertain any doubt of the resolution which you will come to in the alternative presented to your choice. If your Majesty desires as ardently as I do a pacific conclusion, what is more simple than at once to declare that an armistice shall be signed forthwith, that matters shall resume their diplomatic course, that all hostility shall cease, and that all the belligerent forces shall be withdrawn from the places where motives of war have called them? In that case, the Russian troops would quit the Principalities, and our squadrons the Black Sea. As your Majesty prefers to treat directly with Turkey, you would name an ambassador to negotiate with a plenipotentiary of the Sultan, respecting a convention which should be submitted to the conference of the Four Powers.

Let your Majesty adopt that plan, on which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly in accord, and tranquillity will be restored, and the world satisfied. There is, in fact, nothing in this plan that is not worthy of your Majesty, nothing that can wound your honour. But if, from a motive difficult to be comprehended, your Majesty should refuse, in that case, France, as well as England, would be obliged to leave to the fate of arms, and to the hazards of war, what might be decided at present by reason and justice. Let not your Majesty suppose that the slightest animosity can enter my heart; it experiences no other sentiments than those expressed by your Majesty in the letter which you wrote to me, January 17th, 1853. 'Our relations,' you said, 'ought to be sincerely amicable, and ought to be based on the same intentions,—namely, maintenance of order, respect for treaties, love of peace, and reciprocal kind feeling.' That programme is worthy of the sovereign who traced it out, and I do not hesitate to declare that I have remained faithful to it. I request your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of my sentiments; and it is in such sentiments that I am, Sire, your Majesty's good friend,

"NAPOLEON."

To this letter the Czar responded, that he had earnestly desired to maintain friendly relations with France; that he had made every concession compatible with honour; that he had claimed nothing from Turkey but what was already confirmed by treaties; and that had the Porte been left alone, the

differences between them had been solved. He concludes: —

"But a fatal influence has thrown everything into confusion. By provoking gratuitous suspicions, by exciting the fanaticism of the Turks, and by deceiving their government as to my intentions and the real scope of my demands, it has so deranged the extent of the questions, that the probable result seems to be war." The Emperor Nicholas repeats that the occupation of the Principalities was *preceded* by "the appearance of the combined fleet in the vicinity of the Dardanelles; and beside this, much before that period, when England hesitated to assume a hostile attitude, your Majesty took the initiative in sending your fleet as far as Salamis." He cites this to show that *he* did not "remove the question from one of discussion to one of fact." Again, as regards the Vienna note, he says that the Emperor of the French makes it appear that "the explanatory commentaries of my cabinet on the Vienna note rendered it impossible for France and England to recommend its adoption by the Porte;" but "our communications followed, did not precede, the pure and simple non-acceptance of the note." The Powers, he intimates, are not seriously desirous of peace; war was declared by the Sultan to permit the fleets to enter the Dardanelles without violating the treaty of 1841. Had France and England desired peace as much as the Emperor Nicholas, they would have prevented that declaration of war at any cost; or failing that, they would have confined the war within narrow limits on the Danube, so that he might not

have been forced to abandon a purely defensive system. But when the Turks were allowed to capture one of his forts in Asia, to ravage Armenia, and to transport troops and munitions of war, "could it be reasonably hoped that he would wait patiently such a result." "The affair at Sinope was the consequence of it." If the Emperor of the French desired to become an armed auxiliary, would it not have been more honourable to say so beforehand? If the cannon-shot of Sinope reverberated painfully in England and France, does the Emperor of the French suppose that the 3000 pieces of cannon on the Bosphorus "of which you speak," and the report of the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea, "remained without an echo in the hearts of the nation whose honour I have to defend?" The Emperor Nicholas learns for the first time that Russia is to be excluded from the Black Sea. Was that the way to facilitate peace? "Would you yourself, Sire, if you were in my place, accept such a position?" No. "Menaces will not induce me to recede. My confidence is in God and my right; and Russia, as I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812." "If, however, your Majesty, less indifferent to my honour, should frankly return to our programme; if you should proffer me a cordial hand, as I now proffer it to you at this last moment, I will willingly forget whatever has wounded my feelings in the past. Then, Sire, but only then, we may discuss, and perhaps we may come to an understanding. Let your fleet limit itself to preventing the Turks from sending additional forces to the theatre of war. I willingly promise that they shall have nothing

to fear from my attempts. Let them send a negotiator. I will receive him in a suitable manner. My conditions are known at Vienna. That is the only basis upon which I can allow any discussion. I beg your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments with which I am, Sire, your Majesty's good friend,

"NICHOLAS."

The Czar's letter to the French Emperor was accompanied by a manifesto to his own subjects, which he concludes thus: —

"After a course of proceeding unheard of among civilised nations, we recalled our embassies from England and France, and have broken off all political intercourse with those Powers. Thus, England and France have sided with the enemies of Christianity against Russia combating for the orthodox faith.

"But Russia will not betray her holy mission; and if enemies infringe her frontiers, we are ready to meet them with the firmness bequeathed to us by our forefathers. Are we not still the same Russian nation, of whose exploits the memorable events of 1812 bear witness?

"May the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds! With this hope, combating for our persecuted brethren, followers of the faith of Christ, with one accord let all Russia exclaim, 'Oh Lord, our Redeemer! whom shall we fear? May God be glorified, and His enemies be scattered!'

"St. Petersburg, 9th (21st) February, 1854."

This boastful assumption that the right and the cause of true religion were on his side alone, received a sufficient answer in the House of Lords from the lips of the Earl of Shaftesbury, who brought forward evidence to prove that of late years, while Turkey had done everything she could to advance, Russia, on the contrary, had done all in its power to suppress, true religion and the spread of the Bible throughout their respective dominions. He showed that in Russia, since the commencement of the reign of Nicholas, all associations for the diffusion of Holy Writ or the spread of religion, countenanced though they had been by the Emperor Alexander, were now forbidden; and that, in fact, the Sultan was the protector of Protestant Christians throughout his dominions, from the bigotry and superstition of the Greek Church.

But the correspondence between the Czar and the Emperor of the French has led us too far on. Meantime, many other events had supervened. Count Orloff, who had been recalled from Vienna without proceeding further on his diplomatic journey, stated that the Czar would only negotiate with the Turks on these conditions; 1st, that a Turkish plenipotentiary be sent to the head-quarters of Prince Gortschakoff; 2nd, that the old treaties be renewed; 3rd,

that all political refugees be ordered to quit the Ottoman dominions; 4th, that his protectorate over the Greek Church be accorded.

It will thus be seen that, rather than having modified his propositions, in consequence of the bad success of his arms during the winter, and the resolute intervention of the two great maritime Powers with the threat that they would declare war, the Czar had become more resolute and more exacting on all points.

Nicholas had no sooner heard of the passage of the combined fleets into the Black Sea than he gave directions to his ambassadors in England and France to make the following categorical demand: —

"Whether, if Turkish vessels may carry reinforcements to Turkish ports in Asia, they intended to prevent Russia from doing the same as regarded its own ports?" backing it with a threat that "a chance collision between the Russian and combined fleets might bring on a general conflagration." To this the English Government returned, for answer, that the cases were not parallel. "Turkey, the weaker Power, was assailed, and Great Britain intended to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." On receiving this reply Baron Brunow, the Russian ambassador, withdrew from further diplo-

matic intercourse with the Court of St. James; and orders were sent to Sir Horace Seymour, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, to return home. This discussion took place early in February; and on the 8th of February the Russian ambassadors in London and Paris took their departure. On the 2nd the first English troops had embarked for the East, and very nearly simultaneously the French were also in full activity for embarkation.

Late in February the last ultimatum of the British Government was despatched to St. Petersburg by the Hon. Capt. Blackwood, to the effect that the Czar must withdraw from the Principalities on or before March 30th, or five days after the ultimatum should be received. On the 12th of March Capt. Blackwood received a message from the Czar that he had no reply to make to it. Meantime a strong English fleet had been sent to the Baltic, and the united fleets of England and France had since January been traversing the Black Sea at will. Still, however, in spite of continual reverses to his arms, of the fact that his fleets dared not encounter those of the two maritime Powers, and of great monetary embarrassments, the Czar remained immoveable, refusing all attempts at negotiation on any other terms than those already offered. And at last, on the 28th of

March, war was formally declared in Great Britain by a message from the Queen to the two Houses of Parliament, and in France at the same period by the usual formalities; and on this same day a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Great Britain, France, and Turkey was signed at Constantinople. *

It is true that since this period Austria has from time to time attempted to bring about a reconciliation, but without effect. And now the Czar stands alone in the height of his pride, his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him. Turkey, England, and France are at open war with him. Austria, having professed a strict neutrality for many months, has at last signed a treaty binding herself to go hand in hand with the allied Western sovereigns, and to resist the encroachments of Russia by arms as

* The chief points are, 1. The Porte engages never to negotiate with Russia, without the intervention of the Western Powers. 2. Amelioration of the condition of the Christians.

"A separate treaty is annexed, for the following four points. 1. Abolition of the poll-tax." 2. Right of Christians to be admitted as witnesses in judicial proceedings. 3. Right to hold landed property without distinction of nationality or religion. 4. The civil rights of the Christians admitted in the army and the civil service.

"The destination of the English and French forces was to be left to the decision of the Sultan."

well as by treaties, in case that that power refuses to submit to the conditions proposed to it. The Scandinavian kingdoms are content to sit still and see England and France fight their battles. While Circassians and Tartars in the south, and Poles and Fins in the north are already taking advantage, or apparently preparing so to do, of the extremity of their proud oppressor, to throw off his hated yoke and become again free people. And if ever the sympathies of England, or indeed of Europe, were with an oppressed people, they are with Poland; though perhaps they might be in justice as fully claimed by the other nations whom we have named.

Still it must be acknowledged that the Emperor is almost impregnable in his position of defence. He may fail in every offensive effort; his fleets may be blown up in their harbours; his strongholds both north and south be bombarded, his armies annihilated by arms and disease; but woe betide the people or nation who should dare to take the lion by his beard, and attempt to fight against the natural defences of the broad and uninhabited steppes, the level plains, the tremendous distances, the uninhabitable climate to foreigners during the summer months, and the terrible cold of the winter, wherewith Moscow, the seat of his Empire, is surrounded.

CHAP. XIV.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN OF 1853-54, CARRIED ON IN THE PRINCIPALITIES OF THE DANUBE.

BEFORE we enter on the actual history of this war, it is necessary to say a few words as to the state of the offensive power of Russia and the defensive power of Turkey, as compared with what was the case, as regarded both nations, in 1828-29. As to Russia there is but little that has actually changed in the last twenty years. The same customs, the same autocracy, the same serfdom, the same indomitable will of the Sovereign, and the same unlimited submission of the serfs, the same lengthy distances, the same professions of strength, and the same hollowness of real position are, if travellers are to be believed, as essential a part of the Russian system now as heretofore. True! there is a railroad opened between St. Petersburg and Moscow, but that appears the only tangible advance in civilisation throughout the country. True! as far as regards the military, their arms and their discipline are apparently in accordance with the advancing knowledge and dis-

cipline of the age. True! the fortifications of their several ports and towns are said to have been constructed by accomplished engineers; but how far the construction thereof is to be depended on has been shown at the taking of Bomarsund. True! the ships of war are described as being built on the most approved principles; nevertheless. they have not ventured to try their strength against the allies. True! their guns are pronounced faultless, and their number and weight is said to exceed anything that the Turks could bring into the field; but a specimen of their gunnery will be given in another Chapter. We are, however, bound to admit, that the artillery practice at Sebastopol has been very different from what we were otherwise led to expect.

While, therefore, Russia has been actually standing still, if not worse, Turkey has, on the contrary, been advancing. In 1828, the military of Turkey were, as we have seen, partially demoralised by the destruction of the Janissaries, the overthrow of the system connected with them, and the sudden introduction of a new method of drill, discipline, arms, and clothing. Great discontent prevailed throughout the country, so that more than half the levies which might have been expected were withheld in the vain hope that the Sultan, overborne by his troubles, would give way, and return to the old

system. Now, in 1853, on the contrary, the utmost enthusiasm was manifested by the whole nation on the subject of the war. The Turks as with the heart of one man were evidently animated by a desire to avenge themselves on the Russians for past and present insults. The nation was as a high-mettled horse whose rider dared scarcely to check it. Indeed, had not war been at last declared, the Sultan Abdul Medjid might have been compelled to look to his own life or the tenure of his throne. And when war was at last declared, levies of men from Egypt, from Asia Minor, from the Isles of the Archipelago, money in gifts and loans from wealthy subjects, and all the material of war, poured in as if the cause were private and personal.

It is stated that the forces of Russia and Turkey arrayed against each other were very nearly equal at the time when war was finally declared.

The total number of the Turkish army is said to have been as follows;—120,000 between the Balkan and the Danube, 21,000 in Servia, 50,000 in training in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, all these under the chief command of Omer Pasha; and 100,000 on the frontiers of Georgia in Asia under Selim Pasha. Prince Gortschakoff, on the Russian side, is said to have had 70,000 men fit for action in the

Principalities, and to have been supported by an army in reserve of nearly double that number, while a stream of regiments were spoken of as advancing from all parts of the Empire towards the Principalities.

The Russians, when the declaration of war was first made, were stationed, as in 1828-29, in three divisions, the head-quarters of the army being at Bucharest, where was Prince Gortschakoff, the commander-in-chief. The right wing, under General Aurep, was thrown forward towards Slatina and Krajova; the centre, under General Dannenberg, rested on the Danube and the towns of Giurgevo and Oltenitza; while the left wing, under General Luders, was at Galatz and Ismail, threatening the Dobrudscha.

The first shot fired between the contending parties was in this district at Isatchi on October 23rd. Two Russian steamers attempted to force the passage of the river at this point, and were fired upon by the Turkish garrison. The crews of the steamers, supported by a body of soldiers, attacked the fort, but were repulsed with considerable loss, considering the numbers engaged. The Russians lost a lieutenant-colonel and twelve men killed and 59 wounded. Emboldened by this success, a party of Egyptian troops stationed near, in number about

1300, made a foray into the enemy's country. They were met by a party of Luders' force, who intercepted them in their retreat to the river, but they fought their way bravely through, and re-entered the Dobrudscha with little or no loss.

It is said that Omer Pasha's orders were to break down the bridges over the Danube, and then on the opposite shore, and from the heights of the Balkan, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Russians to cross that river. But Omer Pasha well knew that the possession of bridges is a far better protection than their destruction; as also that to break the spirit of his men by holding them in check, when they were animated by a spirit of enthusiasm almost beyond what our northern coldness can imagine or describe, was destruction to the *morale* of his army; while, on the contrary, a check to the vain-glorious enemy would equally destroy their *morale.* Accordingly, having previously made ready his boats, on the 24th a portion of his forces passed the river at Rustchuk, taking possession of the opposite post of Giurgevo; a second and larger body of his extreme left, consisting of 20,000 under Ismail Pasha, was thrown forward over the Danube from Widdin, establishing itself at Kalafat, being thus prepared

to attack the flank of the Russians on any forward movement; and he himself executed the still more difficult manœuvre of occupying Oltenitza from Turtukai, which he had to attempt in the face of a superior army, and made good his position in spite of being attacked, on three successive days, by General Perloff aided by successive Russian reinforcements. A fourth body occupying the extreme length of this advanced position stationed itself at Kalarache, opposite Silistria. The following was an account of the battle of Oltenitza received from Vienna: —

"The island in the vicinity of Turtukai forms a natural battle-ground. The troops with which the Turks made a beginning on the 2nd, after a corps of about 14,000 men had been concentrated between Tschatalscha and Turtukai, remained concealed in the bushes, favoured by the fog. On the 3rd, about 5000 men were posted on the island, 2000 were on board barges ready to be conveyed to the opposite shore, and about 4000 or 5000 men had already landed on the left bank. During the night from the 3rd to the 4th, the passage was attempted over the smaller arm of the river near the Oltenitza, and was carried out by force of arms. The 2000 troops on board the barges sailed round the island, and were the first to reach the Wallachian shore. The Russian pickets were

posted along the Danube; one of these pickets was at Oltenitza; the reserve were posted at the distance of a shot behind this place, amounting altogether to about 5000 men. During the combat, reinforcements arrived. The engagement commenced at dawn of day. On both sides the troops fought with bravery and perseverance. The cannonade lasted unremittingly for eight hours. Towards noon the contest seemed to draw to a close by the retreat of the Turks to their vessels, but was soon renewed. In the evening the Turks were established along the river-side, and the Russians behind Oltenitza. The conflict is described as an exceedingly murderous one, and the losses on both sides must have been very considerable; the Turks fought with a bravery inspired by an extraordinary degree of fanaticism, which is likely to destroy the illusion which may have hitherto been indulged in, about the military prowess of the Turks."

On receiving the news of the defeat of General Perloff, Prince Gortschakoff, who was stationed at Bucharest, advanced with a strong force to make another attempt to dislodge Omer Pasha from his position north of the Danube. He was, however, met and repulsed on the 11th of November, some miles from Oltenitza, by that general, at the head of a gallant body of infantry and cavalry. That this action was not less severe than those which had preceded it on the 2nd, 4th, and 5th, may be inferred from a letter from a Russian surgeon at Bucharest, which

was published at the time; which shows also the miseries to which the Russian troops were exposed from sickness and want of proper attention.

"In utter ignorance of what is going on a few miles from this place, (for all communications and reports are strictly forbidden,) I write these few lines just to say we are quite over-done with sick and wounded. Besides Brancovan, Kolza, (formerly a prison), Kaduwoda, Michaiwoda, and Sveuta Postulni are full, and many other temporary hospitals have been opened. There is a great want of surgeons, for already we have wounded soldiers from Oltenitza, Kalarasch, Giurgevo, Kalafat, and from before Krajova. Judging from the transport of sick and wounded, there must have been very hard fighting at those places. It is especially noticed that a large proportion of the men have sword and bayonet wounds, as if they had been engaged in hand-to-hand conflicts. The cholera has found victims in all the detachments of the army, but its malignity is abated. On the other hand typhus is very prevalent. One of the great evils of the Russian army here is the practice of lodging the men in huts partially excavated in the earth, and not sufficiently protected against the weather. The men cannot stand its injurious effects, especially in the absence of fuel, of which there is a great lack. The present state of things cannot long continue without leading to endemic and epidemic diseases; from which may Heaven preserve us, in whose memories the horrors of war and plague in the Balkan, in 1829, are still fresh!"

For about a month the Turkish forces remained in this position, while reports reached England that they had marched on Bucharest; and a *Te Deum* was sung at St. Petersburg for their defeat at Oltenitza. Such are the conflicting accounts that the historian of the war has to meet: and it is only by regarding the consequences that the truth can really be arrived at. Where foe meets foe in Oriental or Russian guise, without the witness of a "special correspondent," the result is sure to be that both parties claim the victory.

Soon afterwards occurred the fatal catastrophe at Sinope. A squadron of small Turkish ships, which had been with reinforcements to Katoum, was watched into the harbour of Sinope by some Russian frigates, which, however, though equal in strength, did not venture on an attack without further aid. They sent for reinforcements to Sebastopol and returning with three sail of the line, 120 guns each, and six frigates, and four steamers under Admiral Nachimoff, fired upon, and entirely annihilated, the Turkish squadron, consisting of only seven frigates, one steamer, two schooners, and three transports, not sparing even the town itself. Immediately on hearing the news of this proceeding on the part of Russia, so contrary to its profession that it did not

intend, in any case, to act on the offensive, the French and British ambassadors at Constantinople despatched a frigate belonging to each nation to ascertain the truth of the report. The account brought back by the commanders stated, that the whole of the Turkish squadron had been destroyed, and the town itself made a heap of ruins by the bombardment. One frigate had indeed been secured by the Russians and taken in tow, but it had sunk ere it reached Sebastopol; and one other had escaped to carry the news to Constantinople. At least, 5000 brave men had suffered themselves to be blown up with their ships rather than be taken prisoners, and a few had escaped by swimming to the shore. The Turkish commander, Osman Pasha, who had been taken prisoner in consequence of being grievously wounded, died a few weeks after reaching Sebastopol. A *Te Deum* was ordered at St. Petersburg for this so-called victory, which kindled feelings of indignation throughout Europe as an unheard-of massacre.

At the commencement of December, Omer Pasha had withdrawn his troops from the northern bank of the Danube, at every point except Kalafat, retaining possession, however, of the islands opposite Oltenitza and Giurgevo, from whence he could send shells

into those towns, should the enemy occupy them in force. He made the head-quarters of his army henceforth at the fortified camp of Schumla. The cause for this backward movement has been differently given. Some asserted it was the overflowing of the Danube, others the severe cold with the frosts and snow. But there is little doubt, that it was a *ruse* to encourage the onward march of the Russian force, with the consequent power of taking them in flank, which he possessed by keeping a strong force in Kalafat. He fortified that place strongly, and increased Ismail Pasha's division to the number of 30,000 men.

And thus ended the year 1853. Omer Pasha, with the main body of his army in winter quarters at Schumla; Ismail Pasha prepared for an onward movement from Kalafat and Krajova; the English fleets still in Beicos Bay, though ordered into the Black Sea, to prevent the landing of a Russian force below the Balkan; the Russian centre fortified in Giurgevo, though still watched by the Turkish garrison in the island between that town and Rustchuk; the left wing having attacked the Turkish fort at Matschin, but been repulsed, General Luders, advancing to support it with reinforcements from Odessa, with the view of crossing into the Dobrudscha; Gortschakoff

in head-quarters, strongly fortified at Bucharest; his centre under General Dannenberg, thrown forward on Oltenitza and Giurgevo; his right wing, under General Aurep, entrenched at Citate and Krajova; roads impassable; food scarce; and "the number of the sick," writes a gentleman from Bucharest, to his friend in Vienna, "as we have already learnt, very large, and recently increased in a remarkable manner, as has the mortality among the patients."

The year 1854 began, on the part of the allies, with the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and with their sending an announcement to the authorities at Sebastopol and the other Russian ports that no Russian ships of war would be allowed to make their appearance out of port. Their orders were as follows: "To salute Russian vessels; to warn them to return to a Russian port; to accompany Turkish vessels to different Turkish ports; to cruise off the Turkish coasts; to avoid all collision with Russian vessels; and to prevent the same between the belligerents; not to approach the Russian coasts; and if attacked by Russians to act simply on the defensive."

Immense preparations for war were making at this period in Russia. All officers and soldiers on furlough were recalled to their regiments, the Caucasian

reserve, and all the supplementary divisions of the active army, were ordered to march towards the Principalities, the Czar's aim being to raise the army there from 80,000 to 240,000 men. A voluntary donation of 20,000,000 roubles was at this time "exacted" from the clergy, and an order for an addition to the Russian paper currency of 112,000,000 was issued.

The first week in January orders were sent by Gortschakoff to General Aurep at Krajova to attack the Turkish army at Kalafat. The preparations for this movement having reached Ismail Pacha's ears, he resolved himself to take the initiative, and accordingly on the 6th of January the whole Turkish force marched out from Kalafat, ably supported by the garrison of Widdin under the pasha of that town, and attacked the Russian outposts entrenched at Citate. We cannot do better than quote the graphic account of the battle given by an eye-witness, a correspondent of the *Daily News*.

"Intelligence having reached Kalafat on the 4th that an attack was to be made by the Russians on the Turkish outposts, the Turkish general, Achmet Pasha, determined to anticipate it; and on the 5th a strong *corps d'armée* was despatched for that purpose to the neighbouring village of Maglovet, where they bivouacked during the

night. Next morning they were under arms. As yet no sign had been seen of the Russians. Not a sound was to be heard in the village, not a sentinel even was visible, and it was beginning to be conjectured that it had been evacuated. Six companies of chasseurs, under the command of Tefwik Bey, Omer Pasha's nephew, were sent up the hill to commence the attack, and advanced, firing *en tirailleurs*, but without eliciting any response. They were on the point of entering, when a single cannon shot, followed closely by a whole broadside, revealed the presence of the enemy, who now made their appearance, and seemed disposed to contest the ground on the outside. Some sharp firing followed, but the chasseurs were pushed on, and close behind came the four battalions of infantry under Ismail Pasha, with a battery of field artillery, which opened up a heavy fire, and with great effect. The Russian gunnery was execrable; few of the balls hit, and the shells nearly all burst in the air, and fell harmless. Before the Turks had fired a dozen shots the enemy retired into the village, sheltered themselves in and around the houses, and opened up a deadly fire of musketry upon the advancing column. Ismail Pasha's appearance at this moment struck all who saw him with admiration, as it spoke volumes for his daring hardihood as a soldier, though it said but little for his prudence as a general. He rode into the village at the head of the troops sword in hand, mounted on a white horse, his orders glittering on his breast, and wearing a white pelisse, the mark for a thousand bullets at every step. But he seemed to bear a charmed life, for, though two

horses were killed under him, it was long before he was wounded, and then only slightly in the arm. As the troops came on the loss began to get heavy. Men were falling on every side, and a rush was made on the houses with fixed bayonets. The conflict which followed was terrific. The Russian contested every wall and room with desperate courage, and were literally massacred *en masse*. No quarter was asked or given; the Turks, enraged by the resistance, slaughtered all who came in their way, and, to do the Russians justice, they sought no mercy at their hands. The officers were seen, in some instances, pulling down their caps tightly on their foreheads, and rushing madly on their death, scorning to yield. In little more than an hour the high road, and the space round the houses, were covered with dead, 'heaped and piled,' and the blood ran down the hill, literally in rivulets. The conflict raged in this way for nearly four hours, and the loss on both sides was heavy, particularly on that of the Russians, who had about 1000 dead. Of the five companies of Turkish chasseurs, one was annihilated, numbering 100 men, while of the remainder of the force, upwards of 150 were killed. Towards twelve o'clock, every house had been carried at the point of the bayonet and the enemy fell back along the road, but found themselves intercepted by the Turkish cavalry, two regiments of which had advanced along the ravine on the right, and stationed themselves in the rear of the village. Being thus cut off, the Russians had no resource but to fling themselves into the redoubt, carrying their artillery with them. This they were

enabled to accomplish in safety. It was now about twelve o'clock; and another half hour would in all probability have seen the destruction of the remaining Russians, if the attention of the combatants had not been distracted by events of weighter importance in another part of the field. As we feared, intelligence of the attack reached the Russian forces at Musisi and Baylesh, and other villages, and towards noon they were descried advancing towards the scene of action in large black masses along the plain fully six miles distant. They approached rapidly, no doubt incited by the sound of the sharp firing in the village, and by half-past twelve they had arrived within 2000 yards of the Turkish reserve, which was quite prepared for them. It was now easy to estimate their force, consisting of nine battalions of infantry, a regiment of Hulans, and a regiment of the Paskievitz Hussars, with sixteen guns, in all about 10,000 men. Four battalions advanced in line, three in column, as a second line, and two as a reserve: the cavalry and artillery were placed on the flanks, and their march was directed towards the Kalafat road, so as to cut off the retreat of the Turkish troops completely, and, in fact, to place them between two fires. Five Turkish battalions of reserve were all that remained at the foot of the hill, and with these Achmet Pasha resolved to repulse this new attack, by making front in his rear, a movement of great danger, which few troops in the world have the steadiness to perform. The report of an enemy in the rear is generally sufficient to spread a panic through the bravest and best disciplined army. In this case there was no

other resource, as the position was one of desperation. On the side of the hill below the ravine on the right was a sort of old fence, enclosing a square space of ground, probably used by the villagers as a sheepfold, but a long while ago, as the ditch is half filled up, but enough still remains to make it a position easy to defend. The Turkish troops were deployed to the right, above the enclosure, three battalions in line, and two in reserve, the right wing behind it, and the left extending into the plain; on the right flank was placed a battery of four twelve-pounders, and on the left one of six field-pieces. The cavalry at the village was recalled, and in conjunction with those of the reserve, was stationed on the left, one regiment a little in advance of the rest. The time occupied in making these arrangements was one of painful suspense; and even when all was completed, the smallness of the force, as compared with that which was advancing with ponderous steadiness to attack it, was enough to make the stoutest heart quail. There was no retreat; defeat was death. Nothing remained for the Turkish troops, in case of a reverse, but to retreat on the village, and then sell their lives as dearly as they could, and this was the resolution formed by every man on the ground. The advance of the Russians was an imposing sight. Nothing could exceed the steadiness of their march, every line and column stopped in time as one man, and all the distances were as accurately observed as if they were parading at St. Petersburg. As they began to get nearer, three or four officers rode out in front to reconnoitre the ground, and then hastily retired;

immediately afterwards the two battalions of reserve changed their position, and advanced with two pieces of artillery towards the ravine on the right of the Turks, but as soon as they became aware that it was impassable they halted. The artillery on the right now commenced its fire, and the manner in which the guns were served would have been laughable, if anything could have been laughable in a scene so awful. The balls flew over the heads of the Turkish troops without ever shaking them, sometimes at such a ridiculous great distance as to make one fancy they were fired at random. They did no damage whatever, except killing two troopers who were passing from one part of the field to the other, in a place where no one would have expected a shot at all. I am now literally stating a fact. The Russian artillery appears to be about the worst in the world. That of the Turks now opened its fire, and the first shot showed to what perfection they have brought this arm of the service. One could watch each ball in its course from the moment it left the gun till it plunged into the Russian column, opening a lane through the living mass. Then came the confusion amongst the men, and the gradual dressing up of the line, till other balls played the same havoc. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Hadji Mustapha, the officer commanding the Turkish artillery, for the admirable manner in which he worked it. All was not sufficient, however, to check the advance of the enemy, who moved on with the same stolid audacity. At last one of their balls struck one of the Turkish field-pieces, and dismounted it: the fire slackened mo-

mentarily, while it was being set to rights. The Russians taking this as but the prelude to a total cessation, suddenly closed up into a serried column, and prepared to make their final advance with the bayonet upon the Turkish line. The Turkish batteries now opened up a tremendous fire of grape, every shot telling with fearful effect upon the close ranks of the column, sweeping them away one after the other as fast as they were filled up. The infantry at the same time becoming impatient, the order was given to advance, and the whole line came forward, the right wing entering the enclosure, and fired and loaded as they marched, and shouting out their national war-cry. The Russians for some minutes bore up bravely, but at last the head of the column began to waver. In vain the officers urged the men to move onward. Human nature was gaining the ascendancy; and at last, broken by the iron shower from the batteries, and the close and raking fire of the musketry, they fell into disorder, and turned and fled pell-mell across the plain, casting aside everything,— muskets, and even musical instruments. The order was instantly sent to the cavalry to pursue, but the aide-de-camp was unable to find the commanding officer in time for the charge to be made with effect, and unfortunately the Russians were allowed to return and carry away their artillery, which they had at first abandoned. It was now about half-past two or three o'clock, the ammunition was running short, and the troops were exhausted by nearly eight hours of combat, standing up to their knees in mud. Two attacks had been made upon the redoubt,

but had been repulsed, and Achmet Pasha deemed it prudent on the whole to retire. The march was begun shortly after three o'clock, and early on the following morning the last battalion had reached its quarters. The loss of the Turks, according to the official reports, is 33 killed, and 700 wounded; that of the Russians 1,500 dead; but it is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the number of their wounded, but it cannot have been less than 2000. It was in the village that the Turks suffered most. In the combat on the plain they only lost 15 men in killed, and 69 in wounded; while whole companies of the Russians were swept away by single discharges. In the streets of the village the Russian dead lay in heaps, and amongst them great numbers of officers of every rank. During the following night the force which had taken refuge in the redoubt abandoned it, and having hastily buried their dead retired from the village altogether. The same movement has taken place along the whole Russian line, and not one of their troops is now to be found in the village recently occupied by their outpost. The Turkish wounded were brought into Kalafat in carts during the following day and night, and passed across the river to Widdin to be placed in the hospitals. The poor fellows seemed to treat their misfortune very lightly, talking and laughing in the boats with so much hilarity that but for the blood and bandages one would scarcely imagine that they were not sound, both in wind and limb. Nothing can exceed the joy and enthusiasm of the army. Every soldier has carried off a trophy of some kind,—scarfs

swords, muskets, &c.; and groups may be seen standing at every corner in Kalafat, discussing with animated gestures the various details of the action, and crowing over the rout of the 'Moscoviz.' One great encouraging fact has at all events been established by the victory — the complete superiority of the Turkish infantry and artillery to that of the Russians, not behind entrenchments merely, as so many people imagine, but in the open plain, and under many disadvantages as to number and position."

General Aurep is said to have been severely wounded in this engagement. The Turkish army, with their wounded, returned to their fortifications in Kalafat, while the Russians not only retreated to Krajova, from whence they had made the attack, but even fell back upon Slatina, so as to be more within reach of aid from Gortschakoff at Bucharest. General Aurep* was superseded by General Liprandi, as a punishment for losing the battle.

About the end of January the Greeks throughout Albania and Epirus, excited by Russian emissaries, rose almost simultaneously against the Turks. They met at first with much sympathy from Otho King

* Accounts were afterwards received of the death of General Aurep by his own hand, in consequence of mental distress.

of Greece, but any assistance on his part was effectually stopped by the representations of Great Britain and France, and later in the year a French and English force was stationed in the Piræus to check any national demonstration. In narrating this we have somewhat advanced in time, but it was necessary to mention the fact, as it accounts principally for Omer Pasha's throwing so much more strength than might otherwise have been considered necessary into his left wing, thereby rather weakening his own power of meeting the enemy on the north of the Danube with his centre and right.

In the beginning of February General Schilders, the head of the Russian engineering department,—the same who had taken Silistria in 1829,—reached Bucharest from Warsaw, whither he had been despatched. His first communication to the Czar giving a description of the state in which he found the Russian army might well have discouraged a less determined man than Nicholas. He stated that from the commencement of the war to the present moment the Russians had lost above 35,000 men in the Principalities; of whom many had fallen by the fate of war, but the greater part from fatigue, hunger, and disease.

Early in February Omer Pasha again made good

his ground on the north of the Danube at Giurgevo, Oltenitza, and Kalarache; and continued skirmishes took place, "filling the Russian hospitals with wounded men," the Russians by this time having assembled 200,000 men, 1304 guns in Wallachia, and General Schilders having orders to "take all the towns as rapidly as possible." And thus matters went on for above a month, when Prince Paskievitch arrived to take the command in the Principalities. He removed the head-quarters of the army to Ibrail, and withdrawing the right wing from Krajova towards Nicopolis and the Schyl, strengthened his left with a view to the occupation of the Dobrudscha, which was accomplished on the 23rd of March by General Luders at the head of 20,000 men. Omer Pasha withdrew his troops after several skirmishes, in which the Russians suffered far more than the Turks, to the vicinity of Trajan's Wall, which runs from the Danube at Chernavowa to the sea at Kustendje. In consequence also of continued and repeated attacks from Prince Gortschakoff and General Schilders, on all his posts north of the Danube, the Turkish general, though successful in repulsing every attack with much honour to himself and great loss to his enemies, gradually drew back first on one point, then on another, unable to withstand the fresh forces that were daily brought up

against him. At last nothing remained to the north of the Danube but the strong division under Ismail Pasha. It is stated that Omer Pasha wished nothing better than that the Russians should cross the Danube and expose themselves to the marshes of the Dobrudscha.

And now came the landing of the British and French troops at Gallipoli, the bombardment of Odessa by the fleets, the declaration of war on the part of the allies, and a squadron of the combined fleets stationed near Kustendje to prevent the Russian forces from receiving either reinforcements or provisions by sea. On the 6th of April, the Turks were again successful in resisting an attempt of the Russians to get possession of Kalafat; the latter were repulsed with much loss. But gradually the Russian army rolled on, receiving checks indeed, and losing men wherever they encountered the Turks; but obliged to advance by the imperative orders of their Czar, and enabled so to do by their daily additional reinforcements. Omer Pasha on his side gradually withdrew again into his fortified camp at Schumla, awaiting the arrival of the French and English forces, but leaving a strong garrison in Silistria, with that town ably fortified. By the 20th of April, Prince Gortschakoff and General Schilders, with 50,000 troops, lay opposite Silistria to the north, and General Luders, with

some 20,000 more, to the east; while little more than 15,000 fighting men were available for its defence.

Early in May the investment of Silistria was completed, and seventy cannon having been put into position by General Schilders, the bombardment commenced about the 12th. On the 15th, Prince Paskievitch arrived, and having ordered the bombardment to be stopped, sent a summons for the surrender of the town. The governor, Mussa Pasha, however, rejected all terms, and the bombardment recommenced. Between the 16th and 26th of May, the Russians, anxious to take the town before the reinforcements of the allies, who were daily landing at Gallipoli and Scutari, could arrive, four times assaulted the place, but were repulsed by the garrison with great bravery and much loss to themselves. On the latter day the first detachment of the allied armies landed at Varna. Feeling himself now strong enough to relieve the town, Omer Pasha advanced with all the troops he could muster, and throwing in a reinforcement of 8000 men on the 20th, returned to his entrenched camp, apparently with the intention of awaiting the arrival of farther aid. Two British officers too, Capt. Butler and Lieut. Nasmyth, had made their way into the town, and aided considerably, by their knowledge of tactics and bravery, in its defence.

Meantime the left wing of the Turkish forces did not leave the Russian right without work. He worried it by continual attacks, until it had been obliged to draw in on the centre beyond the Aluta.

But this was only a part of what the Russian forces had to bear. In addition to daily loss by sickness, the Turks were active on all points, and especially vigorous in the way in which they resisted the attacks on Silistria.

On the 28th of May, another vigorous attack was made by the Russians on the entrenchments of Silistria. So strong was the supporting body, so determined were the whole army that "Silistria must fall" — the last orders of the Czar,—that the forlorn hope was actually pushed within the Turkish redoubts. But to no purpose. The Turks fought like lions; and though they lost only 100 men, 1500 Russians with their arms were left on the edge of the entrenchments. Again, on the 2nd, 5th, and 9th of June, the assault was renewed, to terminate in a similar manner, though with the unfortunate loss of the brave Mussa Pasha, the commander, on the 2nd. After this, however, Omer Pasha threw in another reinforcement of some 5000 men. These aided to resist another tremendous assault on the 13th, when Prince Paskievitch was severely wounded, and

General Schilders lost his leg. On this latter day three mines had been sprung; but all to no avail, the determined gallantry of the Turks, aided by the wisdom, watchfulness, and order of their leaders, was equal to the determined resolution of 70,000 Russians, *commanded* though they were by their Czar to take the place. The graphic accounts given by our newspaper correspondents of the resolute manner in which, when his brother in arms was struck down in the entrenchments, the Turk took his working tool and continued the labour, will be remembered by some of our readers.

"For the most part, the patient Osmanli displayed the spirit of a true soldier. As he smoked, or rather sucked, a pipe in which there was no longer any tobacco (the facts have been witnessed), he lay at the bottom of a trench, watching with envy the better supplied comrade whose tarboosh rose above the level of the margin, because that comrade worked with a spade, and was therefore on his legs. A cannon-ball sweeps away the red cap and the head within it. The recumbent spectator arises, saying 'Allah is great!' He takes the spade from the yet warm hand, disengages the margilly from the clenched teeth, and fills the brief vacancy—his own tarboosh now surmounting the clay embankment. Soon the place is again vacant, and a successor, equally intrepid and equally serene, continues the excavation; and

in ten minutes, it has thus taken, as it were three generations of valiant Osmanlis to fortify one soldier's post in a bombarded entrenchment, and while doing so, to smoke one pipeful of Latakai tobacco."

After the attack on the 13th the Russian army gradually retired. It was some little time, indeed, before the garrison could believe that such was actually the case, as tents, &c. remained standing, and every care had been taken to conceal the fact. But no sooner was it ascertained, than the garrison, supported by the forces at Schumla, hung on the rear of the retreating army, harassing them all the way till they had reached Bucharest.

And thus the Russian invasion of 1853-54 was completely repelled by the Turks. It was in vain that Prince Dolgorouki, the minister of war, was sent on an express mission by the Czar to inquire into the causes of the disasters of his arms: there was but one way of accounting for the same; his best generals had been out-manœuvred, his choicest troops beaten in hand-to-hand conflicts; and when added to this came the old story of sickness, and marsh fevers, and cholera, and want, and fatigue, we may well account for the fact that it has ended in disgrace and disappointment to the Czar and his choicest generals.

While we have been following the fortunes of the brave defenders of Silistria, we have a little overlooked the proceedings carried on in other places. On the 26th of May, the first portion of the allied forces had, as we have seen, landed at Varna. But eight days previously, Lord Raglan, Marshal St. Arnaud, the Turkish Seraskier, and Omer Pasha had held a council of war at Varna, when the latter general expressed his willingness to act in conjunction with the allied generals, and not, as had at first been proposed, as the commander-in-chief.

Paskievitch, Schilders, and Luders, having been all wounded in the course of the siege of Silistria, the chief command of the retreating army devolved on General Dannenberg. The Turkish forces appear to have harassed him at every step in his retreat. On the 20th and 23rd of June, the vanguard attacked the Russian rearguard fiercely at Rassova, and drove it beyond Trajan's wall.

On the 5th of July the Turks crossed the Danube at Giurgevo, and drove out the enemy, killing and wounding, after two days' fighting, nearly 1200 men, The Turks, however, lost nearly as many; among others, three English officers, who had joined the Turkish advance, fell covered with wounds. On the 8th another body crossed at Turtakai, and took possession of Oltenitza.

Meantime the Russian head-quarters had been again established at Bucharest, to cover the retreat from Silistria. General Liprandi had been sent to occupy the line of the Pruth, with a view to check the advance of the Austrian forces, which by agreement with the allies were expected to occupy the Principalities.

Advancing bodies of the Turkish army gradually pushed forward, till the whole of Omer Pasha's forces lay on the north of the Danube, trusting to the allied armies to guard the Balkan. On the 10th the last remaining portion passed the Danube at Turna, and formed a junction with the left wing, which had always remained at Kalafat. A day or two after this junction, the forces from Giurgevo pushed forward to Frateschi, within eight miles of Bucharest, and, driving out the Russians, established themselves therein.

On July 23rd Prince Gortschakoff having received orders finally to retreat, issued an address ere he quitted Bucharest, which commenced thus: —

"His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, King of Poland, and Protector of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, protector of all who profess the Greek orthodox faith, has resolved to cause the Imperial troops to quit the insalubrious regions of the Danube for a short

space, and withdraw to the healthier mountain-lands." He goes on to say, "I find myself necessitated, on evacuating Bucharest, to leave thirty sick and wounded, who cannot bear the fatigue of transport. I do not know by what troops the metropolis of Wallachia will be occupied: to whatever nation however they may belong, I am convinced that in their hands I can confidently place the fate of these sick and wounded Russian soldiers; and that their treatment will not only be in accordance with the laws of humanity, but that your Excellency, in consideration of the especial care bestowed on the wounded at Sinope, and those of the Tiger in Russia, according to the commands of his Majesty the Emperor, my illustrious lord, and in consideration of the care taken of the sick and wounded who have fallen into the hands of the Russian troops under my command, will render the obligation reciprocal by acting towards these prisoners in a like manner."

On the 7th of August the vanguard of the Turkish army entered Bucharest; and three days later Omer Pasha himself established his head-quarters there, in the same place where Prince Gortschakoff had so long reigned supreme; thus establishing completely his superiority over that general, as well as that of the Turkish forces over the Russians. For it must not be forgotten by our readers, that not a blow had been struck by the allied armies in Turkey. True, they occupied suc-

cessively Gallipoli, Scutari, and Varna, and their presence may have given strength to the onward movements of Omer Pasha; but the Russian forces were virtually defeated — defeated in the field and in tactics — before either the French or English armies had arrived at Varna.

On the 23rd of August the Austrian forces entered the Principalities, occupying the passes of the Carpathian Mountains opposite the Sereth, on which river the main body of the Russian forces had retreated, having also at this time withdrawn their left wing to Ismail.

On the 13th of August the following proclamation was put forth by the Czar and read to "his faithful subjects" at Odessa: —

"In his exalted wisdom, his Majesty the Emperor has ordered the withdrawal of the troops which had entered Moldavia and Wallachia, and commanded their presence here, where the danger is greater. In order to the protection of the Danubian Principalities *against an invasion by the Turks, the ancient ally of his Majesty the Emperor undertakes the duty of temporarily occupying those provinces.* In this place we have to do with a new enemy, who entertains the wicked and presumptuous intention of attacking us in our own country. This enemy has been repeatedly fought and vanquished by our brave fathers. From you his Majesty the Emperor expects the like. By your bravery and discipline you

will conquer and utterly defeat the foe. This new enemy is more expert and courageous, and better led than are the Turks; nevertheless, your valour and might will suffice to overcome him, as your fathers have done before you. In the battle with these French, think of the glorious year 1812, when the Heavenly Father prepared also his armies against these godless and presumptuous men, and caused them all to perish amid ice and snow."

On the departure of the allied armies from Varna, the Turkish reinforcements hitherto stationed at Adrianople advanced and occupied that position in force, forming as it were the right wing of the Turkish army, and keeping up communications with Schumla, while the same was done between Schumla and Bucharest by the former right wing. There Omer Pasha was still stationed, having thrown forward his advanced corps across the Jalumnitz, so as to keep in view that part of the Russian forces stationed at the junction of the Sereth and Danube.

That the Russians again at the commencement of October advanced into the Dobrudscha, is now asserted. But this step, if true, is probably with the view of preventing the Turkish forces stationed at Varna, and offered by Omer Pasha to the allied army in the Crimea, from leaving the country. We can hardly think that the Czar could for any less

urgent reason have ventured on this hurried movement at such a time, and under such circumstances, more especially with the enemy so strong in his flank and rear. But the Czar of Russia is slow to profit by experience, or to believe ought, but that his armies — perhaps because they are his — are irresistible. He is reported to have said, alluding to the defeat of his forces at Giurgevo in July: —

"I can understand the defeat at Silistria, but to be forced, with so great a loss, by a horde of wild, half-naked Turks, from positions which have been occupied and fortified for a year; — that these Turks should first sustain an engagement, then storm the islands fortified by us, and lastly, have paid in blood for every inch of ground gained on the left bank of the Danube; — all this I cannot understand."

CHAP. XV.

THE ASIATIC TURKO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1853–54.

We must now turn to the proceedings of the Russian forces in Asia, at the commencement of the Turkish war in October, 1853. That the arms of Russia have been more successful in Asia than in Europe, in this war, there is little doubt: though we must entirely deny that they have met with any real success, or have gained one foot of territory. As late as August, 1853, news had reached Europe of successes gained by Schamyl over the Russian arms in Circassia. Here Prince Woronzoff was still commander-in-chief, having under him the experienced general Bebukoff and Andronikoff, and at least 100,000 men in full order for fighting. In the autumn again, just before war was declared between Russia and Turkey, Prince Woronzoff's forces were attacked by Schamyl at the head of 20,000, who could not be compelled to retire till Russian reinforcements, making up nearly double the number of Schamyl's forces, had arrived to the rescue.

Shortly before war was declared by the Porte, Selim Pasha, having under him General Guyon, an Englishman, and Abdi Pasha, a general of division, was appointed to the command of the Turkish army in Asia. This appointment was very far from being as judicious as that of Omer Pasha in Europe. Selim Pasha, though not deficient in courage, was at once conceited of his own abilities, irresolute in making decisions, and jealous of General Guyon. He wanted the enlightened largeness of mind which led Omer Pasha to profit by all new European improvements in the science of war and discipline. His wisdom too had been to act more than he appears to have done in concert with Schamyl. His army amounted to about the same number as that under Prince Woronzoff, but the artillery on the Turkish side was not nearly so heavy as that of the Russians.

The first blow actually struck in the war at all, was by Selim, at Kars on the confines of Georgia. He was out reconnoitring on the 20th of October, when suddenly a body of Russian cavalry appeared: Turkish reinforcements were called up, the Russians on their side were supported by some 15,000 infantry, and a sharp engagement took place, in which the Turks had the advantage, and pursued the Russians

to Orelle, which place they took as well as two guns; they made 144 prisoners, while 600 more of the Russians were left dead on the field. Another conflict shortly after took place at Batoum, in which both parties claimed the victory.

Again, later in October, a regular engagement occurred at Chevdeky, where the Russians had intrenched themselves strongly. Selim Pasha took the place by storm, and the Russians gave way, leaving three guns, 100 prisoners, and a large number of dead. In the town, too, the Turks found a store both of ammunition, muskets, and flour. Having sent on a body of troops to Redout Kaleh, Selim Pasha seems now to have turned aside for the purpose of keeping up his communications with Schamyl, to take the fortress of Gumri, situated between Kars and Teflis. The intentions of the two commanders were, as it appears, that both should march northwards, the Turks under General Guyon by the way of the sea-coast, and Schamyl along the passes in the interior, thus cutting off Prince Woronzoff's communications with Russia; while Abdi Pasha was to be left in command at Bayazid.

On the 15th of November, a strong marine force, sent from Sebastopol, attacked the fort of St.

Nicholas belonging to the Turks, and situated at the nearest point to their own territories, but without success. They were repulsed five times successively. One of their frigates, with 1500 men, stranded; and the whole of the crew were either lost or taken prisoners by the Turks.

The division which had been sent forwards to Redout Kaleh succeeded in taking it, as did Schamyl in forcing the pass of Dariel; and the position of Prince Woronzoff at Teflis, watched as he was by Selim Pacha at Gumri, and Abdi Pasha at Bayazid, became somewhat critical. To relieve himself from some of his foes, he seems to have assumed the defensive in the province of Kars on November 1st, and to have attacked that division of the Turkish forces which was stationed under Abdi Pasha at Bayazid, but without success. And while thus engaged, Selim Pasha took advantage of his being otherwise engaged to take the fortress of Saffa, near the coast, after gaining an advantage over a strong body of the enemy at Okeska, and even to advance rapidly and storm Akhaltsik. Abdi Pasha, too, following up his success, had on his side advanced towards Teflis. Obliged to strike a decisive blow or make a dishonourable retreat, Woronzoff sent a strong division commanded by General Bebukoff to Gumri, and another

equally strong under General Andronikoff to Akhaltsik. Both divisions engaged the enemy, and both were successful, the Turks losing in one engagement a cannon and two standards, and in the other near Akhaltsik, 4000 men slain on the field of battle. The cause of these defeats was to be attributed entirely to bad generalship, and not to a want of bravery and determination in the men. They were beaten in detachments, small bodies of the Turks being exposed one after the other to the furious attacks of strong bodies of the enemy. On the other hand, the Turks represent that they had maintained their ground, and had completely, with the aid of Schamyl, cut off the communications of the enemy with Russia. And certainly they had to show, as the result of their first two months' warfare, the cities and fortresses of Gumri, Redout Kaleh, and Kislar, though the first was abandoned in the course of the winter; while Schamyl had also captured several forts in the interior, and had defeated a corps of 15,000 Russians under General Orlianoff. But, nevertheless, as a consequence of the late Russian successes, the Turkish forces were obliged to withdraw into their own territories, Abdi Pasha was superseded by Kerim Pasha, and other new arrangements proposed in the Turkish forces.

The Czar on receiving the news of Woronzoff's successes, wrote him an autograph letter, congratulating him on having "annihilated the presumptuous attempts of Schamyl," and on having "won a series of brilliant victories over the Turks."

What were his successes over Schamyl, neither Turkish nor Russian records have brought to light. And certain it is, that towards the end of the year, Schamyl succeeded in receiving both arms and ammunition which were sent him from Turkey.

After remaining inactive for a month or six weeks during the depth of the winter, the Turks appear to have resumed the offensive towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Gumri, under Khousouf Pasha, otherwise General Guyon. But the return of cold weather, or other causes, arrested any real hostilities till the end of March, when we again find Schamyl on the alert, and driving the Russian forces into their fortified posts on the coast of the Caspian Sea. Those they had preserved on the Black Sea were, during April and May, abandoned and blown up by the Russians, and their garrisons drawn back towards Georgia, with the intention of recruiting Woronzoff's army. On reaching the pass of Dariel, however, on their way to Teflis, they were interrupted by Schamyl, who at-

tacked them furiously and allowed but few to escape. The communication between Woronzoff and Russia could now only be kept up by the third, and most difficult of the Russian military roads in Circassia; namely, that which runs along the coast of the Caspian Sea, through Derbend.

During the spring, but few or no reports reached England, either through Petersburg or Constantinople, as to how matters were advancing in Georgia and Armenia. Little or nothing appears, indeed, to have been done on either side; Woronzoff was evidently not strong enough to take the initiative, and the Turkish army was not only disorganised,—as appears, indeed, always to be the case with it during the winter and spring—but its generals were far from agreeing one with the other. General Guyon (Khousouf Pasha), who seems to have obtained a higher command after the dismissal of Abdi Pasha, was greatly impeded in his operations by Zerim Pasha, a Polish refugee. His sole efforts were for a time directed to the getting together of an army at all, to the bringing up of stores and ammunition, and to disciplining the various corps to work simultaneously. In June he is reported to have organised an efficient army of some 45,000 strong. Still, however, he could not do much, being only the second in command, and

being hindered on all occasions by his superior officer, Selim Pasha.

To oppose these Turkish forces Prince Woronzoff, having been reinforced by those from the Black Sea forts who had escaped from Schamyl, had now an army of about 54,000 men, with which, towards the end of June, he appears to have made some demonstrations. A portion of his army to the number of 12,000, was, however, attacked at Ardahan, by Kerim Pasha, on July 2nd, at the head of one division of Selim Pasha's army, with great success on the part of the Turks, who captured six guns and made 400 prisoners.

But, on the other hand, towards the end of July, a large body of the Turkish army, under Zarif Pasha, Seraskier of the district, was defeated at Kars, by Prince Bebutoff, as was also Selim Pasha himself near Urzughetti, by the Russians under General Andronikoff. The Turks, according to the Russian reports, lost thirteen guns, several standards, much ammunition, and many men. They were said to have fought well, but to have been unable to stand against the Russian heavy artillery and numerous cavalry. Meantime, the Russians also lost four superior officers killed, and one general and nine superior officers wounded. A truce was agreed on

after the battle, and both parties retired, the Turks on Kars, the Russians on Gumri.

The truce, however, does not seem to have been of long continuance, or perhaps only a portion of the Turkish forces were included in it; for on the 16th of July, Ismail Pasha, at the head of 1500 Bashi-bazouks, turned the enemy's flank at midnight, and, leaving the Russian camp behind him, arrived before day-break at the village of Baiordir, occupied by Georgian militia and Cossacks. This village, which is one of tactical importance, and was the scene of a battle at the commencement of the campaign, in which the Turks had the advantage, was defended by some redoubts, which the irregulars surprised, and then penetrated into the village. A desperate fight ensued, in which eighty Cossacks and Georgians were killed, five taken prisoners, and a considerable number of cattle with 400 sheep captured. The Russians defended themselves inside the houses; but from being taken quite by surprise, their resistance was useless. Having effected this coup-de-main, Ismail Pasha returned by the enemy's lines without encountering any opposition, having possessed himself of the stores of provisions and ammunition therein contained.

On the 1st of August, the Russians under General Wrangel encountered the Turkish force near Ba-

jazid with much success. By the Russian accounts, though these must be received with suspicion, the Turks lost 3000 men, four guns, and seventeen colours.

Fearful lest the main body of the Russian army should unite with that which had so lately been victorious at Bayazid, the Turkish commander-in-chief, now, as it appears, Zarif Pasha, though as to when and how, or by whom Selim Pasha had been displaced, no account has as yet been given, determined on attacking the Russian position in front of Gumri with all his forces. It is probable that at this time, Ismail Pasha was sent on the expedition we have mentioned, to create a diversion, or at any rate to secure a supply of provisions and ammunition. Be that as it may, on the 3rd of August, a determined battle was fought, called that of Kouroukdere. The battle lasted eight hours, and was carried on with very varying success; ending, however, so far in favour of the Russians, that they repelled the attack made upon them, though with the loss of a great many killed and wounded, among the former a general officer. The Russians claimed it as a victory; but that such could not be exactly the case we may infer from the fact that the Turkish army stood its ground after the battle, while the Russians, the next

day, retreated from before Gumri, leaving their camp standing. On entering it the Turks found ten spiked cannon, ammunition, and baggage waggons. It is said that the hastiness with which this movement was made on the part of the Russians, was in consequence of a rumour that Schamyl was threatening Teflis, the head quarters of the army and the residence of Prince Woronzoff. Later accounts add that the attack made by Schamyl at the head of 20,000, has been completely successful. Meantime the Turkish army having marched into Gumri, commenced besieging the citadel thereof, in which the Russians had left a strong garrison. General Wrangel's force from Bayazid advanced to its rescue, but was repulsed with great loss.

And this brings us up to the last account from the seat of war on the confines of Georgia. The observant reader cannot but remark the great discrepancy of the facts as narrated, we are bound to say, chiefly from Russian sources, and their results. From the commencement of this year's campaign, if we are to believe the accounts rendered to us, we find that the Russians have been successful in almost every engagement; and that the Turkish force is not only a mere swarm of half-disciplined barbarians, but that these barbarians can neither stand fire,

bayonet, nor sabre. And yet, looking at the present position of the Turkish forces as compared with that which they occupied at the commencement of the war, we find that they have not only stood their ground well, having retained all that belonged to them, but that they are now masters of Bayazid and Gumri, Kars and Ardahan in the interior, and also of a chain of fortified places on the sea coast commanding a communication with Schamyl, and shutting the Russians out from one of their main roads. That they were assisted to obtain some of these forts by the allies need not dim the lustre of their achievements.

If the Czar has time to think at all of his Asiatic dominions, while those which lie so much nearer his heart, are now so severely threatened by the allied armies, he can have little hope of eventually subduing Circassia, or even of retaining Georgia. And we own that our expectation is, ere long, to hear that the Russian general has been obliged to accept of the best terms in his power, for permission to lead the remains of his forces back to Russia.

This, however, is speculation; which perhaps should seldom be indulged in, least of all when there is so much of real glory and real triumph on which the foes of Nicholas may congratulate themselves.

CHAP. XVI.

THE WAR WITH THE WESTERN POWERS.

We have stated already, as the most anomalous fact in the present war, that in spite of the advancing civilisation of the world, in spite of the universal desire of all the nations concerned, except perhaps the Russian itself, for peace, in spite of the chivalrous spirit which has marked the conduct of the allied armies as regards their enemy, and which has been assumed, if not practised, by the Russians also, that acts of war were committed — ships blown up, and towns bombarded, before a declaration of war had been made.

We have already given an account of the Russian attack on the Turkish squadron at Sinope, while that nation still pretended that, if not at peace with Turkey, yet that it had given universal orders to its generals and admirals to act only on the defensive.

We have seen a Russian army advancing into provinces dependent on an ally, because that ally refused to agree to an unjust demand; and now we

are to show that not only were the fleets and armies of the Western Powers prepared and put in position for war, but that even in one place at least, the sound of cannon and the terrors of war preceded its actual declaration.

It was, as before stated, early in January, that the allied fleet first entered the Black Sea with the view of preventing the Russian fleet from carrying reinforcements and provisions to their armies either in Asia or on the Danube; and frigates were despatched to the several Russian ports to warn the admirals and commandants of ships not to sally forth, and thus produce a breach of the peace. The *Retribution*, which carried the message to Sebastopol, entered the harbour and had time to take a summary view of the defences thereof before it could be brought to. The cold stormy weather, and dangerous navigation of the Black Sea, on account of the fogs and sudden squalls, as well as the want of proper maps, occasioned the return of the allied fleets to the Bosphorus at the end of January.

Towards the middle of February, preparations for war were actively commenced, both in Great Britain and France. It may be said that for years previously, the Czar had been making his preparations; but at this time also he was using every means to

increase his army, discipline his troops, and fill his exchequer. Levies of men and horses were being made in all parts of his dominions in larger numbers than had ever been the case before. "The whole neighbourhood of Petersburg and Moscow resembled one vast camp." Fortifications of all kinds were added to the already strongly fortified posts of Sebastopol and Cronstadt, while Revel, Helsingfors, and Bomarsund were amply garrisoned and fortified, and provided with ammunition. For the first time, too, even Petersburg itself had forts and batteries erected for its defence, lest any mischance should happen to Cronstadt. The Czar was using every exertion to raise money by voluntary loans from other countries, and by forced loans from the clergy and commercial houses at home. And more than ever by manifestoes to his own people, and assertions that the right as well as the might were on the side of the Russians, was he stirring them up to fight with fanaticism as well as patriotism.

It was on the 14th of February that the first departure of troops for the East took place from London. We need not remind our readers of the enthusiasm wherewith they left and were bid adieu to by their compatriots. On the 20th a review of another portion was held in St. James's Park, and during that week

and the following some 20,000 English troops embarked for Malta on their way to Turkey. These numbers were afterwards greatly increased by reinforcements sent throughout the whole spring and summer. Lord Raglan was appointed the commander-in-chief of the British forces in the East, and Marshal St. Arnaud of the French.

On the 11th of March the English fleet, having been reviewed by her Majesty at Spithead, sailed for the Baltic under the command of Sir Charles Napier. It is perhaps scarcely the province of the historian of the Czar to allude to the vain-glorious boasts made by the commander of the Baltic fleet before he started, unless it be to "point the moral," so often pointed before, and yet so little heeded, of the folly of boasting. Well might the reprover quote the words of the King of Israel, "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off." We say nothing of the nautical reasons which may have occasioned Sir Charles Napier and his fleet to have done actually less than any other of the warriors who left our shores. We only feel that such was to be expected from one who could take a part in such puerile boastings as were made at the parting feast.

The total strength of the fleet under the command

of Sir Charles Napier, including ships and frigates of all kinds and sizes, amounted to 2200 guns, being manned by 22,000 men, and impelled by steam of about 16,000 horse power.

To meet this splendid fleet the Russians had even a larger one in the Baltic, consisting of twenty-seven vessels of the line, eighteen frigates, and fifteen smaller vessels, manned with 30,000 men, and with 2800 guns.

As the proceedings of Sir C. Napier and Admiral Chads in the Baltic were entirely distinct from those of the allied armies and fleets in the Black Sea, we think it will be better, to avoid confusion, to pursue their operations, few and meagre though they be, to the end, rather than to disturb the history of the more brilliant exploits in the East.

It must be remembered that Admiral Chads, with the French fleet, did not reach the Baltic till the middle of June, and that the English fleet had not only sailed from England, but actually entered the Sound on the 14th of March, a fortnight before war was even declared between the contending parties. It must be remembered, too, that the chief part of the Baltic Sea is sealed up during the greater half of the year by impenetrable ice; not such ice as we read of in the Arctic seas, in which floes and channels appear

from time to time, but clear, thick, smooth, glassy ice, which extends from shore to shore, effectually shutting up all ingress or egress. It was not till the British fleet had been four weeks at the entrance of the Baltic that it could make its way even to the nearest point of the Russian dominions, nor till another fortnight had elapsed that the channel to Cronstadt and Petersburg was set free.

The first exploit of any kind performed by any part of the English fleet did not take place till the 23rd of May, when the *Arrogant* and *Hecla* advanced up the narrow channel leading to Hango in face of the enemy's fire, drove the men from the batteries, landed and carried off three guns, and having cut out one of the three merchant-men which were in the harbour, returned without loss to report their success.

From the 5th of May till the 10th of June was spent by Admiral Plumridge with a squadron in the Gulf of Bothnia, blowing up and destroying the naval property of Russia in the several harbours and cutting out the merchant ships. On the 30th of May this was done at Branestadt, on the 31st at Ulcaburg. But a similar attempt on the 1st of June at Gamle Carleby met with a very severe check. The water was so shallow that the ships were unable to anchor within five miles of the shore. A force of

200 men was therefore sent in boats with a flag of truce, to demand a surrender. This was refused by the commander; and the flag of truce being taken down, the boats pulled on past the town to reconnoitre. When well in front, the Russians unmasked a concealed battery and opened a sharp fire of musketry and artillery on the boats, cutting them about and wounding several men. One of the boats, a paddle-box belonging to the *Vulture*, was so maimed that it drifted on shore, and the crew thereof were taken prisoners. The rest returned to their ships, having had 54 men killed, wounded, and missing, and one boat, and its gun, a 24-pound howitzer, missing.

After the arrival of the French fleet, Admirals Plumridge's and Corry's squadrons were called in, and hopes were entertained that the allied fleet would perform some great exploit. On the 21st of June a reconnoissance was made of Bomarsund, and a few shells, as if to try the range, were thrown in; but it was decided that nothing could be done without the aid of land forces, and letters were sent home to demand that such should be furnished. In consequence of this demand, General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with 10,000 French troops, embarked on the 1st of August on board a fleet of English men-of-war and transports, which reached the allied fleet off

the Isles of Aland on the 6th. Meantime Sir C. Napier and Admiral Chads had been reconnoitring Cronstadt, Revel, and Helsingfors, and keeping up a strict blockade of all the Russian ports, so that neither man-of-war nor merchant vessel dared venture out. It was stated at one time that cholera had appeared in the fleet; but, if this were the case, it does not appear to have raged to any extent.

Bomarsund had been strongly fortified for years back, but the batteries and other fortifications had been lately strengthened and renewed by order of the Czar, and ammunition and stores of all kinds sent in. It is situated on the largest of the Aland Islands. The main fort stood—we speak in the past tense, the works having been all destroyed—at the head of a semicircular bay facing the south. It was a long granite structure, about forty feet in height, and mounted from eighty to one hundred guns. Its fire swept the whole bay. Above this fort the ground rose rapidly, and on the crest of the hill stood three round granite towers. Opposite the south-east point of the island lay the small Isle of Presto, fortified by a tower; and on the west was an earth-work mounting six guns, thrown up by the Russians.

Early on the morning of the 8th, this earthwork was taken by the *Amphion* and *Edinburgh*, which,

after firing half an hour and silencing the guns, sent in a boat and found the battery forsaken. While this was going on, the *Bulldog* and *Stromboli* engaged the attention of the western tower to so good effect, that the 10,000 French troops were landed, and at the north of the island, nearly simultaneously, 1200 English and French marines. By the 13th, the first French battery was able to open fire, which it did with much damage to the western tower. The fire from the English fleet, which stretched quite across the bay, was opened at the same time. On the 15th, the English marine battery was completed, and fired with such effect on the eastern fort, that a flag of truce was quickly hoisted. A newspaper correspondent thus describes the firing from the English battery:—

"Each gun from the battery told against the enemy's walls with stunning effect; each shot left its mark, and each succeeding one picked out a fragment, or dislodged a block, until the shaken wall, no longer able to bear the heavy blows from the 32-pounder shot, began to totter and give way. In about two or three hours, a huge gap was visibly enlarging, and a few salvoes now increased it to a regular breach, completely obliterating two embrasures in the upper tier, and opening the casemates and inner court to view; the fort being circular, only four of the guns could be properly trained to bear upon the

battery. A third gun was at length silenced; and so ought to have been a fourth, but this gun and its heroic defenders would not yield. The English shot now began to bring down the wall in large masses, and the fallen ruins continued to smother the muzzle of this invincible gun; but as often did the brave Russians rush into the breach, no longer an embrasure, and madly shovel away the lime and stones from the gun, and even at times the gun was fired from within, through the heap, so as to blow away the accumulating mass. After several hours of mortal strife, this wonderful gun still tenaciously held its ground, and would not yield. It still gave shot for shot. The action continued until half past five, when the side of the fort was quite demolished, and the gun now lay deeply buried in the ruins of the fallen walls.

"Under the walls of this huge fortification the ground was completely bestrewed with 84-pound shot, broken shells, grape, and canister, intermixed with enormous sheets of iron that had been dislodged from the roof; and the granite walls had been broken away in thousands of pieces. In the interior, which was a large square and parade ground, the fatal missiles, and heaps of broken granite and brickwork, bespoke the terrible vigour of the siege."

The governor on consideration found that their chance of holding out longer had become quite hopeless; a 10-inch gun, turned from their own mud battery against them, being also well handled. He observed too that the battery from the heights was

brought to play upon him (this was Captain Ramsay's), and that the French were gradually advancing and securing their position. Meantime, the two other chief forts having been silenced or entered by the allied troops, the Governor, General Bodisco, surrendered; the garrison, amounting to 2000 men, laying down their arms. The last two shells that were fired, were from Captain Pelham's gun on the mud battery; they entered the same embrasure, and set fire to the officer's quarters.

The loss of the allied army was inconsiderable: while the whole of the Russians were either killed or taken prisoners. That the same success might have been obtained by the fleet alone, without the aid of the French troops, there is but very little doubt.

On the 30th and 31st of August, the prisoners having been embarked on board of the English and French fleets, the fortifications of Bomarsund were blown up and completely destroyed. A portion of one of the strongest towers was left, that the service of the shells of the English fleet might be tried; which was done with such effect on the 1st of September, that the whole of the granite structure, apparently so massive and so immovable, was battered down after two or three discharges.

And now that the power of floating batteries

against the strongest fortifications had been proved, and that an army as well as fleet — the proudest that had ever sailed the ocean — were in readiness, surely, thought the English public, Cronstadt will be attempted and will fall next: and much more would they have thought and spoken about it, but that the stirring events in our eastern armies occupied their thoughts and aspirations, and prayers. But Sir Charles Napier and his French colleague were apparently as immovable as the granite towers of Cronstadt itself. After amusing themselves with sailing hither and thither, looking first at one fort and then at another, and frightening the Russians into the voluntary blowing up of Hango, the commanders-in-chief of the Baltic fleets and armies held a council of war in the second week of September, in which it was decided that nothing more could be done this year. The French army returned, and was landed to form a part of the Boulogne camp; and gradually, from that time up to the present, vessel after vessel has made its way home, and Admiral Sir Charles Napier is expected shortly.

The allied fleet in the Black Sea, under the command of Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin, was not nearly so strong, nor so well appointed as the Baltic fleet; it consisted of some twenty-two

vessels, large and small, carrying 1733 guns and being manned by 16,000 sailors and marines. To oppose these there was a Russian fleet more than double the size and strength of that of the allies, in the harbour of Sebastopol, which has, however, never ventured out. The Russian fleet, which has thus remained inactive, is said to have consisted of sixty-five vessels of different sizes, some very large, carrying 2320 guns.

On the 12th of March two frigates, the *Retribution* and the *Caton*, were despatched by Admirals Dundas and Hamelin to the Sulina mouth of the Danube, to break through the obstructions which had been partly placed, and partly allowed to accumulate there, by the Russians.

On the 28th, as we have already stated, war with Russia was openly declared by Great Britain and France; but the account that such was the case, did not reach the allied fleet till after the bombardment of Odessa. Simultaneously with, or very soon after, the declaration of war, were published those commercial arrangements on both sides, which have tended to cause the present war to be less injurious to the peace establishments of the several countries engaged in it, than any preceding ones. Six weeks were granted to all ships of commerce to quit the several ports in

which they were lading; and all merchandise in neutral vessels from neutral states, even though procured from an enemy's country, was declared free on all sides.

The first portion of the allied army which reached Turkey, was a division of the French army which disembarked at Gallipoli, under General Canrobert, on the 31st of March. They were within a week joined by a body of British forces from Malta, under Sir George Brown. Almost at the same time the allied fleets, under Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, took up their station at Kavarna, a few miles to the north of Varna, with a view to strengthen the hands of Omer Pasha by their proximity.

On the 15th of April the two commanders-in-chief of the allied armies left England and France respectively, to join their forces; and now all the horrors of war seemed to be imminent. The home fleet began to bring in prizes, and accounts from the Baltic soon told of others. And the English nation began to realise that it was absolutely at war, when a day was appointed to be set apart for humiliation and prayer.

At the commencement of April, took place the first hostile encounter between the forces of Russia and the Western allies. The *Furious* war-steamer,

having been sent with a flag of truce and message to Odessa, was fired upon by the batteries of that town. This gross breach of the law of nations was quickly chastised by the allied fleet. On the 23rd the whole fleet having drawn near, nine war-steamers bombarded that town.

The first division which attacked the batteries consisted of the French frigates *Vauban* and *Descartes*, and the English frigates *Samson* and *Tiger*. Captain Jones, of the *Samson*, led the attack, and steaming to within about 2000 yards of the batteries, delivered his fire. He then wheeled round in a circle about half a mile in diameter, followed by the other steamers, each taking up the fire in succession. "Thus they kept wheeling and twisting about like so many waltzers, without ever touching or getting into scrapes." The guns on the mole steadily replied; and three hot shots dropping into the *Vauban* set her on fire. The pumps were had recourse to to extinguish the fire, but in vain; one of the red-hot cannon balls had penetrated the outer coating of her timbers, and was slowly burning internally. She went out of action for a short while until the fire was extinguished, when she returned. Soon after the second division of attack, consisting of the French steamer *Mogador*, and the British steamers, *Terrible*, *Furious*, and *Re-*

tribution entered into the action, standing further in shore, and commenced a tremendous fire upon the batteries, hailing down shells and balls. A small flotilla of gun-boats, sent by the rest of the fleet, were also now taking part in the engagement; and the *Arethusa*, sailing frigate, stood most prettily in and out, and kept up a patter of shot upon the guns of the Quarantine Mole, which had begun to fire. To engage the gun-boats, the Russians brought down a horse artillery battery of six guns; but a shower of congreve rockets speedily sent them flying. About one o'clock a shed at the back of the Tongue battery on the Imperial Mole, caught fire and blew up. The ships stood further in; and the *Terrible* threw her shells among the shipping, setting them on fire. The attack was continued until about five o'clock, when the ships were recalled. The destruction of the military port of Odessa, its shipping, barracks, and stores was complete. The British loss was one killed and ten slightly wounded. The French loss was two killed and two slightly wounded in the *Vauban*, from an accident with one of her guns. Though the town and inhabitants were entirely spared, the Czar made it a great subject of complaint that they should be thus disturbed on Easter Day.

It was shortly after the bombardment of Odessa, that the first and only mishap that had as yet occurred to the English flag in this war, took place at that very Odessa the transgressions of which had been so fearfully avenged by the allied fleet. This was the loss of H. M. ship *Tiger* on the 12th of May. The accounts received at the time stated that going at six knots an hour in foggy weather, the *Tiger* got into shoal water within reach of the guns from the shore. That it was fired upon by them, and having had its captain, another officer and a few men wounded, lowered its flag, the officers and crew surrendering themselves prisoners of war. The ship was subsequently sunk by the Russians to prevent its being got off and rescued by its consorts which appeared in sight within two hours of its capture. The death of Captain Giffard from his wound, and the continued captivity of many of the crew, a portion of whom the Czar has refused to exchange, has probably prevented as much discussion on the subject as would otherwise have taken place. But even under present circumstances much blame has been imputed to those in charge of the vessel for going at such a rate in foggy weather on an enemy's shore; and hints have been thrown out that other crews would have taken to their boats, and run the chance

of being taken up by the other vessels of the fleet which were in company at the time, though they had more prudently kept off shore in such weather.

But merciful though the press and the authorities in England have been, the official accounts in the Russian papers have not dealt so lightly with the conduct of the officers and crew. Contrasting the efficiency of the Russian and English navy, a St. Petersburg paper says: —

"We have convinced ourselves that the moral strength of the combined fleet has not increased, but, on the contrary, diminished, in proportion to its augmented powers. For instance, the English steam-frigate *Tiger*, of 400 horse power, and sixteen guns, was stranded about six wersts from Odessa. On the shore where this took place, were posted two field guns, a company of infantry, and one-half squadron of Lancers, — and what followed? Why, an event unknown in the annals of the most timorous and most insignificant fleets. The steam frigate, which borrowed its name from the most savage of all beasts, took no measures to defend the honour of its flag. Although it had only five wounded, and its crew consisted of twenty two officers and more than 200 sailors and marines of the guard (!!!) it surrendered itself prisoner to a mere handful of land troops; and as we had no boats, the English gave themselves the trouble to row themselves ashore in their own boats. This cannot be called manly conduct."

The beginning of May, the allied fleet appeared

off Sebastopol, with the view of tempting the Russian fleet to come out and give them battle; but without success. This being the case, a portion of the fleet explored the coast of the Crimea as far as Eupatoria northwards; and five English and two French steamers were despatched under Sir E. Lyons, to the coast of Circassia, to attack and destroy the Russian fortresses on the coast, and to open communication with Schamyl and the Circassians; the rest of the fleet remaining at Sebastopol, in the hopes of inducing the enemy by their diminished strength to show themselves. On the arrival of Sir E. Lyons' squadron on the coast of Circassia, they found that many of the Russian garrisons having set fire to their forts, had, by order of the Czar, retired into the interior to join the army of Prince Woronzoff. The English vessels, however, attacked and took Redout Kaleh and Toti, still held by the Russians.

Alarmed by the preparations for war made by the allied nations, and with a view to collecting a sufficient force to withstand the allied troops which were daily arriving in Turkey, as well as to remedy his own losses in the Principalities, in May the Czar published a ukase, ordering an additional levy of nine men out of every thousand Russians, and ten out of every thousand Jews throughout his

dominions, besides three more out of every thousand, to make up the last levy not yet completed. On the 25th of May, an order from the minister of police at Petersburg prescribed the conduct of the inhabitants in the event of the taking of Cronstadt and the blockade of the capital. Old men, women, and children, the bells of the churches and the images of the saints, were to be removed to Moscow. The streets were to be unpaved, and the troops stationed in the houses. At this time the Russian forces on the Austrian frontier were stated to amount to 90,000 men.

Early in May, the two commanders-in-chief of the allied armies had reached Constantinople, the head-quarters of the English troops being fixed at Scutari, that of the French at Gallipoli. But it takes time, even after armies and generals and all "the pomp and circumstance of war" are prepared, actually to engage in it. Everything seemed ready, but there must necessarily be due consideration as to where the first blow was to be struck. Meantime the allied forces were employed in the less noble though not less arduous task of throwing up batteries to protect Constantinople, should the enemy now, as in 1829, succeed in forcing the Balkan.

The first council of war between the commanders-

in-chief of the three nations was held at Varna, May 18th, Marshal St. Arnaud, Lord Raglan, and the Seraskier of Turkey, and the two admirals of the fleets, having gone there for the convenience of Omer Pasha, who could not leave his post at Schumla for a more distant point. The result of the deliberation at this council was the bringing up of chief part of the English forces in the East, and a considerable body of the French troops, and landing them at Varna. This took place in the last week in May and the commencement of June, shortly before the siege of Silistria was brought to so happy a conclusion by the valour of the Turkish garrison.

Probably the intention of all the generals was, that the allied troops should support Omer Pasha more effectually than it has ever been requisite for them to do, as they immediately proceeded to open communications with his camp at Schumla. But it was within a fortnight of the landing of the first English regiment at Varna that the siege of Silistria was raised, and the Russian army in consequence had commenced its retreat. Meantime, another division of the French army, under General Bosquet, had marched to Adrianople, and that under Prince Napoleon had taken up its station at Bourgas.

That little or nothing was done for some eight or

ten weeks after the landing of the allied army at Varna, except that Lord Cardigan with the light cavalry scoured the country as far as Schumla, and a body of the French troops were sent to Kustendje, there to be decimated by the scourge of cholera, occasioned no little disappointment in the public mind. But the public forgot that even in our glorious Peninsular campaigns, days, and weeks, and months elapsed in marchings and countermarchings, in preparations of the commissariat, and the bringing up of ammunition, while our great feats and splendid victories were, though numerous counted in mass, yet, when looked at in respect to time, few and far between. That after a forty years' peace there might be many mistakes, some necessaries altogether forgotten, others left behind, and others sent and placed wrong, was not greatly to be wondered at.

Evidently, too, those in authority had hoped that the show of military force would bring the Czar to his senses without any real blow having been struck. This accounts for the various embarkations and disembarkations at Malta first, then Gallipoli, Scutari, Varna, and finally the Crimea. Moreover, our Western Governments seem ever to have been unduly imbued with the idea, of which they may be now happily disabused, that the Russian troops are in-

finitely superior to the Turkish. It was evidently expected that in 1854 as in 1829, Silistria would fall, and probably Schumla; and that the Russians would again pass the Balkan. This accounts for the disembarkations at Gallipoli and Scutari. From the latter place Constantinople could be occupied in a few hours; from the former an advancing Russian army could be intercepted ere it reached Soulah Bourgas.

The removal to Varna was the result of the council of war of which we have already spoken, when the fate of Silistria still hung on a thread. But the repulse of the Russians at that town, and their retreat, greatly altered the face of matters. Two courses were open:—1. For the allied armies to join the Turks, and pushing after the retreating Russians, to open a campaign on the borders of Bessarabia, thereby exposing the troops to the famine of the already exhausted Principalities, and all the horrors of the fevers and dysenteries so well known to pervade these districts, while all the time they were aiming at no vital point: or, 2. For them to lie still awhile, braving the impatience of active spirits till all could be prepared for some great stroke,— some stroke that would effectually cripple the enemy by the subjugation of that which is a

part of its strength. The last was resolved on. Who can say unwisely? Meantime late in June, Captain Parker, with the *Firebrand* and *Fury*, were sent once again to open the Sulina mouth of the Danube, which was accomplished with much gallantry; the Cossack guard being driven off, and the officer in command taken prisoner. Unfortunately Captain Parker lost his life while gallantly leading on his men.

It was not till the end of July that notice was publicly given to the allied armies, that they were to prepare for embarkation on a great enterprise. And even then what that enterprise was to be, was still a doubt. Was it Odessa or Anapa? or could it really be the Crimea and Sebastopol? A council of war had been held on the 18th, and Generals Brown and Canrobert had embarked with three steamers on a reconnoitring expedition along the whole coast of the Crimea and South Russia, from Balaklava to the Danube. But that told little. Sir Edmund Lyons had also reconnoitred the other side of the Crimea, and the neighbourhood of Anapa.

Just, however, as everything was prepared, and the siege train so long looked for from France had arrived, and the transports which had been gathered from all parts were ready, the cholera, which had

shown itself slightly for the last few weeks, broke out with such violence, both in the fleet and armies, that present embarkation was impossible. Whole companies were laid low, and regiments decimated. The French especially suffered.

But a lull in this fearful disease took place towards the end of August. The sick sailors were sent ashore to recruit, and it was thought that a sea voyage would do as much good to the army. And on the 29th of August commenced the embarkation of the largest armada that has ever crossed the sea to invade an enemy's country. Twenty-five thousand English and as many French troops, and ten, some say fifteen thousand Turks were, after the delay of a day or two occasioned by an equinoctial gale, at last safely embarked on board vessels of all sizes and descriptions. And on the 7th of September, 600 sail of different kinds *rendezvoused* at Serpent's Isle opposite the mouth of the Danube, thence to stretch across the sea to the Crimea. Such a sight had never before met the eye of human being, as the smaller ships steamed or sailed promiscuously in the centre, guarded on each side by the tall and commanding vessels of war, and exhibiting a front of at least nine miles in breadth.

And was the Czar not doing something to meet

all these vast armaments? Undoubtedly. Sebastopol was ably garrisoned. By how many we as yet know not.* Prince Menschikoff was commander-in-chief of the Peninsula, with 60,000 men. General Liprandi was in full march thither with another force of 30,000. Anapa even had been abandoned, that its garrison might swell the numbers of the defenders of the Crimea. A proclamation had been issued, offering great privileges and a rapid rise from the ranks, to such Greek, Lutheran, and Armenian priests as should join the army. Incredible efforts were made to obtain funds and raise and discipline recruits. The Czarovitch was despatched to Warsaw with the reserve of the Guards, to check the Austrian forces collected at the frontiers of Hungary, and now left in charge of the Principalities. The two Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas were despatched to join the army in the south, and nothing was left undone that could be done to defend Sebastopol, that jewel in the Czar's crown, even to the sinking of six men-of-war at the entrance of the harbour.

On Sunday, the 10th, the fleet lay to, and divine

* Accounts from the seat of war put the garrison of the Crimea now at 46,000 men; while the guns and other material of war are innumerable.

service was read in every ship in the British division—a fitting commencement to so perilous an enterprise, and a due acknowledgment from a Christian army that its trust is in the God of battles.

The morning of the 12th of September broke upon the invading army, and with it the shores of the Crimea. Every eye was strained to catch the first view of the theatre of future conflicts, every pulse beat strong, and every heart thrilled, partly with excitement like a high-mettled horse which has long been held in when within sight of the goal, and partly with martial emulation. Many a time had British and French forces stood face to face, their strength, their valour, their discipline, their manhood pitted the one against the other. Now they were to stand side by side against a common foe, and the question was which should do most for the common cause. The whole day was spent in placing the fleet in position for the disembarkation. The *Times* correspondent, who was with the fleet, thus describes the evening of this day:—

"The sunset was of singular beauty and splendour. Heavy masses of rich blue clouds hung in the west, through innumerable golden chasms, in which the sun poured a flood of yellow glory over the dancing waters laden with great merchantmen, with men of war, stagger-

ing under press of canvas, and over line after line of black steamers, contending in vain to deface the splendour of the scene. When night came on, and all the ships' lights were hung out, it seemed as if the stars had settled down on the face of the waters. Wherever the eye turned, were little constellations twinkling far and near, till they were lost in faint halos in the distance. The only idea one could give of this strange appearance is, that suggested by the sight from some eminence of a huge city lighted up, street after street, on a very dark night. Flashes of the most brilliant lightning, however, from time to time, lifted the veil of night from the ocean, and disclosed, for an instant, ships and steamers lying at anchor as far as could be seen."

By and by, on the morning of the 14th, came the order for disembarkation. It was to take place a little to the south of Eupatoria, some thirty miles north of Sebastopol. No enemy was in sight, if we may leave unnoticed a few Cossack horsemen, who now and then showed their heads over the top of the hill, and nearly did good service to their cause too, by almost taking prisoner Sir G. Brown. That general had been one of the first to land, and to occupy himself during the disembarkation of his division, he had proceeded to the top of the hill to take a view of the position of the ground.

"Sir George (writes the *Times* correspondent) was in danger, but he did not know it. Neither did the Russians see that the picket was advancing towards the brow of the hill. Sir George was busy scanning the country, and pointing out various spots to the quarter-master-general. Suddenly they turn and slowly descend the hill; the gold sash disappears; the cocked hat is eclipsed; Cossacks and officers dismount, and steal along by the side of their horses. In about five minutes, two or three tiny puffs of smoke rose over the cliff, and presently the faint cracks of the rifle are audible to the men in the nearest ships."

Night came on, and with it cold and heavy rain. By this time considerably more than half the invading force had been landed. But they were without tents, or shelter of any kind. By the command of Lord Raglan, whose desire was to take all the troops that could possibly be taken, every thing that could possibly be dispensed with was left behind. The English forces, therefore, were, from the generals to the privates, lodged under the open canopy of heaven, which, on this particular night and many succeeding ones, was a resting place somewhat similar to the interior of a shower bath. The Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Brown, each located himself for the night under a country cart which had been found and tilted over. And before

morning came, every one was lying in a pool of water for the most part soaked through and through. How this told on the health of the troops, especially of the officers little accustomed to such exposure, was manifest in the course of a week, when nearly as many fell a sacrifice to cholera, dysentery, and fever, as were laid low by the sword of the enemy. But not a murmur was heard. The men were in fine spirits, and only desired to face the foe. On the 15th the last remaining part of the forces were landed with somewhat more of difficulty than had been the case the previous day, inasmuch as the weather was squally and stormy. But it was fortunate that there had been such a lull of the periodical gales during the time that the armament had been at sea.

Why Prince Menschikoff did not meet the enemy on their landing no one can say. Even 500 mounted Cossacks might have done considerable damage had they only been on the watch. And such a force, one would suppose, might have been placed along the whole shore at small intervals. Such, however, was not the case. Prince Menschikoff lay, with 60,000 of his choicest troops, on the heights of Belbek, where batteries and redoubts had been thrown up, and if we are to believe the tenour of his own papers, if he did not expect a complete victory over

the allies, he had at least expected to hold his position for a fortnight or three weeks, till General Liprandi's forces should have arrived to reinforce him.

Forward to Sebastopol was the cry, as soon as the landing had been effected, and the horses had found their legs after their sea voyage, the men their regiments, and regiments their places. Along the sea-coast, between that and the salt and stagnant lakes lay their course, till they reached the river Boulganack on the 19th, on which day, and at which place, they first encountered the enemy. The army had been marching that morning at least eight miles without water, when the river was reached. Again, after a short halt, in which every one refreshed himself if not therein, yet therewith, the army pushed on. The cavalry, under Lord Cardigan, consisting of about 500 of the 8th Hussars, and a few of the 11th Hussars, and 13th Light Dragoons, were in front. When about a mile beyond the stream they came in sight of some Cossack Lancers.

"Lord Cardigan threw out skirmishers in line, who covered the front at intervals of ten or twelve yards from each other. The Cossacks advanced to meet us in like order, man for man, the steel of their long lances glittering in the sun. They were rough-looking fellows mounted on sturdy little horses, but the regularity of their order

and the celerity of their movements showed they were regulars, and by no means despicable foes. As our skirmishers advanced, the Cossacks halted at the foot of the hill. Their reserves were not well in sight, but from time to time a clump of lances rose over the summit of the hill and disappeared. Lord Cardigan was eager to try their strength, and permission was given to him to advance somewhat nearer; but as he did so, dark columns of cavalry came into view in the recesses of the hills, and it became evident that if our men advanced up such a steep ascent, their horses would be blown, and that they would run a risk of being surrounded, and cut to pieces by a force of three times their number. Lord Lucan therefore ordered the cavalry to halt, gather in their skirmishers, and retire slowly. None of the infantry or artillery were in sight of us, as they had not yet topped the brow of the hill. When our skirmishers halted, the Cossacks commenced a fire from their line of videttes, which was quite harmless. Few of the balls came near enough to let the whiz be heard. Two or three officers who were riding between the cavalry and skirmishers, Lieutenant-col. Dickson, R. A., Captain Fellowes, 12th Lancers, Dr. Elliott, R. A., were looking out anxiously for the arrival of Captain Maude's Horse Artillery, when suddenly the Russians, emboldened by our halt, came over the brow of the hill, and slowly descended the slope in three solid squares. We had offered them battle, and they had lost their chance, for our cavalry now turned round and rode quietly towards the troops. Our skirmishers, who had replied smartly to the fire of the

Cossacks, but without effect, retired and joined their squadrons. At every fifty paces, our cavalry faced about to receive the Cossacks, if they prepared to charge. Suddenly one of the Russian cavalry squares opened — a spirt of white smoke rose out of the gap, and a round shot, which pitched close to my horse, tore over the column of our cavalry behind, and rolled away between the ranks of the rifle-men in the rear, just as they came in view of the cavalry. In another instant a second gun bowled right through the 11th Hussars and knocked over a horse, taking off his rider's leg above the ankle. Another and another followed, tearing through our ranks so that it was quite wonderful so many escaped. Meantime, Captain Maude's artillery galloped over the hillock, but were halted by Lord Raglan's order at the base, in rear of the cavalry on the left flank. This was done probably to entice the Russians further down the hill. Meantime our cavalry were drawn up as targets for the enemy's guns, and had they been of iron, they could not have been more solid or immovable. The Russian gunners fired admirably; they were rather slow, but their balls came bounding along, quite visible as they passed, in right lines from the centre of the cavalry columns. After some thirty rounds from the enemy, our artillery opened fire. Their round shot ploughed up the columns of the cavalry, who speedily dispersed into broken lines, wheeling round and round with great adroitness to escape the six and eight pound balls. Our shells were not so successful, but one, better directed than the rest, burst right in the centre of a column of light infantry, whom

the Russians had advanced to support their cavalry. Our fire was so hot, and the service of the guns so quick, that the enemy retired in about fifteen minutes after we opened on them. While this affair was going on, the French had crept up on the right, and surprised a body of Russian cavalry with a round from a battery of nine-pounders, which scattered them in all directions. We could count six dead horses on the field near the line of fire. It is not possible to form an accurate notion of the effect of our fire; but it must have caused the Russians a greater loss than they had inflicted on us. We lost six horses, and four men were wounded."

At length the day dawned, bright and sunny, the 20th of September, when the English and French allies should try their strength and their valour, man to man, against the long-thought-of enemy. Every advantage of situation was on the part of the Russians. The chief of them lay on the top of the heights of Belbek, guarded in front by batteries and redoubts which commanded the deep though narrow stream at the bottom of the hills, which, however, must be crossed before either ally could reach their foe. Between the river and the English division lay two villages, which, after being held for some time by the advanced guard of the Russian army, were abandoned and set on fire, as being the most accessible point in the ascent. The French occupied

the right wing, with the sea on one side and the Turks on their left, while the English forces formed the left wing of the army. All along the slopes of the hills lay dense masses of Russian infantry, together with redoubts of guns at every available point. At a council of war held on the evening of the 19th it was resolved, that the French, assisted by the Turks, should advance first and turn the enemy's left flank, assisted by the guns of the fleet, while the English were to attack in front: the latter also were to attempt, if the nature of the ground should permit, to turn the right flank of the Russians; this, however, did not prove to be possible.

The line having been formed, in the early morning the English infantry lay down awhile, by command of Lord Raglan, to await the signal that the French had passed the Alma, and were ready for the attack on the enemy's flank; while the Russian artillery fired, with much execution, over their heads. It appeared that the Russians had actually set marks to indicate the range of their guns, and the loss among our men was terrible. About one o'clock, the Russians, having fired the village of Burliuk, retired to the left bank of the Alma, and the signal for a general attack was given by Lord Raglan. The whole front line, formed of the light and 2nd divisions

of the English forces, dashed through the river, amidst a shower of cannon and shell that lashed the waters into a foam; and commenced to storm the heights. Meantime General Bosquet, on the right, aided by the shells from the fleet, had succeeded in his object almost without opposition, the enemy having retreated out of the reach of the guns of the fleet, and apparently thinking that the extreme ruggedness of the hills at that point would prove their safeguard. Not so, however: the light and active Zouaves, who formed the van of the French force, climbed, even ran up the hills like monkeys, and were in possession of the heights before they were even seen by the enemy. Only then did the fighting commence. The Russians were completely routed, being driven back on their main body. On the other hand, the English light division, finding it impossible, from the nature of the ground, to turn the Russian right wing, or even to bring their artillery across the stream, marched deliberately up the hill, in the face of the enemy's artillery and musketry, which mowed them down at every step, and reserving their own fire till they got close upon the foe, then fired a volley, and running in with fixed bayonets took the redoubts by storm. So great was the loss of the two English

regiments which led the attack, the 23rd and 33rd, that for a moment after the redoubts were taken, when charged in full force by the enemy, they staggered and were almost driven back. But the Guards and Highland regiments, advancing to their support, the 23rd and 33rd regiments, though more than decimated, having kept their colours, fell in with the 2nd division, side by side, and the Russians were driven back. Just as the English troops gained the heights, the French having driven the Russian left wing off the field, charged the main body in flank in full force, at the same moment that our 2nd division were charging them in front, and the rout was complete. Six thousand Russian troops, at least — some accounts have said more — were left dead on the field. Prince Menschikoff's private carriage, with all his papers, fell into the hands of the French, whose general, the night of the 20th, occupied the same ground which Menschikoff had occupied on the night of the 19th. Fourteen hundred French, and about two thousand English lay dead, or fearfully wounded, on the field of battle; and among them many of the flower of England's chivalry. For years past it had been the usual taunt of a certain class of writers to speak of the young nobility and gentry, as cumberers of the

earth, drones, silken officers, and the like. It seemed as if they were determined to take the first occasion to show that they were made of like stuff with their ancestors of Cressy, and Blenheim, Vittoria, and Waterloo. Among the roll of England's dead and wounded, were the well-known names of Erroll (who has lost an arm), of Chewton*, who survived long enough to show that he could suffer as well as die like a hero; of Monk, Hare, Crofton, Cust, Annesly, Wynn, and many others not less loved, nor less regretted, though not so well known to the public; and though last not least in the remembrance of those who love to hear of heroic deeds, the young and gallant Sir William Young, who was murdered by his savage foe when in the act of lifting his head to give him a drink of water from his canteen. "If thine enemy thirst, give him drink." Strictly and literally was the command to have mercy on a foe complied with, by both the allied armies. While the Russians fled precipitately, without even thinking of their dead and wounded, the heart of their enemies opened towards them; though but too often meeting with a most unworthy recompence. Wounded

* This gallant officer, aged thirty-two, was carried, pierced with eighteen wounds, to Scutari, where he lies buried, by his own wish, among his brother officers and soldiers.

Russians were seen sitting up and deliberately firing at those who had given them aid in the hour of their extremity. Still the civilising process of the age, the advance of education and with education of right feeling, aye! and we may hope of Christian feeling too, obtained the victory over revenge. Though the brains of some were dashed out as a punishment for their treachery in a moment of almost excusable irritation when discovered, the usual process was to take from the wounded their ammunition, and to break their muskets. And when all was over, and our armies had passed on and our own wounded were carried to the ships to be transported to the hospital at Scutari, an English surgeon and his assistant were left to tend the wounded of our enemy.

Two days did the allied armies lie on the field of Alma after the battle, to "bury their dead out of their sight," provide for the wounded by getting them on board ships to be conveyed to the barracks at Scutari and Constantinople, for the English and French respectively, and to rest after their great fatigue. The morning of the 23rd brought the sight of the gigantic *Himalaya*, having on board the Scotch Greys—a welcome reinforcement, so weak as the allies acknowledgedly were in cavalry. This day they moved on to the borders of the Belbek, which

stream they crossed on the 24th, having been obliged to take a somewhat eastern course for the sake of crossing the river at a fordable place. On arriving within sight of Sebastopol, it was found that its northern fortifications had been so greatly strengthened that it did not present as many advantages for an attack as had been at first anticipated. Added to this was the difficulty of landing the heavy guns, ammunition, and siege train on an open coast, without port, docks, or any appliances or means to aid so difficult a work in any situation; not to mention that the rear of the attacking army would have been always open to the attacks of the Russian reinforcements. The fleet, too, must have gone back to Eupatoria, from whence all the material of war must have been dragged through an open country at great cost of carriage and still greater risk of attack. On seeing all these difficulties, which opened themselves to him at a glance, Lord Raglan came to the rapid conclusion, that the army must, by a rapid flank movement, pass by and leave Sebastopol on the left, and take possession of the port and heights of Balaklava; and the French generals apparently concurred in this splendid strategic movement. It will be remembered that the reconnoitring generals had visited that natural harbour when they

coasted the Crimea to consider the best point for their future operations. Accordingly, on the 25th the British force performed this complicated movement; as gallant an exploit, situated as they were between two enemies—the one in the town of Sebastopol, the other at Batschi Serai, whither the remains of Menschikoff's army had retreated—as even the battle of Alma itself. But ere we proceed to describe it, we must mention the embarkation and subsequent death of the French commander-in-chief, Marshal St. Arnaud, immediately after the victory of Alma. That gallant veteran had been long afflicted with a painful chronic disorder, which was brought to a crisis by the exposure and fatigue of the last few days since they had reached the Crimea. And before the forces moved on, he felt himself obliged to resign the command into the hands of General Canrobert, and embarked on board a steamer for Marseilles. In two days more he expired.

It was then early on the 25th that the British army, led by the Scotch Greys, started on their perilous journey across the country, through unknown paths, or rather no paths at all, but a dense low brushwood, where no order of march could be kept up, from the heights of Belbek to Khutor Mackenzie, a farm on the road to Balaklava. Fourteen hours were they on foot, and providentially we

may and must say, without encountering an enemy, for had they done so the consequences would have been fearful. Two or three thousand determined men stationed at any part of their route might have cut the whole of those gallant men nearly to pieces. But the Russians had received too severe a check at the Alma to expose themselves again quickly to the bayonets and rifles of the British infantry, or the swift charge of its cavalry. Indeed, when the Scotch Greys, on emerging from the wood, found themselves in the centre of 15,000 Russians, who were escorting a convoy of ammunition into Sebastopol, they left their waggons and took refuge in flight, without waiting to see on what a mere handful of men they were turning their backs.

One individual exploit must be mentioned in connection with this so justly admired flank movement. That of Lieut. Maxse, a young officer who was acting as aide-de-camp to one of the British generals.

How could notice be given to the fleet of this unexpected movement? was the question. The naval armament had kept side by side with the allied army from Eupatoria to the north of Sebastopol, and though the army had diverged to the east for the purpose of crossing the Belbek, yet the fleet expected it to return to the western shore of the Crimea

north of Sebastopol; for it was not, as we have seen, till his commanding position on the heights of the Belbek had given Lord Raglan a view of the fortifications of Sebastopol that he had changed his intention of making the attack on that quarter. How then were the fleet to be informed that the army was to be found on the south instead of the north of Sebastopol? Lieut. Maxse offered his services to traverse the tangled brushwood and intricate paths of the ground over which the army had travelled that day, and to carry the news of its movements to the combined fleets. And he did so. Starting after dark through an unknown country, a country only traversed by him once, in face of all those marauders that in every case follow the rear of an advancing army, he rode off, and ere morning dawned had reached the ships and given his verbal message to the admirals thereof.

By the 27th the allied armies were not only in possession of the hills which command the southern fortifications of Sebastopol, but of the heights and port of Balaklava itself, the high road from Alousta to Sebastopol, Cape Kherson, and indeed all the country between the port of Balaklava and the southern side of the gulf which forms the harbour of Sebastopol.

For the purpose of understanding the difficulties which the allied armies have encountered in besieging Sebastopol, a glance at the map will show that the harbour of Balaklava, where all the guns and ammunition for carrying on the siege have been landed, is at least eight miles from the point where the furthest parallels from Sebastopol were erected; consequently that every foot of ground gained by our troops rendered the labour of bringing up guns and ammunition more difficult. However, nothing ever has daunted British troops, and the French, always excitable, were more than ever active and zealous on this occasion, matched as they were against the British, though working in concert with them. And now, whether because it so came to pass from the order of the march, each wing of the army having marched straight on and turned on its own pivot, or whether the death of Marshal St. Arnaud leaving Lord Raglan the chief officer occasioned it we cannot say, but in facing Sebastopol the British troops occupy the right wing, the French the left wing of the army. The Turks, supported by the light cavalry, lie at the rear of the British lines to guard the communications with Balaklava from the Russian army under General Liprandi, which, amounting to at least 36,000 men, lies at Batschi Serai. At the rear of the British

army, to support the Turks and the light cavalry, are placed the Highlanders, who did such service at the battle of Alma, and they are in their turn supported by the heavy cavalry, keeping up the communications with the British batteries in front of Sebastopol. General Bosquet, with the light division of the French forces, lies on the rear of the French lines of attack, between the Turks and the sea. Reinforcements, both of British, French, and Turkish troops, have been received; but the numbers of the combined armies even now are said not to exceed those collected in Sebastopol for the protection of that town, while there is at least as large an army in their rear under General Liprandi, threatening their communications with Balaklava on every occasion. The Russian garrison, too, may be added to at discretion, seeing that the north of the town is not commanded by the enemy, and consequently that the road to Batschi Serai is open, and communications may be kept up with both General Liprandi and Prince Menschikoff, if, as is supposed, he is stationed with a large army at Simpheropol.*

* In the multitude of communications which reach us it is almost impossible to disentangle the various descriptions of the same event. Prince Menschikoff is, according to some accounts, at Batschi Serai, according to others in Sebastopol. Both may

On the 27th of September our armies, as we have said, took up the position they now occupy before Sebastopol. On the 1st of October commenced the landing of the *matériel* for the siege; great part of which, from the deficiency of baggage animals, had to be dragged up by human labour to the heights above Sebastopol. On the 10th the first ground was broken, and parallels were opened at the distance of 2300 yards from the enemy's lines. But the commanding position of the allies enabling them to view all the operations of the Russians, showed that as fast as they could form trenches and batteries, the enemy also could strengthen their own lines, throw up earthworks, and bring guns to bear on our batteries. It was settled, therefore, by the allied generals that the bombardment should commence even before their works were in the condition they could have wished, and while they had only 117 guns in position, to meet 130 of the enemy's. And accordingly, on the 17th of October, began the bombardment from the lines of the allied armies, and at the same time from

be right, as the communications are open, and he has the undisturbed power of changing his head quarters. The two younger Grand Dukes, Nicholas and Michael, are also with the force in the Crimea; as well as General Luders, who has arrived with reinforcements from Odessa.

the combined fleets, or at least from as many men-of-war as could find a place for action, which steamed as far into the harbour as the sinking of the enemy's ships would allow, took up their station, opposite to the imposing batteries in the north and south entrances to the harbour, and commenced on their side an essay of what wooden walls can do against granite ones. The fleet suffered severely, especially the *Agamemnon* and *Sanspareil*, which were most distinguished. What effect it had on the enemy's works is not so easy for us at present to determine.

From the 17th of October up to the 5th of November, the bombardment on the part of the allies and a fierce return from the Russians went on, with, as may be expected, a few variations of success; such as the silencing of the French batteries for a few hours, which were at first decidedly too weak, their guns being only 24-pounders, and the unfortunate blowing up of one of their powder magazines; the blowing up or setting fire to many of the Sebastopol public buildings and magazines, with many other details, which belong rather to a chronicle of the war than to a general sketch of its proceedings.

On the 25th of October, General Liprandi made a vigorous attack on the rear of the British lines in the

hopes of cutting off their communications with Balaklava. With 30,000 men, he crept stealthily up through the wooded country and ravines from Batschi Serai to the redoubts that had been raised to defend our communications, which were placed in the charge of the Turks. Completely taken by surprise, the Turkish forces, after spiking the guns of some of the batteries, retreated on the British lines, leaving other guns and all the ammunition in the enemy's hands, to be turned by them against their owners. The Highlanders, supported by the English cavalry, quickly arrived to the rescue; the former, receiving and resisting the charge of the enemy in gallant style, the latter charging through and through double their own number of the enemy's cavalry, and driving it back from the position it had taken up.

The enemy's attack having been thus repulsed, an unfortunate mistake exposed the light cavalry in a manner which brought them out of the field victorious, but having been most severely handled by the Russians, who, having taken possession of the redoubts, had turned the guns they had found therein against their original possessors. The light cavalry, headed by Lord Cardigan, charged down the valley, through a cross fire of Minié rifles, and our own nearest batteries now held by the enemy in their

flanks, and in face of the nine guns of our most distant battery. They charged through two lines of cavalry, drove off the artillery, made a circuit round the guns, which they could not possibly bring away with them, and charging again through the enemy's cavalry, which had reformed in their rear, and again passing up "the valley of death," rejoined the heavy cavalry which had advanced to their support, leaving 400 out of their 600 dead, wounded, or missing.

Night came, leaving the enemy still close to our lines, and having possession of two of our own batteries; the two others had been retaken. On the 26th, a sally from Sebastopol on the other side of the British lines, and another vigorous attack from the forces of General Liprandi, evidently showing that these were preconcerted movements from within and from without, to cut off the British from all communication either with Balaklava or their allies, thus virtually putting them in the position of besieged instead of besiegers, was most effectually repulsed by our troops; who even recaptured the two remaining forts which had been taken by the enemy on the preceding day. The loss of the Russians on these two days is said to have been from 500 to 1000 men; that of the allied Turkish and British troops to rather more than half that number.

In the meantime the British and French parallels were gradually advancing from above 2000 yards from the lines of Sebastopol, at which distance they first commenced the bombardment, to within from 200 to 300 yards, at which distance they now are. Two Russian admirals, one of them the commander of Sebastopol, have been killed — Admirals Korniloff and Nachimoff, — the two who assisted at the massacre of Sinope; as if by a providential retribution for that unwarlike and barbarous action.

The streets of Sebastopol are said to be encumbered with the unburied dead, who lie tainting the air and bringing sure destruction upon both besieged and besiegers if the end does not come quickly. The Russians acknowledge to a loss of 5000 men since the siege began; it probably is much more. The allies, up to the 1st of November, lost 1500 killed and wounded, and some sixty taken prisoners. But far more than those who have been killed by the fate of war, are those who have died of cholera and dysentery, brought on by fatigue, and exposure, for eighteen days after they landed, to the rains and night fogs of the Crimea without covering or tent. Meantime the allied troops are in good spirits, and intend to win their game, and a comfortable winter residence in Sebastopol, while the Russians are reported

to be at strife among themselves. And still the Czar's peremptory commands to Prince Menschikoff are, as reported from his last autograph note written the beginning of this month: —

"The enemy must be defeated, cost what it will; and I hope that your next messenger will bring me news that such has been the case."

After the vigorous repulse of the sally on the 26th, the batteries of the allies were worked with such effect, that on the 5th of November it was hoped that breaching batteries could be erected, and the bombardment for a breach commenced. It was probably with the hopes of preventing this, and partly, perhaps, that the garrison of Sebastopol were urged to greater and more decisive measures by the presence of the two Grand Dukes, that another *sortie* was determined on for the 5th. Within an hour both the French and English batteries were violently assaulted in front from the town, while the English rear was at the same time attacked with equal violence by General Liprandi's division. The disposable forces of the Russians were at least double what the allies could oppose to them; and for a time, overwhelmed by numbers, their batteries were in the hands of their enemies; but nothing can

overcome the dogged courage and impenetrability of the British, nor the daring impetuosity of the French; unitedly they are invincible; and the Russians were not only driven back with the loss of 9000 men, but the French pursued the flying enemy so rapidly, as almost to enter Sebastopol with them. The fire from the town batteries, however, was opened so briskly that the French were obliged to retire. The loss on the side of the allies was great. It is computed that, as usual, it was about one-half that of the Russians. No less than five English generals were wounded: among them, Sir G. Brown, the second in command; and Generals Cathcart, Strangways, and Goldie were killed.

And now, spite of the invincible valour of our troops, spite of the fact that they are successful in every engagement, it must come to pass now, as heretofore, that the Russians, even in death and defeat, are conquerors, unless sufficient reinforcements are sent, and in sufficient time, to fill up our ranks. One half of our whole army is gone either by the sword of war or sickness, and more than half our cavalry has been swept away. And as yet supplies and reinforcements have been dispatched sparingly, as if England did not hold the world's purse in her hands, or Her Majesty's "faithful

Commons" had refused one farthing of the already large sums demanded by our rulers. Is England never to profit by experience? Are the names of Sir John Moore and thousands of others who watered the Peninsula with their blood, and of the gallant heroes who found

"The snow their winding-sheet,"

in the passes of Cabul, to have no effect in arousing the authorities from the sluggish insensibility that cannot alter for a second the routine of public business to dispatch more quickly the necessary succours to rescue the bravest of England's chivalry—the thousands of beloved husbands and fathers, and sons and brothers, whose relatives at home rest not day and night in seeking for them protection in the day of battle? Are the dispatches of Wellington, now become "familiar in our mouths as household words," if those of none other of our departed heroes be read by men in power, to have no effect in proving that economy in war is ever false economy—that men are money, and the life of man, even of the lowest soldier in the ranks, is and ought to be of more account to us than the keeping to an estimate or the construction of a budget?

If England does not grudge her money, why should her rulers stint her armies and risk her glory?

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERSON AND CHARACTER OF THE CZAR.

THE Czar is now fifty-seven years of age; in person, tall and commanding, being about six feet two inches in height, stout and well made, but rather inclined to corpulency; as yet, however, this is kept within due bounds by tight lacing, said to be very injurious to his personal health. His shoulders and chest are broad and full, his limbs clean and well made, and his hands and feet small and finely formed. The Emperor has a Grecian profile, a high but receding forehead, that and the nose being in one grand line; the eyes finely lined, clear, large and blue; the mouth delicately cut, with good teeth and a prominent chin; the face is a large one, and his whole air military. In looking more closely at him, his countenance is said to be deceptive, inasmuch as the eyes and mouth have a different expression; the former being indeed always fierce and inflexible, even

though the latter smiles. His eyes are said to search out every one, while none can confront them. As a young man, the Czar was cold and stern and dignified, even with his youthful companions; and he still carries about with him the same character and the same manners wherever he goes and with whomsoever he assbciates. He is unbending to all, either in his public or domestic intercourse, excepting to the Empress, to whom he is said to be sincerely attached.

Dr. Michelsen, in his "History of Nicholas I.," gives the following sketch of the Emperor of All the Russias in his own house: —

"Nicholas rises at an early hour, and goes soon to the business of the day, after having taken a short walk. The most scrupulous order reigns in his study; the walls are adorned with pictures of regimental costumes. The furniture is elegant, but not over rich; while there is nowhere to be seen a trace of useless ornaments. The dinner meal usually takes but little time, for it is served quickly, while the dishes are comparatively few. The Czar eats heartily, but is very moderate in his drink. He neither smokes nor takes snuff. In the evening, he has two or three cups of very strong tea, and spends the interval between that and bed-time at some game. Despite his regularity of life, which is necessarily much interrupted by receptions, travels, &c., the Czar is no

slave to habit. According to those who have had the best opportunity of judging, his relation to the Empress is simple, yet noble—an expression that undoubtedly admits of varied interpretation. Women are not without their influence at this court. In 1846, a young lieutenant of the guard, danced a polka with Lady Dashkoff, so much to her entire satisfaction, that he was soon after installed as one of the aides-de-camp to the Czar. His friends composed a new polka, which they dedicated to him under the ironical title of the 'Promotion Polka.' Much has never been said of the exhibition of parental feeling on the part of Nicholas—at least he did not display it in any lively degree, while his children yet remained young. The Grand Duchess Olga, the late Princess Alexandra, and the Grand Duke Constantine, were frequently indicated as his pets; though, judging outwardly, since they have been grown up, a large amount of form and ceremony has accompanied their intercourse. Custine, in his work 'Russia in 1839,' says:—'Nicholas forgets his majesty only in domestic life, where he is reminded that man has his happiness independent of state duties.' There is, however, a degree of coquetry in the domestic life of the Winter Palace. Persons well acquainted with the imperial family assert, that though Nicholas may love his children dearly, yet it cannot be denied, that he assumes towards his sons a serious and cold demeanour, while his behaviour to his daughters is chivalrous in the extreme; but this is a conduct which he generally adopts towards ladies. The weak and sickly Empress he treats with compassionate

affection: we can find no better word. When from indisposition she is confined to her apartment, he frequently visits her there; and the newspapers, which are always loud in praise of his undiminished affection, mentioned that, at the time of the imperial stay at Naples, in 1847, he used to carry her in his arms up the staircase to her chamber. During the burning of the Winter Palace in 1836 (says Grätsch), Count Orloff reported to the Emperor, that the fire was about reaching the imperial private cabinet or study, and asked him what he desired to be saved in it, as no time was to be lost. 'Only my portfolio,' was the reply; 'it contains the letters of the Empress, which she wrote me during our engagement.'"

The Marquis de Custine appears to have had more personal intercourse with the Czar than any other foreigner who has ever visited Russia. His opinion of him is decidedly unfavourable. He says:—

"When I draw near the Emperor, when I see his dignity and his beauty, I admire this miracle. A man in his right place is rarely found anywhere; but on the throne, such a being must be a phœnix. I rejoice to live in an age that has produced such a prodigy, seeing that I take the same pleasure in bestowing respect, as others in bestowing insult. If, however, I attentively examine the object of my respect, it unfortunately results, that, on looking closely at this unique personage, his head seems to present two faces, like that of Janus; and the words violence, exile, oppression, or their equivalents, are graven on the side concealed from me."

The Marquis informs us that the Emperor was repeatedly seen walking about in the streets of his capital, and that he was also in the habit of frequenting private houses, though apparently this was sometimes as a spy rather than as an act of condescension: —

"The Emperor Nicholas is frequently seen in the Neoskoi. His approach is signalled by the unusual flutter of the crowd, as if his coming had been announced by an *avant courier*. Hats fly off, and each one wheels to the right about, and waits the approach of his Imperial Majesty. If he rides, it is in an old and forlorn barouche or sleigh; if he walks, it is alone, and at a moderate pace. There is nothing in his appearance to attract attention. A tall figure in a chapeau and plume, a dark cloth cloak and strapless pantaloons, passes along; receives the homage of his subjects, gives them the military salute in return, and disappears before the multitude have recovered from their surprise. The other members of the imperial family generally ride out in a low chariot and four, with grooms in blue and silver. Sometimes they pass unobserved in a plain close coach, while the servants and retainers of the household, who frequently go errands in the great court carriages, with footmen in scarlet liveries, are mistaken for imperial blood, and receive the reverences of the people."

"Beggars are never seen. Smoking in the streets is strictly prohibited. The Emperor, while walking one day, met a Frenchman smoking a cigar. He approached,

and asked him if he was not aware that it was contrary to the law to smoke in the street. The Gaul, not knowing by whom he was addressed, replied, that he had been in the habit of smoking in the streets of every other city. The Emperor, who detests a Frenchman, left him, and proceeding to the *boutka*, which is the station of police, near at hand, gave directions to the *boutousknik*, as to the disposition of the smoker. The latter was immediately placed by force in a *kibitka*, which is a small waggon without springs of any kind, and conveyed over a thousand miles of bad road, to the Turkish frontier, where he was dismissed, with permission to follow the Parisian fashions."— *Custine.*

"A noble who is honoured with the information that he will have a visit from the Czar, prepares with more than ordinary care to give *éclat* to the occasion; and he selects from among the courtiers, those only whose association he supposes would not be disagreeable to his sovereign. An appearance of anxiety is depicted on almost every face, and there is a stiffness of demeanour and a solemnity of deportment, really distressing. The Emperor, on these occasions, is usually dressed in a dark, loose frock-coat, and ample pantaloons of his favourite Cossacks. An epaulet, and a bit of ribbon at the button, are his only decorations, and his whole appearance indicates more of negligence than neatness of person. He moves softly and quickly from room to room, exhibiting in his countenance and manner something of diffidence and something of impatience, the first frequently verging upon awkwardness, the latter approaching violence. His

restlessness hurries him from one apartment to another, surprising, with his sudden entrance, those who supposed he was a long way off. As he enters, the company rise up, make the most profound obeisance, and stand silently before him. Every eye is upon him, every ear is open to catch his words. He may, or may not, return the general salutation with a bow; he may, or may not, motion to the ladies to resume their seats; and he will occasionally single out, and advance towards, some individual, and commence a conversation, which will be terminated by an abrupt departure to another chamber." —*Ibid.*

Other writers speak of the Czar very much like the French marquis, describing him as not a man, but an autocrat—as not a monarch, but a despot; as living ever in public to eye and overawe his people and his servants, and ever under a mask to conceal the terrible vindictiveness with which the slightest fault discoverable towards himself, Russia, and his ideas of what is due to both, is ruthlessly punished. For even while his admirers tell of his determination to punish peculation, and other faults of the same nature, yet, in the true spirit of the tyrant, he punishes to revenge himself on the offender, not to avenge the majesty of the law, or to hinder from future iniquities of the kind. M. Golovin, a Russian, gives a most repulsive sketch of the great

Czar, and cites various anecdotes in support of his views especially as to his treatment of literary men:—

"Lermontoff, another eminent Russian poet, died, and Nicholas exclaimed—'He lived like a dog, and he has died like one!' Ryleïecff was a distinguished lyric poet. Nicholas hanged him! That is his way of treating Russian talent. Polejaïeff was another young poet of Liberal tendencies. Nicholas called him to him, and embraced him. Everybody believed that he meant to take him in favour. He made him a soldier, and when the poet died, a friend, wishing to find his body, was told to go and look among the boxes which are used as coffins for the common soldiers! Sakoloffsky wrote some spirited verses against the Czar. His judges asked him whether he had not hurled his fiercest invectives against God? 'Yes,' replied the poet, 'knowing that God is more merciful than the Czar.' He was thrown into a dungeon, which he never quitted, save as a corpse. Even at this very moment Nicholas is wreaking his vengeance on Bakunin, whom he is pledged to Austria to keep immured in prison. Disgust prevents our continuing the sad list of victims, and we will, therefore conclude by mentioning a single fact, to show his mode of treating female poets. Madame Rastoptchin wrote some verses entitled, 'The Husband and the Wife.' The husband is Russia, and the wife is Poland, and the poet shows, that if they do not love one another, it is for want of a proper understanding. Madame Rastoptchin was exiled to Moscow; the Court goes there, and, at the end of a few months, the Empress meets the exile at Madame Nesselrode's, and invites her

to a ball at the palace. As soon as Nicholas sees her, he orders her to quit the palace!"

The one overwhelming feature of the Czar's character is ambition. To be a great Russian Emperor, and to make Russia the chief empire in the world, seems to have been his aim from the moment he mounted the throne, even if it was not the dream of his life from a still earlier period. The partition of Poland with others, his amenities to Austria, the assistance he rendered that state during the civil war in Hungary, were all so many present self-denials to smooth the way for the future conquest of the land on which he had set his heart,—Turkey. For long years, as witnessed by the diplomatic correspondence lately published, has he determined on possessing himself of the keys of the Empire of the East, which, he thinks, and probably truly, added to his mighty Northern possessions, would give him supreme dominion throughout the world. Very crafty, deep-laid, and sagacious have been his plans; but the British feeling of protecting the weak, and the far-sighted policy of the Emperor of the French, have unexpectedly come in his way.

But the errors of Nicholas are to a certain degree the hereditary appanage of the sovereigns of Russia,

and a part indeed of the system of autocracy, as will be shown from the following extracts from the catechism taught in the Russian schools, where absolute devotion is required to the Czar as "the Vicegerent and Minister of God to execute the divine commands": —

"*Q.* How is the authority of the Emperor to be considered in reference to the spirit of Christianity?

"*A.* As proceeding immediately from God.

"*Q.* What duties does religion teach us, the humble subjects of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to practise towards him?

"*A.* Worship, obedience, fidelity, the payment of taxes, service, love, and prayer, the whole being comprised in the words worship and service.

"*Q.* Wherein does this worship consist, and how should it be manifested?

"*A.* By the most unqualified reverence in words, gestures, demeanour, thoughts, and actions.

"*Q.* What kind of obedience do we owe him?

"*A.* An entire passive and unbounded obedience in every point of view.

"*Q.* How are irreverence and infidelity to the Emperor to be considered in reference to God?

"*A.* As the most heinous sin, and the most frightful criminality."—*Morell's Secret Documents.*

CHAP. II.

THE FAMILY OF THE CZAR.

If the Marquis de Custine and other travellers in Russia can say little in favour of the Czar himself, yet all unite in describing the elegance, beauty, and goodness of heart of the Czarina. Though it is fifteen years since the Marquis de Custine described her as thoroughly worn out, she is still alive. And thanks to a winter spent in Italy, in 1847, when Nicholas wished to gain a similar influence over the Pope to that which he is reported to have gained over most others with whom he comes in contact, she appears infinitely stronger than at the time when the following description of her was penned.

"The shocking thinness of the Empress, her air of languor, the diminished lustre of her eye, rendered these presages the more ominous. Her life, like a disease, may be said to be mortal; fêtes and balls every evening! There is no choice here, but that of dying of amusement or of *ennui*.

"For the Empress, as well as the zealous courtiers, the

spectacle of parades and reviews commences early in the morning. These are always followed by receptions; the Empress then retires for a quarter of an hour, after which she rides out in her carriage for two hours. She next takes a bath before again going out on horseback. Returned a second time, she has some more visitors to receive: this over, she proceeds to inspect certain useful institutions, superintended by herself, or by some of those honoured with her intimacy. From thence she follows the Emperor to the Camp, there being always one some where near. They return to dance; and thus her days her years, and her life are consumed."—*Custine.*

The Czarina was, as we have before stated, a Prussian Princess. In person she is extremely engaging, and in her manners still more so. The late Marquis of Londonderry, in his "Tour in the North of Europe," says of her,—

"The indescribable majesty of deportment and fascinating grace that mark this illustrious personage, are very peculiar. Celebrated as are all the females connected with the lamented and beautiful Queen of Prussia, there are none of them more bewitching in manner than the Empress of Russia; nor is there existing, according to all reports, so excellent and perfect a being."

She is devotedly attached to her husband and family, and her long illness even is said to have been greatly occasioned by the mental anxiety she underwent at the period of the Czar's accession to the

throne, ever since which she has been subject to a severe nervous affection.

There is no doubt that but for the Czarina the Czar would be even more impetuous, overbearing, and cruel than he is.

"The Empress has always exercised a beneficial influence over her husband, by tempering his passion and his excesses. Though she does not possess any superior qualities, the atmosphere in which she lives has not been able to efface the good principles which she imbibed in the Court of Prussia. The countenance of the Empress is represented to be mild, radiant, and benignant, resembling in its sweetness of expression that of a ministering angel."—*Marquis of Londonderry.*

The Czarovitch, the Emperor's eldest son, Alexander, is reported to be amiable and popular. The Marquis de Custine, even at the early age to which this Prince had attained during his visit, gave a good report of him as to talents, manners, and personal appearance.

"The countenance of the Grand Duke Alexander, the Emperor's son, is expressive of goodness, his walk is graceful, buoyant and noble—he is truly a prince; he appears modest, without timidity, which makes one at ease with him."

A more recent traveller reports:—

"The heir to the throne inherits his father's majestic

person, and somewhat of the regularity of his face, but with the utter absence of the Emperor's unsympathising grandeur. On the contrary, the son has a face of much sentiment and feeling; the lips full, the eyelids pensive; more of kindness than of character in his expression."

He is thirty-four years of age, and has married the sister of the present Grand Duke of Hesse Darmstadt, a family which, like that of Wurtemberg, has frequently formed alliance with the Romanoffs, the Holstein Gottorps, and the Hohenzollerns of Prussia. He is now appointed commander-in-chief of the reserve of the Guards in Warsaw.

Many hints have been given of late, that the Czarovitch does not approve of the present conduct of his father, or sympathise in his desire of encroachment on foreign states; his own feelings and policy being more in accordance with that of his uncle the late Emperor.

The Grand Duke Constantine, born in 1827, is the second son of the Czar. He was named probably by his father, as was his uncle the Viceroy of Poland by the Empress Catherine, with a view to his sitting on the throne of Constantinople. He is said to be more ambitious, more designing, and more tyrannical than his elder brother; his character being violent, like that of his uncle Constantine, and cold and politic like that of his father. In short, he

seems, far more than his elder brother, the legitimate successor of the half-barbarian Peter, the insane Paul, and the vehement Nicholas. He married, in 1844, Alexandra, daughter of the Prince of Saxe Altenburg. His present appointment is High Admiral of Russia; but he is kept by his father's side. Many think that this is with the view of his superseding his eldest brother in the throne, as did his father.

The third son of the reigning Czar, the Grand Duke Michael, is more like his father in person and character than either of his elder brothers, being handsome, wary, cold, and tyrannical. He was born in 1831.

The fourth son, the Grand Duke Nicholas, is a year younger than Michael. These two Princes are appointed to command in the armies of the South. They were publicly blessed by their father on the 23rd of October, at a review of the Imperial Guard, when the Czar, his sons, and the whole 30,000 Guards knelt to implore the blessing of the Almighty. Can we think that this display of piety is genuine in one who otherwise acts so impiously?

The Czar's eldest daughter, Maria, a very beautiful woman, was married in 1839 to Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg, who died in 1852.

It is said that the Duke during his lifetime did not enjoy the splendid prison in which by his marriage he had incarcerated himself, nor did he willingly submit to the domestic tyranny of his father-in-law. This produced many disagreements, and he was continually under arrest for persisting in the freedom of appearing in his royal wife's boudoir in his dressing gown, for smoking in her presence, or for buttoning his military coat otherwise than according to the Emperor's regulations. So that not even the mutual affection between him and his wife prevented him from congratulating the Duke de Bordeaux, when a proposition for his marrying another of the daughters of Russia was broken off, that he had "escaped the cage in which he himself was enclosed."

The widowed Duchess of Leuchtenburg visited England last year, and was probably seen by many of our readers.

Olga, the second daughter of the Emperor, born in 1822, is said to be the most beautiful of this strikingly handsome family. She has suffered much from ill-health, and is still very delicate. She married, in 1846, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg.

The fourth daughter, Alexandra, born in 1824, is married to Prince Frederic of Hesse. She died in

1851, to the intense grief of her parents. She was the youngest and best beloved.

All the Emperor's brothers are now dead. That the Emperor Alexander was the most amiable, the most benevolent, the most civilised — in a word, the most Christian, — there is little doubt.

Of the Grand Duke Constantine we have already had occasion to speak elsewhere as violent and ungovernable in his temper, even to insanity. When Viceroy in Poland, the cruelties exercised by his command towards the unhappy Poles were great beyond description. He died of the cholera in 1831.

The Grand Duke Michael, who was born during the brief reign of his father Paul, had in consequence the largest private fortune of any of his family. He is said to have resembled the Emperor Alexander in his disposition more than either of his other brothers. To his bravery Nicholas very much owed the successful termination of the conspiracy which attended the commencement of his reign. He married Helen, Princess of Wurtemberg, and died in 1849, leaving a widow and three daughters, but no sons. These daughters were brought up by their mother in great retirement; the eldest, Catharine, married, in 1851, George, Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz; and the second, Elizabeth Michaelowna,

married Adolph of Warsaw. We find thus, that by means of royal marriages the Czar has connected himself with almost all the principal reigning families in the continent of Europe. His sister is widow of the late William II. of Holland, and he himself brother-in-law to the king of Prussia.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA.

THE Russian Empire extends over the north-eastern part of Europe, over the whole of Northern Asia, and the north-western coast of North America. It consists of Russia in Europe, Georgia, Siberia, and Kamtchatka in Asia, and some settlements on the north-west coast of North America. The area and population have been estimated as follows: —

	Sq. miles.	Population.
Russia in Europe -	1,700,000 -	56,000,000.
„ Asia -	4,400,000 -	4,000,000.
„ America -	400,000 -	500,000.

The great portions, governments, and districts of the above are as follows: —

RUSSIA IN EUROPE.

Baltic provinces. — St. Petersburg, Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland.

Great Russia.—Moscow, Smolensk, Pskow, Twer, Novgorod, Olonetz, Archangel, Vologda, Yaroslaw,

Costroma, Vladimir, Nischnei, Navgorod, Tambow, Riasan, Tula, Kaluga, Orel, Kursk, Voronetz.

Little Russia. — Kiev, Czerigov, Poltava, Slobode-Ukraine.

South Russia. — Ekaterinoslav, Cherson, Taurida, Bessarabia, Don Cossacks, Georgia (including Daghestan, &c.), Saratow.

Western Russia. — Wilna, Grodno, Vitepsk, Mohilev, Minsk, Volhynia, Podolia, Bialystok.

Poland. — Cracow, Sandomor, Kalisch, Lublin, Plock, Masovia, Podlachia, Augustovo.

Russia in Asia.

Astrakhan, Casan, Pensa, Simbisk, Wiatka.

Siberia. — Tobolsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Yenisseisk, Irkatsh, Yahutzk, Ochotzk, Kamtchatka.

Russia in America.

North-west territory. — *Aleutian Islands* and *Kurile Islands* in the Pacific.

Russia in Europe extends from 43° to 71° N. lat., and from 20° to 63° long. The principal rivers are the Dwina, Volga, Duva, Niemen, Dnieper, Dniester, Don, and Ural.

As to its general features, Russia may be said to be one vast plain; the Ural mountains and a moun-

tainous tract in the Crimea being the only undulating ground. Excepting these, there is no part of Russia more than 700 feet above the level of the sea. The vast rivers flow on sullenly and slowly through a gently descending district from the interior; in many cases seeming scarcely to flow at all, but forming bogs, morasses, and lakes throughout the country. The steppes of Russia are vast elevated plains in the centre of the country, not, however, of sufficient altitude to obtain the title of table-land. The steppes of Russia have a totally different character to any other plains in the world. Generally speaking they consist of rich pastures intermingled with woods, barren sands, and saline clays; and abound in lakes, pools, and streams of salt and bitter waters. The soil of Russia, as may be expected of so large a tract of country, is very varied. In some parts of the southern and temperate zone it is extremely fertile; but whole tracts of country lying in the Arctic regions are entirely unfit for cultivation. Between the two the country is covered by large pine forests; one of them is said, indeed, to extend without interruption over a tract of 150,000 square miles.

As to climate, Russia is a land of extremes. At St. Petersburg, for instance, a long cold dark winter

is scarcely atoned for by three weeks of intense heat in summer. While in the South the case is reversed, and a long summer and short and severe winter are to be expected. Throughout the whole country the spring and autumn are short, and the transition from cold to heat, and *vice versâ*, very rapid.

The inland trade of Russia is principally transacted at large fairs. The number of manufactories is increasing; but such works may at present be considered but in their infancy in that country, though all the czars from the time of Ivan I., in the fifteenth century, to the present moment, have done their best to enlarge them. The foreign commerce is chiefly with Great Britain: the comparative number of merchant vessels employed in it are one Russian to ten English. The exports of Russia to Great Britain are chiefly wheat, tallow, flax, linseed, hempseed, and hemp. Its imports from Great Britain are coals, woven cottons, cotton twist, and yarn; earthenware, hardware, and cutlery; iron and steel goods; lead and shot; machinery and millwork; tin, woollens and worsteds, and yarn. The productions of Russia, especially in its grain, are far greater than its requirements. It is thus our chief market for wheat and other cereals. The climate of the southern portions of the country is favourable also

to fruit and vegetables. Peaches, apricots, quinces, mulberries, walnuts, almonds, cherries, apples, and pomegranates; potatoes, cabbages, turnips, carrots, cucumbers, radishes, and pumpkins, are all extensively grown. Russia has all our domestic animals except rabbits, and in the Asiatic territories camels in addition, besides a vast number of goats in all parts, and buffaloes and reindeer occasionally in their several districts. The forests abound in wild animals such as elk, deer, wild hogs, hares, bears, gluttons, badgers, wolves, foxes, wild asses, saiga-antelopes, ermines, otters, marmots, and other small animals, these last giving to the country a great trade in fur.

Russia has mines of gold, silver, copper and iron; mercury, arsenic, nickel, cobalt, antimony, and bismuth are met with also. Salt is found in various parts, and a few coals, but not in large quantities; malachite, if we are to trust to the wonders of our Exhibition, is very abundant. Marble and granite works are also met with.*

* For the whole of this chapter we are chiefly indebted to the National Cyclopædia.

CHAP. II.

ST. PETERSBURG.

THE town of St. Petersburg was built by Peter the Great, on the banks of the Neva; partly on a low flat marsh to the north and south of the river, and partly on a group of islands situated in the river.

A few fishermen's huts erected along the banks of the Neva, and often washed away by the spring overflows, caused by the thaw of ice, was, in 1703, the whole of what is now the capital of Russia; at present it has a circuit of eighteen miles, though only a portion of it is covered with buildings. The measures taken by Peter the Great to enforce the rapid building of this new capital were somewhat stringent. By one ukase, which appeared in 1714, 350 noble families were ordered to establish themselves in the new capital, and to build houses in the places indicated by the sovereign. By another ukase, the merchants and mechanics were ordered to build 300 houses. By another, the use of stone was prohibited for a certain time in every city of the

empire except St. Petersburg. And by another, every ship arriving in the harbour was to bring a certain quantity of stone, according to its size and tonnage. A modern writer says,

"Brick is the material generally used for building in St. Petersburg, wood being prohibited, and stone being far too expensive. As soon as the brick wall is dry, it receives a coat of plaster, which is washed white, yellow, or pink, according to the fancy of the proprietor. This plaister is stained and cracked with the humidity and frosts of autumn, and peels off with the storms and severe cold in winter. The pilastres and ornamented crevices are universally affected in December with a sort of cuticular eruption, and long before the spring the statues in stucco upon the Winter Palace, and in the niches of the imperial and noble dwellings, have lost their heads or arms, or some other member; and certainly present a most woful and ludicrous appearance.

"Towards the first of June some 70,000, or 80,000 serfs arrive from the interior, and are set to work to repair and re-beautify the magnificent city. Cosmetics, in the shape of a new coat of plaster, and a new wash of colour are applied, and by the time the ice has disappeared, and the first steamers have arrived, St. Petersburg looks as fresh, and bright, and beautiful as summer tourists have described it. It must be confessed that this nice and new appearance, and the immense extent and variety of the buildings, have an imposing and grand effect." — *Maxwell's Czar and his People.*

The Marquis de Custine's description of his first thoughts as he entered this capital — the creation of one man's caprice, rather than the gradual growth of ages — as is the case with every other capital of Europe — does not give a very pleasant idea of it, notwithstanding the fact that "St. Petersburg is a city of palaces."

The Marquis writes thus: —

"The streets of Petersburg present a strange appearance to the eyes of a Frenchman. I will endeavour to describe them, but I must first notice the approach to the city by the Neva. It is much celebrated, and the Russians are justly proud of it, though I did not find it equal its reputation. When at a considerable distance the steeples begin to appear, the effect produced is more singular than imposing. The hazy outline of land, which may be perceived far off, between the sky and sea, becomes, as you advance, a little more unequal at some points than at others; those scarcely perceptible irregularities are found, on nearer approach, to be the gigantic architectural monuments of the new capital of Russia. We first begin to recognise the Greek steeples and the cupolas of convents, then some modern public buildings — the front of the Exchange, and the white colonnades of the colleges, museums, barracks, and palaces, which border the quays of granite, become discernible. On entering the city, you pass some sphinxes, also of granite. Their dimensions are colossal and their appearance imposing; nevertheless, these copies of the antique have no

merit as works of art. A city of palaces is always magnificent, but the imitation of classic monuments shocks the taste when the climate under which these models are so inappropriately placed is considered. Soon, however, the stranger is struck with the form and multitude of turrets and metallic spires which rise in every direction; this, at least, is national architecture. Petersburg is flanked with numbers of large convents, surmounted by steeples; pious edifices, which serve as a rampart to the profane city. The Russian churches have preserved their primitive appearance; but it is not the Russians who have invented that clumsy and capricious Byzantine style by which they are distinguished. The Greek religion of this people, their character, education, and history, alike justify their borrowing from the lower empire; they may be permitted to seek for models at Constantinople, but not at Athens. Viewed from the Neva, the parapets of the quays of Petersburg are striking and magnificent; but the first step after landing discovers them to be badly and unevenly paved with flints, which are as disagreeable to the eye as inconvenient to the feet, and ruinous to the wheels. The prevailing taste here is the brilliant and the striking: spires gilded and tapering like electric conductors; porticoes, the bases of which almost disappear under the water; squares, ornamented with columns which seem lost in the immense space that surrounds them; antique statues, the character and attire of which so ill accord with the aspect of the country, the tint of the sky, the costume and manners of the people, as to suggest the idea of

their being captive heroes in a hostile land; expatriated edifices, temples that might be supposed to have fallen from the summit of the Grecian mountains into the marshes of Lapland,—such were the objects that struck me at the first sight of St. Petersburg. The magnificent temples of the pagan gods, which so admirably crown with their horizontal lines and severely chaste contours the promontories of the Ionian shores, and whose marbles are gilded by the sunshine amid the rocks of the Peloponesus, here become mere heaps of plaster and mortar; the incomparable ornaments of Grecian sculpture, the wonderful miniature of classic art, have all given place to an indescribably burlesque style of modern decoration which substitution passes among Finlanders as proof of a pure taste in the arts. Partially to imitate that which is perfect, is to spoil it; we should either strictly copy the model, or invent altogether. But the reproduction of the monuments of Athens, however faithfully executed, would be lost in a miry plain, continually in danger of being overflowed by water, whose level is nearly that of the land. Here nature suggests to man the very opposite of what he has imagined. Instead of imitations of pagan temples, it demands bold projecting lines and perpendicular forms, in order to pierce the mists of a polar sky, and to break the monotonous surface of the moist grey steppes which form, further than the eye or the imagination can stretch, the territory of St. Petersburg. I begin to understand why the Russians urge us with so much earnestness to visit them during winter; six feet of snow conceals all this dreariness; but in summer, we

see the country. Explore the territory of Petersburg and the neighbouring provinces, and you will find I am told, for hundreds of leagues, nothing but ponds and morasses, stunted firs and dark-leaved birch. To this sombre vegetation the white shroud of winter is assuredly preferable.

"But, however shocked our perceptions of the beautiful may be, by the foolish imitations which spoil the appearance of the Russian capital, it is impossible to contemplate without a species of admiration, an immense city which has sprung up from the sea at the bidding of one man, and which has to defend itself against a periodical inundation of ice, and a perpetual inundation of water."—*Custine's Russia.*

Notwithstanding the Marquis's critical objections to the architecture of the city, in which no doubt he is correct, St. Petersburg is a remarkably handsome town. The substantial and extensive quays as you approach it by water, and the large, long, and broad streets must be very imposing; most of them being from 60 to 120 feet broad, no less than eight 6000 long, and two of them respectively 14,350 and 10,222 feet long.

One or two of the houses alone form what would in London be a respectably long street, and contain a whole population of inhabitants. M. Kohl says: —

"Many of these houses look unpretending enough when

seen from the street, to which they always turn their smallest side; but enter the gateway, and you are astonished at the succession of side buildings and back buildings, of passages and courts, some of the latter large enough to review a regiment of cavalry.

"The building of a house is a much more costly undertaking in St. Petersburg than in any other part of Russia. Provisions are dear, and the price of labour always comparatively high. Then the ground brings often enormously high prices. There are private houses, the mere ground of which is valued at 200,000 roubles, a sum for which, in other parts of the empire, a man might buy an estate of several square leagues, with houses, woods, rivers, and lakes, and all the eagles, bears, wolves, oxen, and human creatures that inhabit them. In particularly favourable situations for business, as much as 1000 roubles a-year has been paid by way of rent, for every window looking out into the street. The next thing that renders building so costly, is the difficulty of obtaining a solid foundation. The spongy, marshy nature of the soil makes it necessary for the builder to begin by constructing a strong scaffolding under ground, before he can think of rearing one above it. Every building of any size rests on piles, and would vanish like a stage ghost, were it not for the enormous beams that furnish its support. Such is the pedestal on which stands the citadel with all its walls; and even the quay along the river side, the foot pavement, and the frame-work of the canals, must be secured in a similar way. The foundation alone for the Isaac's Church cost upwards of a

million of roubles, a sum for which a magnificent church might have been finished in other countries. Even with all this costly precaution, the builders do not always succeed in getting a solid basis to build on. After the inundation in 1824, the wall in many houses burst asunder, in consequence of the foundation having given way."—*Kohl's Architecture of St. Petersburg.*

The Neva is crossed by bridges of boats, which, however, are usually broken by the spring thaw.

That this magnificent city is destined one day to be overwhelmed by the Neva at the breaking up of the frost, is a feeling very general among its inhabitants. Each, however, hopes this will not happen in his time, and so the inhabitants live on, as it were, on the brink of a precipice. It is said that after his ukase had gone forth for the building of the city, Peter the Great came upon an ancient tree with a mark far above the level of every building in his infant town. He demanded what it was the mark of; and was informed of the spot where the highest inundation on record had stopped. He caused the tree to be cut down, as if by destroying the record he could avert the risk. Alison's account of the greatest inundation of modern years — that which took place the year after the present emperor came to the throne — will interest all readers. It was in 1826: —

"All the 19th of November, the wind blew from the south-west with terrific violence, and brought the Baltic waves in such a prodigious mass to the mouth of the Neva, that its waters were made to re-gorge, and soon the quays were overflowed, and the lower parts of the city began to be submerged. This at first, however, excited little attention, as such floods were not uncommon in the end of autumn; but the alarm soon spread, and terror was depicted in every visage, when it rapidly ascended over the whole town. By half-past ten, the water in the Perspective Newski was ten feet deep; in the highest parts of the city it was five. The Neva had risen four fathoms above its ordinary level, and, worse still, was continuing to rise. The whole inhabitants crowded to the upper stories of the houses. Despair now seized on every heart; the reality of the danger came home to every mind; the awful scenes of the Deluge were realised in the very centre of modern civilisation. At Cronstadt, a ship of the line was lifted up from a dry dock, and floated over the adjacent houses into a great square. At eight in the morning, a cannon of alarm began to be discharged. The terrible warning repeated every minute, so unusual amidst the ordinary stillness of the capital, proved the terror which was felt by the government, and augmented the general consternation. Ships torn up from their anchors; boats filled with trembling fugitives; stacks of corn borne on the surface of the waves from a great distance; cattle buffeting with the torrent, intermingled with corpses of persons drowned, or at their last gasp, imploring aid;

and immense quantities of furniture, and moveables of every description, were floated on to the most intricate and secluded parts of the city. The waters continued to rise till four in the afternoon, and every one imagined that all who could not save themselves in boats would be drowned. The rush was dreadful, accordingly, into every vessel that could be seized on, and numbers perished in the attempt to get on board. At five in the evening, the wind fell, and the water sunk as rapidly as it had risen, and by the next morning the Neva had returned to its former channel. The total loss occasioned by the wind and the inundation, was estimated at 100,000,000 rubles (£4,000,000); five hundred persons perished in the sea, and twice that number, sick or infirm, were drowned in their houses. Such had been the violence of the waves and the wind, that when the waters subsided, they were found to have floated from their place cannons weighing two tons and a half."—*Alison's Europe.*

CHAP. III.

MOSCOW.

"THE real capital of Russia is Moscow," says Schnitzler. The Marquis de Custine, in the same spirit, says that Petersburg is the capital of progress and usurpation; Moscow, of Russianism and Conservatism.

All travellers unite in expressing their wonder and admiration of this master city, so unlike as it is, too, to any capital of civilised Europe. The centre, the heart of this vast city, is the Kremlin. "What the Acropolis was to Athens, and the Capitol to Rome, the Kremlin is to Moscow." * In the Kremlin are all the offices of authorities, the court, the army, the police, the church, and even the chief commercial establishments; and around this Kremlin lies the rest of the town stretched out like a large irregular suburb at its feet.

Kohl says:—

"The Kremlin is best as viewed from the south side,

* Kohl.

and from the bridge of Moskva Rekoi. From the river that bathes its base, the hill of the Kremlin rises picturesquely adorned with turf and shrubs, the building appears set in a rich frame of water, verdant with foliage and snowy wall, the majestic column of Ivan Willkoi rearing itself high above all, like the axis round which it moves. The colours are everywhere the most lively—red, white, green, gold, and silver. Amidst the confusion of the numerous small, antique edifices, the Belshoi Dvorez (the large palace built by Alexander) has an imposing aspect. It looks like one large mass of white rock, amidst a multitude of fragments."

The Marquis de Custine, looking more into the spiritual than the material aspect of the text, writes:—

"How am I to describe the walls of the Kremlin? The word *wall* gives an idea of quite too ordinary an object; it would deceive the reader: they are a chain of mountains. This citadel, reared on the confines of Europe and Asia, is, as compared with ordinary ramparts, what the Alps are to our hills. The Kremlin is the Mont Blanc of fortresses. If the giant that is called the Russian Empire had a heart, I should say that the Kremlin was the heart of the monster; but as it is, I would call it the head. I wish I could give an idea of this mighty pile of stones, reared step by step into the heavens."

The real power of Russia is doubtless at Moscow,

as that of England is in London; while Petersburg may be styled the Liverpool of Russia; and the Russians, doubtless, look forward to making Constantinople its Portsmouth or Southampton. Moscow and its neighbourhood are better peopled than any other part of Russia.

In the Government of Moscow each square verste is computed to contain forty-eight inhabitants; whereas in Petersburg the density of the population in the same space is only sixteen or seventeen — in Novogorod less than nine — in Archangel one to every three verstes, and at Astrakhan two to each square verste. But "this is not all: this agglomeration of men, more compact than elsewhere, is also by far the most industrious, and, consequently, the richest, and the least ignorant. Of about 7000 establishments of factories that Russia possessed in 1842 more than a thousand, or more than one-seventh, belonged to the Government of Moscow, where nearly 100,000 workmen were employed, out of 420,000 men devoted to the industrious arts throughout the empire. Vladimir, whose rich village, the property of the Counts Cheremetiffe, is well known, shares also this prosperity, concentrated in the heart of the state; but Moscow is its principal source. Manufacture is there rapidly progressing, as a few figures will prove.

In 1820 this town received only 100,000 pouds * of cotton, but it received 450,000 in 1842." †

Napoleon, then, was right in his idea that at Moscow could the most effectual blow at the existence of Russia be struck. He aimed at the heart, and would have succeeded in his design, but that it was covered by an impenetrable shield — a threefold shield, formed by famine, frost, and patriotism. These three arrayed themselves against him. Napoleon himself said "*fate*" was against him. We recognise the hand of an all-wise Governor who had said to him, "Thus far shalt thou come and no further: here shall thy proud waves be stayed."

Moscow, and especially the Kremlin, are built after the fashion of an Eastern city, and neither the various conflagrations that have devoured,—not even that terrible one which dashed the hopes of Napoleon to the ground,—have contributed to alter its Oriental character.

Nothing, perhaps, tells us more strongly of the devotion of the Russians to their nationality, and the simplicity of their faith in, and obedience to, their monarch, than the history of the French

* The *poud* is forty Russian pounds, or about 30 lbs. in English weight.

† Schnitzler's Secret History of Russia.

occupation of Moscow. And as an integral part of the history of the town, no less than as setting forth the negation of will of the Russians themselves, we would refer our readers to some of the many thrilling descriptions which have been written of this terrific conflagration.

It was the governor of Moscow, Rotopschin, who conceived the great idea of sacrificing the capital to save the country; he set the example by applying the torch to his own magnificent house; and for this noble conduct he was, like so many other Russian patriots, disgraced, and that even under the mild sway of Alexander.

But this terrible conflagration has very little altered the appearance of the town; indeed the Kremlin, where the fire raged most furiously, was but little injured in its external architecture; the stone having resisted the action of the flames, and the town, like all other Russian towns, and indeed too many English, being a victim to periodical colouring, — white wash, and green wash, though in Moscow, in opposition to the universal yellow wash of our London houses.

Schnitzler says,—

"The conflagration in 1812 has given Moscow a more modern appearance; but the Kremlin remains with its

peculiar character and strange style, with its massy, white-washed, and uneven walls embattled and pierced with loopholes, surmounted with towers of every style imaginable, Gothic or Byzantine, and displaying, in its interior, a whimsical assemblage of churches, monasteries, and palaces, crowded together in a narrow space. This *ensemble*, which calls to mind the intimate union of religion and polity, and of a religion apart — different from that of the West, which is stiff and formal—appeals strongly to the imagination. A vast number of domes, mostly covered with gilded sheet-iron, surmounts this multitude of churches, and on their summits rise innumerable crosses, like a forest of spears, the highest of which, that of Ivân Véliki, seems to be summoning the whole country to prayer. You imagine yourself to be in an immense convent."— *Secret History of Russia.*

Moscow is crowded with churches generally built in stories, the upper story for summer use, the lower heated with stoves for winter. This plan of course destroying all the effect of internal ecclesiastical architecture. It has good markets, and abounds, in memorials of bygone ages; it being here, especially, that all the national trophies of every kind are laid up. In the Kremlin also are the apartments of the dead preserved; rooms being set apart in which the memorials of the departed monarchs are arranged in order. Petersburg may be the city of the Czar, but

Moscow is the city of the Russians. An autocrat's authority may cause the one to be styled the capital, but no autocrat can drag the other out of the heart of the nation.

CHAP. IV.

THE PORT OF SEBASTOPOL.

THE following extracts from "Travels in the Steppes of the Caspian Sea, the Crimea, the Caucasus, &c., by Xavier Hommardie de Helle," contain information of an interesting kind relative to a place which has become the scene of important operations:—

"A little beyond the quarantine cove, the traveller discovers Sebastopol, situated on the slope of a hill between Artillery and South Bays, the first two ports on the right hand as you enter the main roads. The position of the town thus built is an amphitheatre, rendering its whole plan discernible at one view, and gives it a very grand appearance from a distance. Its barracks and stores, the extensive buildings of the Admiralty, the numerous churches, and vast ship-building docks and yards, attest the importance of this town, the creation of which dates only from the arrival of the Russians in the Crimea. The interior, though not quite corresponding to the brilliant panorama it presents from a distance, is yet worthy of the great naval station. . . . . The port of Sebastopol is unquestionably one of the most remarkable in Europe. It owes all its excellences to

nature, which has here, without the aid of art, provided a magnificent roadstead, with ramifications forming so many basins, admirably adapted for the requirements of a naval station. The whole of this noble harbour may be seen at once from the upper part of the town. The great roadstead lies east and west, stretching seven kilometres (four miles and three quarters) inland, with a mean breadth of 1000 yards, and serves as a station for all the active part of the fleet. It forms the medium of communication between Sebastopol and the interior of the peninsula. The northern shore presents only a line of cliffs of no interest; but on the southern shore the eye is detained by the fine basins formed there by nature. To the east, at the foot of the hill on which the town stands, is South Bay, in length upwards of 3000 metres, and completely sheltered by high limestone cliffs. It is here the vessels are rigged and unrigged; and here, too, lies a long range of pontoons and vessels past service, some of which are converted into magazines, and others into lodgings for some thousand convicts who are employed in the works of the arsenal. Beyond South Bay, and communicating with it, is the little creek in which the Government is constructing the most considerable works of the port, and has been engaged for many years in forming an immense dock with five distinct basins, capable of accommodating three ships of the line and two frigates, while simultaneously undergoing repairs. The execution of the basin seems, however, to be very far from corresponding to the enormous expenses they have occasioned, and it is strange indeed, that a weak and

friable limestone should have been employed in hydraulic constructions of such importance. The angles of the walls, it is true, are of granite or porphyry, but this odd association of heterogeneous materials conveys, in itself, the severest condemnation of the mode of construction which has been adopted.—Highly favoured as is the port of Sebastopol with regard to the form and the security of its bays, it yet labours under very serious inconvenience. The waters swarm with certain worms that attack the ships' bottoms, and often make them unserviceable in two or three years. To avoid this incurable evil, the Government determined to fill the basins with fresh water, by changing the course of the little river, Tchernoi Retchka, which falls into the head of the main gulf. Three aqueducts and two tunnels, built, like the rest of the works, in chalk, and forming part of the artificial channel, were nearly completed in 1841; but about that period the engineers endured a very sad discomfiture, it being then demonstrated that the worms they wanted to get rid of were produced by nothing else than the muddy waters which the Tchernoi Retchka pours into the harbour. Artillery Bay, which bounds the town on the west, is used only by trading vessels. This and Carneeing Bay, the most eastern of all, are not inferior in natural advantages to the two others we have been speaking of; but we have nothing more particular to mention respecting them.

After discussing the harbours and works belonging to them, we are naturally led to glance at the war fleet and the famous fortifications of which the Russians

are so proud, and which they regard as a marvel of modern art. In 1831, when the July revolution was threatening to upset the whole *status quo* of Europe, a London journal stated in an article on the Black Sea and Southern Russia, that nothing could be easier than for a few well-appointed vessels to set fire to the imperial fleet in the port of Sebastopol. The article alarmed the Emperor's council to the highest degree, and orders were immediately issued for the construction of immense defensive works. Four new forts were constructed, making a total of eleven batteries. Forts Constantine and Alexander were erected for the defence of the great harbour, the one on the north, the other on the west of Artillery Bay; and the Admiralty and the Paul batteries were to play on vessels attempting to enter South Bay or Ship's Bay. These four forts, consisting each of three tiers of batteries, and each mounting from 250 to 300 pieces of artillery, constitute the chief defences of the place, and appear at first sight truly formidable. But here, again, the reality does not correspond with the outer appearance, and we are of opinion that all these costly batteries are more fitted to astonish the vulgar in time of peace, than to awe the enemy in war. In the first place, their position, at some height above the sea, and their three stories, appear to us radically bad, and practical men will agree with us that a hostile squadron might make very light of the three tiers of guns which, when pointed horizontally, could, at most, only hit the rigging of the ships. The external arrangements struck us as equally at variance with all the rules of

military architecture. Each story consists of a suite of rooms opening one upon the other, and communicating by a small door, with an outer gallery that runs the whole length of the building. All these rooms in which the guns are worked, are so narrow, and the ventilation is so ill-contrived, that we are warranted, by our own observation, in asserting that a few discharges would make it extremely difficult for the artillerymen to do their duty. But a still more serious defect than those we have named, and one which endangers the whole existence of works — consists in the general system adopted for their construction. Here the improvidence of the government has been quite as great as with regard to the dock basins, for the imperial engineers have thought proper to employ small pieces of coarse limestone in the masonry of the three-storied batteries, mounting from 250 to 300 guns. The works, too, have been constructed with so little care, and the dimensions of the walls and arches are so insufficient, that it is easy to see, at a glance, that all these batteries must invariably be shaken to pieces whenever their numerous artillery shall be brought into play. The trials that have been made in fort Constantine have already demonstrated the correctness of this opinion, wide rents having been there occasioned in the walls by a few discharges. — Finally, all the forts labour under the disadvantage of being utterly defenceless on the land side. Thinking only of attacks by sea, the government has quite overlooked the great facility with which an enemy can land on any part of the Chersonesus. So, besides that the batteries are totally

destitute of artillery and ditches on the land side, the town itself is open on all points, and is not defended by a single redoubt. We know not what works have been planned or executed since 1841; but at the period of our visit a force of some thousand men, aided by a maritime demonstration, would have had no sort of difficulty in forcing their way into the interior of the place, and setting fire to the fleet and arsenals."

That this description is substantially correct even at the present moment, is ascertained by the accounts received since the landing of the allied armies in the Crimea, and the subsequent investment of Sebastopol. The fact is, that at present we are fighting against earthworks and redoubts lately thrown up, as we learn from our newspaper correspondents and others, who are now able to look down upon the town, from the heights occupied by our armies.

We complete the sketch of the interior of the town by an interesting extract, from the *Journal des Débats.*

"The site of Sebastopol consists of a series of platforms running up a steep acclivity from the sea to the high hills which tower over it at the distance of a league and a half, and from the top of which is unfolded the whole panorama of the town and harbour. Nearer, that ensemble ceases to be visible; and even the tops of the masts are no longer seen, so deeply does the site sink down to the

level of the roadstead and of the port. From this configuration of the ground it comes to pass that the town is built one part over the other, so as to form an amphitheatre, like Algiers, but better built, as its construction is quite modern, dating from 1790. The transverse streets, parallel to the roadstead, communicate with each other only by steep ascents; but at their extremities there are lines of communication of a less abrupt character for vehicles. The town contains several monuments, and, among others, the churches, and principally all the buildings of the navy, the arsenal, the barracks, and the hospitals. The population is about 40,000 in ordinary times, including 20,000 soldiers or sailors. The 20,000 civil inhabitants are employés of all kinds,—persons from the navy and the army on half-pay, a few shopkeepers, and some workmen and fishermen. The reader must bear in mind this fact, that not one of the great forts situated outside the town on the harbour can protect it against attacks by land; and that the two batteries of the Quarantine, situated at the lower part of the outward ground, cannot aid in its defence. . . . . The Quarantine Bay on the West (the extreme left of the attack) is defended by the double battery of the same name. Near that spot is Fort Alexander; and by the side of that fort a battery called the Battery of Sebastopol, because it forms part of the town itself. From this battery runs a crenellated wall for musketry, about five-eighths of an English mile in length, which runs up the steep hill to the top, where is a large round fort with twenty guns on the platform, and surrounded below by a battery, the rampart

of which is twenty feet high. The wall and the bastion have a ditch in front, but there is neither covered way nor glacis in front of this ditch. Under the cannon of the round fort is situated a large fortified barrack, which has been lately flanked by several strong works. From that barrack runs a wall entirely surrounding the town, the port, and the arsenal, to beyond the careening basin towards the Tchernaya, at the extremity of the roadstead, which gives a development of from three and three-quarters to five English miles, including the sinuosities. This wall is three feet thick, is crenellated, and has in front a ditch, the earth of which has been thrown in front to form a glacis covering the masonwork in many places. This wall is not terraced—that is, does not form a rampart above on which artillery can be placed. But on the points where, in a regular fortification, there would be bastions, the Russians have raised batteries, in the form of cavaliers, firing above the wall. The centre of the line is defended by the fort of Akhtiar, raised on a high point at the top of the town. At a little distance from this fort commence three ravines, descending to the roadstead. One, on the West, terminates by the Quarantine Bay; another, in the centre, cuts the town into two unequal parts; and the third, on the East, descends right to the North to form the port, which is the prolongation of that same ravine into the sea. It is principally at the lower opening of this ravine, and on the Western side of the port, that are accumulated the defences.

"Among the works destined to defend the ravine of

the port, two great batteries in the form of towers are mentioned; a recent construction, said to be built of stone and brick. From want of time to raise a third power at the bottom of the fort, the Russians have placed a line of battle ship, to perform the duty of a battery against the mouth of the ravine. Besides, the works are still going on, night and day, without interruption. One-half of the garrison is occupied with them, and all the able-bodied inhabitants are obliged to take part in them. Sebastopol is commanded almost on every side by hills rising one over the other to a great height, as already stated. But the nearest hills have been a long time back levelled by works which lasted twelve years; and the earth taken from them was removed to the side of the Quarantine, or to certain hollows which might facilitate the approaches. There is not, consequently, any height now commanding the town within 500 or 600 yards of the place."

CHAP. V.

ODESSA.

Is the chief commercial city in the south of Russia. It is situated on the north coast of the Black Sea, in 46°.28′, N. lat. and 30° 43′, S. long., and contains about 70,000 inhabitants. It was founded by order of the Empress Catharine. The site was well chosen. The bay is extensive, the water deep, and the anchorage good. The appearance of the town "has often been compared to Brighton, but the line of cliffs on which it stands has a slight curve inwards, forming a shallow bay, with a radius of some three miles. These cliffs face the north-east, and towards the north they sink into low sandy mounds and flat endless steppes. Stretching out from below them, at the lower or south-easterly end of the town, runs a long fortified mole, at the end of which was a lighthouse. This is called the Quarantine Mole, and shelters a great crowd of ships of all nations. Their crews are never permitted to

go into the town, but are strictly imprisoned within a small walled-in and strictly-guarded quarantine district at the foot of the cliffs, even if they should happen to be detained there for six months at a time." At the northern extremity of the cliffs there was another mole, called the Imperial Mole, enclosing a mass of Russian ships of all sorts, and some large stores or barracks. Both moles had a formidable array of embrasures; and there was a battery between them at the foot of the cliffs, but, as far as we could learn, they were badly off for guns. We counted over seventy empty embrasures. The steamers employed in the storming thereof in 1854, had orders to go as far as possible in-shore, so as to rake and destroy the Imperial Mole and shipping, but to avoid firing upon any part of the town or upon the shipping in the Quarantine Mole."

Odessa may have been termed hitherto the great corn emporium for Western Europe; in ordinary years more than 800 ships having entered and left that port, receiving corn in return for manufactured goods and other commodities. Whence we are to obtain our corn, and how Russia is to get the articles it requires in return, remains a question to be solved in the course of the war on which we have now entered.

CHAP. VI.

REVEL AND CRONSTADT.*

At the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, after the navigator has doubled the isle and lighthouse of Odensholm, the first points of interest are the fort of Rogervich and the great harbour called Port Baltic. Before Russia possessed the splendid harbours of Finland, vast works were begun by Peter the Great, and continued by the Empresses Elizabeth and Catharine, for the purpose of shutting in the port of Rogervich by a dyke and rendering it fit for a naval station. But the operations required were not less formidable than those of Cherbourg, and the Government ultimately abandoned them. Revel, which lies eight leagues from Rogervich, has thus become the first or westernmost military harbour on the gulf. The city of that name is the capital of Esthonia, contains some 25,000 inhabitants, and is situated about 130 leagues from St. Petersburg.

* This chapter has been chiefly extracted from the public journals.

The harbour of Revel is extensive, with a great depth of water. Around it are building-docks, a naval arsenal, a cannon foundry, and all other works requisite for a military port. The town stands on an elevation, and is strongly fortified, especially on the side towards the sea. The guns of the citadel command the harbour, although from some distance. The channel leading into the port winds amongst islands and sandbanks, which render the navigation extremely difficult, especially when, as at present, the buoys and landmarks are removed. But in spite of these difficulties, the Russians themselves have never considered Revel impregnable*, as they do Cronstadt or Sveaborg. The Government has, however, taken vigorous measures to strengthen its defences. New batteries have been constructed; its suburbs razed within the radius of a cannon-shot;

* A curious letter from Revel, this year, appeared in the *Ost-see-Zeitung*. It says, "that General de Berg, commandant of the place, announced some time since to the people there that he was going to prove the cannons of the fortress. At the appointed time all were in the utmost expectation of hearing a grand cannonade, when what was their disappointment at hearing only two isolated shots! It then appeared, on investigation, that the whole of the guns excepting six were entirely useless; they were of iron, and completely corroded with rust. Of the six which were discharged, two lost their muzzles at the first shot."

the women, children, and infirm sent out of the town, and the civic and judicial authorities transferred to Veissenstein, a little town ten leagues inland. Finally a corps of 30,000 men has been despatched to protect the city and its environs, among whom are several regiments of the famous Cossacks from the banks of the Don.

Penetrating deeper into the Gulf of Finland, we arrive at Cronstadt, which may be considered as at once the outwork, the arsenal, and the commercial entrepôt of St. Petersburg. Eight leagues of water separate the two localities; but that water is seldom more than eight feet deep, so that all large vessels, and even the packet-steamers, are obliged to stop and unload at Cronstadt. Ships of war are indeed built at St. Petersburg, where there are excellent building and graving docks, but they are always sent to Cronstadt to be rigged and armed; and even the bare hulls of the larger vessels are transported down the shallow water of the Neva on "camels." Some years since the Emperor Nicholas ordered a gigantic ship of the line, intended to carry 140 guns, to be built in his capital; but the proportions were so badly calculated that, when finished, it was found impossible to convey it to the sea, and the marine colossus was perforce taken to pieces without ever

being launched. Cronstadt itself contains three ports — one used for commercial purposes, another for the repair and outfit of ships of war, the third as a station of the Russian navy.

Cronstadt lies upon the island of Kottline, three leagues in length by half a league in breadth. Its western point is, however, much narrower. Sand-banks surround it on every side except at the south-east extremity, where the town and harbour are situated. Opposite to the island on the south lies Oranienbaum, on the coast of Ingria. Along this shore another sandbank stretches, and extends so far into the sea as to leave but a narrow and winding channel by way of entrance to Cronstadt harbour. Within the port, moreover, the water is from six to seven fathoms deep, but the channel in places is barely four — a depth by no means sufficient for huge 131-gun ships like the *Duke of Wellington*, for whose passage even the Sound was not considered safe. Beyond this channel and the harbour, on the side towards St. Petersburg, there is a roadstead, but too shallow for ships of war, and only imperfectly sheltered by the island of Cronstadt and the heights of Oranienbaum. Farther on, as we have mentioned, the water shoals to eight feet. All this part of the gulf is brackish,

the proportion of salt in the water diminishing as we approach the eastern extremity, where it degenerates into a series of lagoons leading up to Lake Ladoga.

In its double character of fortress and trading town Cronstadt boasts a fluctuating population amounting sometimes to 50,000 souls, if we include some 20,000 garrison and the commercial and maritime residents. The town is built of wood. Except the Admiralty, the great hospital, and the military works of all sorts, there are no edifices either of strength or importance in the place. The batteries, the forts, and the vast moles which surround its three harbours are indeed of the most imposing magnificence. Russia has always been addicted to a kind of theatrical display in her public performances of all kinds. There is much of this developed in the fortifications at Cronstadt, although they also possess the reality of strength to a serious degree.

Approaching Cronstadt from the west, we have on the left the western angle of the island forming a sharp point, extended into the sea by a line of rocks, of which the last is crowned by the lighthouse of Talboukin. Afterwards we pass the south coast of the isle, lined with batteries, and in front a series of five forts placed chequerwise on rocks or banks

between which winds the deep-water channel leading into the harbour. On the right, about two leagues off, are the heights of Oranienbaum, with its imperial park and château. In the distance, when the fogs permit, may be traced the outlines of St. Petersburg, whose lofty edifices, and the gilded dome of the Church of St. Isaac, stand out in bold relief against the sky.

The most formidable defences which Cronstadt possesses are those that guard the entrance to its triple harbour. There are five forts in the sea and seven on the shore or the moles. These forts are furnished with casemated batteries, each of two or three stages, and the greater part of them built of huge square blocks of granite, whereon it is said shot can make no impression. The position of these batteries has been carefully adjusted so as to enfilade the different sinuosities of the channel, so that every ship approaching Cronstadt must be exposed to a series of raking fires in front, without having a chance of bringing her broadside to bear until she has arrived actually between the forts. A single vessel also sunk in mid-channel would effectually choke up the passage.

A technical description of this mass of fortifications would be very uninteresting and altogether unin-

telligible without a plan. We must therefore content ourselves with a brief enumeration of the series of cannon-crowded piles of masonry which an intruding fleet will have successively to confront. "On the coast of the island, and lying to the left of the channel, there are — 1. The Petersfort, presenting to the sea a rounded curtain, flanked by two casemated bastions. These bastions have a double tier of guns, of which the upper is *en barbette*, i. e., uncovered from above. The fort mounts altogether seventy-six pieces of large calibre. 2. The Kesel battery, mounting eight cannon on the water level. 3. A battery, commanding the landing-place, situated outside the walls of the town, on a projecting cape, comprising ten guns. 4. The great mole, covering the commercial harbour on the west, and presenting an immense battery of seventy cannon and twelve mortars right in front of all entering vessels. 5. Fort Menschikoff, constructed opposite the mole on the other side of the harbour. This fort constitutes a parallelogram, pierced with forty-four embrasures, and mounted with cannon of ten and twelve inches calibre. 6. A battery, which commands the second or outfitting harbour. 7. Another battery on the mole of the military harbour, at the south-east of the island and the town. The moles which we

have mentioned are not mere jetties thrown forward into the sea, but continuous works surrounding and dividing the three harbours. They are formed of double ranges of piles, whose surface is broad enough both for the passage of vehicles and the manœuvring of the guns. The three ports have two entrances apiece, each of the six openings being masked by a large demi-lune formed of piles, which are crowned with cannon, and flank the curtains of the moles.

These land batteries mount about 250 large guns. In addition, there are a series of forts built in the sea, and containing about 400 more. The first of these, reckoning from seawards, consists of a pair of forts called Alexander and Risbank, between which all vessels must pass at a distance from each of about 800 yards, for the channel, which narrows afterwards, is nearly a mile wide at its entrance. Fort Alexander is, in its ground plan, of an elliptical shape—an enormous granite *patè*, it has been called—consisting of a front with four tiers of cannon, two flanks with three tiers, and a rear wall mounted with guns *en barbette*. It is built of granite, on piles driven through eighteen feet of water. Ships rounding this fort are commanded by 116 eight and ten-inch guns. Risbank, which lies to the right, is also built of granite, on a foundation of piles in sixteen

feet water. It contains sixty-two heavy guns in two tiers, the lowest of which is on the water level. Then comes Fort Constantine, nearly facing the Petersfort already mentioned, and containing twenty-five guns in a single tier; and afterwards we approach the Fort St. Peter, facing the battery on the landing-place, and armed with fifty cannon, twenty-eight of which are in casemates. Last is the grand fort of Cronslott, at once the most ancient and the nearest to the harbour. Its form is that of an irregular pentagon, flanked by five small bastions at its angles. The armament consists of fifty-six guns in casemated embrasures, and thirty-two in open batteries. Cronslott fronts the Menschikoff fort, the former to the right, the latter to the left, of the deep-water channel, which at that point is barely 200 yards in width. Passing ships must therefore approach within 100 yards of one or other of these formidable batteries. The total number of guns, mortars, &c., mounted upon all the forts we have enumerated is nearly 600, and their fire crosses at almost every point."* Their combined strength doubtless prompted the Emperor Nicholas when recently saying, with a smile of irony, "I am curious to learn by which end they will lay hold of Cronstadt."

* Fraser's Magazine.

Nevertheless, the *Press* gives the following anecdote:—

"Some years since, the Emperor Nicholas, acting himself as cicerone, conducted an English admiral over the fortifications of Cronstadt, when the following conversation took place:—'You will admit, admiral, that this is a magnificent fortress, and as impregnable as Gibraltar?'—'Oh, sire, no fort but Gibraltar is impregnable.'—'What, then, is your opinion of Cronstadt?'—'It is a good fortress, and one difficult to take.'—'Yes, doubtless, difficult.'—'It could not be done with fifteen ships.'—'Could it be done with twenty?'—'Not easily.'—'With twenty-five?'—'It would take a fortnight.'—'With thirty-five?'—'Oh, your Majesty, fifteen hours.'"

Many of the forts above described are assailable from the rear; but their rear never could be assailed until Cronstadt itself had fallen. There is, no doubt, a northern shore to the island. But the channel on this side is comparatively shallow, and has been carefully obstructed by the Russians, who have driven in a double row of piles six miles in length, and filled up with massive blocks of stone. It is, however, in this quarter that an attacking force would, it is stated, find its best chance of success. A powerful fleet to keep the command at sea, a flotilla of gun-boats for the shallow waters,

and a strong body of land forces, comprising 25,000 or 30,000 men, well supplied with engineering tools and materials, might, it is believed, overcome all obstacles and effect a lodgment on the north-west point of the island. There they might cover their position with entrenchments in the course of a couple of nights, and thence besiege the town and fortifications from the rear, or shell them from a distance. None of the sea forts, except perhaps Forts Constantine and St. Peter, are near enough to do any damage to the invaders on that side. And though the higher guns of the great forts on the channel command the surface of the ground, the enemy may speedily place themselves in the shelter of entrenchments, where nothing but bombs could reach them. If once masters of the batteries along shore, they would not only diminish by one-half the danger to be encountered by the attacking fleet, but might silence the greater part, if not all, of the sea forts. The capture, from the land side, of Petersfort and the Kesel battery is said to be by no means impracticable, the chief strength of those places being turned towards the sea. Even their capture might not enable the assailing fleet to force the narrow pass between Cronslott and Fort Menschikoff; but the ships would win their way into positions whence

they could effectually bombard the harbour of Cronstadt, and co-operate with the land siege of the fortress.

From another weapon of assault — famine — Cronstadt is protected by its climate. During four months, at least, of every year, the waters are frozen between the island and St. Petersburg, and a constant communication by means of sledges is open with the capital. On the other hand, if the blockading squadron should allow itself to be caught in the ice, every ship would inevitably be destroyed by cannon brought over the frozen surface into advantageous positions, if not surrendered beforehand. "The taking of Cronstadt," says the *Débats*, in an article to which we are indebted for many of the foregoing details, "would inflict a blow on the Russian empire more terrible than the loss of ten provinces, since it would thereby lose its navy. St. Petersburg would soon find itself besieged at the entrance of the Neva, and bombarded by a flotilla which would be supported by the fleet in possession of Cronstadt. This danger is not, perhaps imaginary. It is for this reason that the Russian Government has collected together round that port the most formidable means of defence. Peter the Great, in founding his capital, also founded Cronstadt,

in which his genius must be admired; for it must be seen that, without Cronstadt, Petersburg the Superb, with its eight feet of water, would only be a small coasting port, that might be blockaded and bombarded by gun-boats."

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.


SLIGHT SKETCH OF THE EMPERORS OF RUSSIA.

LITTLE is known of the early history of Russia. It is said to have been converted to Christianity in the reign of Vladimir the Great, who reigned from 980 to 1015. Then followed a series of struggles till it was conquered by Toushi, son of Genghis Khan, between 1223 and 1240. For two centuries it remained, more or less, under Tartar dominion, when Ivan III. shook off the hated yoke. Ivan IV. was the first who assumed the title of Czar: he was an able but cruel prince, and a great conqueror, having subdued Astrakhan and the Cossacks. After him came in succession Feodor, Boris, Michael Romanoff, Alexis, Feodor II., Ivan V., with whom reigned jointly for seven years, his brother Peter the Great, under the guardianship of their sister, the Princess Sophia. Peter ascended the throne in 1682, and died in 1725. To him we have alluded elsewhere; but his history,

as one of the greatest monarchs that ever lived, is worthy of a perusal in full.

In obedience to his commands, Peter was succeeded by his widow the Empress Catharine, whom he had raised from a low estate to be his wife and successor in the Imperial crown. She reigned but two years, and died in 1727. After her reigned Peter II., grandson of Peter the Great, who died in 1730; and then followed Anne, daughter of Ivan V., till 1740, when she was succeeded by her nephew, Ivan VI., an infant, who was deposed in two months in favour of Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great and Catherine. Elizabeth reigned till 1761, when, dying childless, she was succeeded by her nephew Peter III., Duke of Holstein Gothorp. Peter III. was shortly deposed, and died after six months, a violent death, as was supposed, while his widow Catharine II., surnamed the great, but properly the wicked, succeeded him. In 1796 Catharine died, and her son, Paul I., came to the throne. Of his end we have already spoken: but the following table will show the various relationships of the above, and the titles and names of the present royal family: —

GENEALOGY OF THE ROMANOFF IMPERIAL FAMILY.


1. MICHAEL FEDOROVITCH, beg. r. 1613, d. 1653.
2. Alexis Michaelovitz, beg. r. 1653, d. 1676.
3. Feodor Alexivitch, beg. r. 1676, d. 1682.
4. Ivan V., beg. r. 1682, d. 1696.
5. Peter the Great, beg. r. 1682, d. 1725, m. 1st, a daughter of Feodor Abrahamavitz; m. 2nd, 6. Catharine I., Empress, beg. r. 1725, d. 1727.
A Daughter, m. Prince of Brunswick Beveren.
Anne, m. Prince of Mecklenburg.
8. Anne, m. Duke of Courland, beg. r. 1730, d. 1740.
9. Ivan VI., beg. r. 1740, dep. 1741, d. 1764.
Alexis, m. Princess of Wolfenbuttel, d. 1719.
7. Peter II., beg. r. 1727, d. 1730.
Anna, m. Duke of Holstein Gothorp, d. 1726.
10. Elizabeth, Empress, beg. r. 1741, d. 1761.
11. Peter III., m. 12. Catharine the Great, beg. r. 1761, beg. r. 1767, d. 1796. d. 1707.
13. Paul, m. Mary of Wurtemburg, beg. r. 1796, d. 1801.
14. Alexander, Emperor, m. Maria of Baden, b. 1783, beg. r. 1801, d. 1825.
Constantine, Grand Duke, m. 1st, Juliana of Saxe Coburg; 2nd, a Polish lady. b. 1785, d. 1831.
15. Nicholas I., Emperor, m. Alexandra of Prussia, b. 1796, beg. r. 1825.
Michael, Grand Duke, m. Helena of Wurtemburg, b. 1799, d. 1849.
Anna, m. William II., of Holland.
William III. of Holland.
Catharine Paulowna, m. 1st, Prince of Oldenburg; 2nd, King of Wurtemburg.
Charles, Prince Royal of Wurtemburg, m. Grand Duchess Olga.
Catharine m. Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz, 1851.
Elizabeth Michaelowna, m. Adolph of Warsaw.
Alexander, Czarovitch, b. 1818, m. 1841, Princess Mary of Hesse.
Four ons.
Maria Grand Duchess, b. 1820, m. Duke of Leuchtenberg.
Olga, Grand Duchess, b. 1822, m. Prince of Wurtemburg.
Constantine Michaelovitch Grand Duke, b. 1827, m. 1848, Princess Alexandra of Saxe Altenburg.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, b. 1831.
Michael, Grand Duke, b. 1832.
Alexandra, Grand Duchess, b. 1824, d. 1851, m. Prince Frederic of Hesse.

CHAP. II.

RUSSIA, HOW GOVERNED.

THE government of Russia is absolute. Its present Emperor, Nicholas I., has promulgated a code of laws, over which, however, he has absolute control, being able either to dispense with or alter them at his pleasure.* This code embraces "40,000 laws, which are divided into more than 2,000 chapters, containing innumerable separate articles, and subdivided into paragraphs and *notà-benes*, referring the reader to one and another, each one being directly contrary

* The Marquis de Custine's report of the present Czar's remarks on different existing constitutions is very significant and characteristic. "I can understand," remarked his majesty, "what is meant by an absolute monarchy, because I am myself at the head of one; I also comprehend a republic, because it constitutes a complete and exclusive form of government; but I abhor constitutional monarchy; it is a government of fraud, falsehood, and corruption; and I would rather fall back upon China than adopt it. It is a truce between democracy and monarchy, under the auspices of two very mean tyrants, fear and interest."—*Russia, by the Marquis de Custine.*

to all the rest. They are contained in forty-five quarto volumes." *

Several classes of the inhabitants enjoy certain privileges, though even these may be overturned and abolished at the will of the sovereign.

The privileged classes rank thus: 1. Nobility,—consisting of the *Boyards*, or hereditary nobility, and the *Tschinn*, or created nobility; 2. clergy; 3. merchants; 4. burghers; 5. the last and largest class, of the peasants or serfs, who are slaves completely under the dominion of their masters, even as far as the power of taking away life and limb.

The great defect in every governmental establishment in this country is venality. The Emperor Alexander is said to have been fully aware of this, and to have made the following speech in alluding to it: "They would steal the teeth out of my head while I was asleep, if they could do so without waking me." Autocrat though he is, the Emperor of Russia cannot command truthfulness, or even the power of seeing the truth, though he look for it ever so diligently. †

* De Launey.

† "At a review in April, 1826, soon after his accession to the throne, four men, dressed as peasants, with great difficulty succeeded in penetrating to the Emperor Nicholas, near his magnificent palace of Tsarcko-Selo, and revealed to him an enormous

The old anecdote, so often repeated, of the manner in which the Czarina Catherine was deceived in her progress through her dominions by fictitious villages and happy peasants, which, formed like the painted scenes as in a play, were put up from time to time, at a short distance from the road she travelled, will be brought to all minds when they read of the Emperor Alexander's last journey to Tarantog in Odessa. Probably he too had heard of the deceit practised on his grandmother, and to satisfy himself he determined to enter the actual cottages of the peasants. It was the hour of dinner, and great was the Empe-

system of dilapidation of the public naval stores which was going on at Cronstadt, where cordage, anchors, and sails belonging to the crown were publicly exposed at the bazaar, and purchased at a low price by foreigners. Nicholas instantly ordered an officer with 200 men to surround the bazaar, and upon doing so, ample proofs of the truth of the charges were discovered. Orders were given to prosecute the delinquents with the utmost rigour, and the Imperial Seal was put on the dilapidated stores; but the culprits were persons of great consideration. In the night of the 21st June following, a bright light was seen from St. Petersburg to illuminate the western sky, and in the morning it was cautiously whispered that the bazaar had been totally consumed by fire, and with it the whole evidence of the guilt of the accused. The 'Gazette of St. Petersburg' made no mention of the fraud, or of the conflagration by which its punishment had been prevented."—*Alison's Europe.*

ror's satisfaction at finding the family just sitting down to partake of a hot roast-pig. Unbelieving gentile, was one of his suite! to cut off the little pig's tail for the purpose of marking it. Unwise courtier to show it to the Czar, and how it fitted exactly to the stump of the tailless pig of which the peasants in a neighbouring cottage were also found about to partake! Very far from a favourite was this follower from that period.

All travels in Russia are filled with the secretiveness of the different establishments in this country. Indeed nothing ever is known or admitted, however notorious a matter of fact. Every accident, every punishment, every offence, and all offenders or sufferers are ignored. Does the Neva rise, or does an inappropriate storm engulph 4000 Russian sightseers, no one knows, or will admit that he knows, any thing of it. And if, as was the case with the Marquis de Custine, some one's private friend or acquaintance has been lost, the official answer to inquiries is that "it was but a private vessel containing from thirty to forty individuals which went down." A lady of rank allows her maid a holiday for an hour or two. She never returns. Inquiries are made of the police. They have neither seen nor heard anything of her. The girl's cousin is a surgeon, and finds her body sold

by the police to the establishment in which he studies, maltreated and murdered.*

Nothing, indeed, can be worse than the whole system of the police establishment in Russia. Apparently constructed and used by government as the agents of its own private cruelties, and otherwise possessed of unlimited power, it is an instrument of harm rather than of good, of violence and cruelty rather than of justice.

"It persecutes the innocent and protects the guilty—it stifles complaint and paralyses justice. Venal and corrupt, it is at the bidding of both the friends and enemies of the sovereign. It ferrets out conspiracy and revolt for the one; it assists at regicide and revolution for the other. It enters every habitation in the empire; it is familiar with every passage in the palace. In the morning it condemns the serf; at midnight it murders Paul. It is a double-edged and most formidable weapon, now doing by stealth and cunning that which was effected openly and boldly by the fierce bands of the Strelitzs, who alternately protected and trampled upon the throne. The chiefs of the police make vast fortunes by the bribes they take from those fearing persecution. Their subordinates share the plunder taken by fraud and violence. Stolen goods are seen upon their persons and in their houses. A thief caught in the act is discharged by the

* The Marquis de Custine's Travels in Russia.

magistrate, should he recognise him as an old friend or acquaintance."*

The police are the agents through which the Emperor's code of laws and his personal mandates are executed. Secret, stealthy, violent is their manner of administering justice. A man is seized and hurried off to Siberia without knowing of what or by whom he has been accused; far less is he allowed to speak in his own defence. Indeed, cases have been known of one man having been substituted for another, and condemned to years of exile in Siberia either from a mistake in his identity, or because the man really accused was not forthcoming. The police had been directed to punish, and a victim must be produced to bear the punishment. So that the sentence was executed, on whom it should fall would not so much signify.

It is well remarked by an intelligent traveller, that either the cruelties and barbarities inflicted by the police are against the law, or that the Emperor's code is accountable for them. He adds:—

"The punishment of death does not exist in this land, except for the crime of high treason; but there are certain criminals whom they nevertheless kill. The way in

* Maxwell's Czar and his People.

which they reconcile the mildness of their code with the traditional ferocity of manners is this:—When a criminal is condemned to more than a hundred strokes of the knout, the executioner, who understands the meaning of such a sentence, kills him through humanity, by striking him at the third blow on a mortal part." *

This punishment of the knout is cruel beyond description, for not always is the executioner allowed, even if he wished it, to give the merciful death-blow. The sufferer, whether male or female, is stripped to the loins, his hands are fastened on the top of one another and fixed to iron rings, as are also his feet. At a short distance stands the executioner holding in his hands the terrible knout. This is a kind of whip consisting of a thong of thick leather, cut triangularly, nine or ten feet long, and an inch broad, tapering to the point, and fixed to a wooden handle some two feet long.

"The signal is given; no one ever takes the trouble to read the sentence. The executioner makes some steps forwards, with his body bent, holding the knout in both hands, while the thong drags between his legs. On coming to about three or four paces of his victim, he raises the knout vigorously above his head, and instantly bringing it down with rapidity towards his knees.

* The Marquis de Custine.

The thong flies into the air, whistles, descends, and clasps the body of the sufferer, as with a circle of iron. Notwithstanding his state of tension, the sufferer bounds as if under the powerful shocks of galvanism. The executioner retraces his steps, and begins the same manœuvre as many times as the criminal is condemned to suffer blows. When the thong envelopes the body with its folds, the flesh and the muscles are literally cut into segments, as with a razor; but if it falls upon the plane of two angles, the bones crack. The flesh is not mashed, but pounded, crushed; the blood gushes from all parts, the sufferer becomes green and blue, like a rotten corpse. He is carried to the hospital, where all care is taken of him; he is then sent to Siberia, where he disappears for ever in the bowels of the earth." — *The Knout and the Russians.*

Still more cruel, if possible, than the punishment of the knout, is that of the rods. The army is the executioner of this fearful sentence. The law allows more than 6000 strokes, though that is the usual number to which the victim is condemned, and 6000 men are appointed to put it in execution; though usually death ensues after about 1000 strokes. The following account was written by an eye-witness. The wretched victim was a serf who had shot his lord. It occurred in 1841:—

"He was condemned to six thousand strokes of rods, and twenty-four hours after, six thousand men, ranged in

two parallel lines, in a plain without the city, awaited, armed with small sticks of green wood, about the size of the little finger, for the hour of execution. The condemned was conducted in a cart, escorted by some men. No priest had attended him. He was bound, and dressed in a pair of drawers wound round and below his hips, and fastened by a string. The rest of his body was naked, and only covered by a soldier's cloak, which they had thrown over his shoulders. They made him get out, and fastened his hands tightly to the mouths of two muskets, crossed to the heights of the bayonets with which they were armed. In this situation, his hands rested on the barrel, and the points of the bayonets upon the breast of the criminal. A roll of drums was now heard; the officers entered their ranks, and two non-commissioned officers came to take the muskets, which they held in the same manner as a soldier does who advances holding the bayonet before him. Here again, admire the barbarity—the refined intelligence of this people! The man, at a given signal, must advance with slow steps between the two ranks of soldiers, who, each one in his turn, must strike him vigorously on the loins. Pain might suggest to him the idea of passing as quickly as possible through the midst of this hedge of executioners, to avoid the number and violence of the blows which cut the flesh from him. But he calculates without considering Russian justice; the two sub-officers step back, step by step, slowly, to give each one time to accomplish his mission; they retain or repulse the wretched being by thrusting the point of the bayonet into his breast. Each

stroke must cut open the flesh, and make the blood gush; there is no pity; each person must do his duty. The Muscovite soldier is a machine, who must have no feeling; and woe be to his own shoulders if he shows any hesitation; forthwith he will receive from twenty-five to one hundred blows at the will of the General who has the honour of commanding those six thousand executioners. The Russian Government is scrupulous in the smallest details, it lays stress on everything being carried into effect; but with such men you run no risk. Thus they act with regard to a man who is being executed after rehearsals like those for a review. A bundle of straw or hay, placed in the chariot, is driven before through their ranks in preparation.

"The sufferer advances to the nine hundredth stroke of the rods. He has not uttered a cry or a single complaint — a convulsive trembling alone, from time to time, announces his agony. The foam now begins to flow from his mouth, and the blood from his nose. After fourteen hundred strokes, the face, which for a long time has turned blue, becomes at once green; the eyes are haggard, they almost start from their sockets, from which flow large bloody tears, which wrinkle his face. He was panting — he sank down. The officer who had accompanied me opened the ranks for me; I approached the body; the skin was literally peeled off; it had, properly speaking, disappeared. The flesh was chopped — almost reduced to a hash. Strips hung down over the flanks like so many thongs; other strips of flesh remained attached and glued to the bayonets of the executioners. The muscles were

torn. No human tongue could describe this spectacle. The commander ordered the cart to approach which had brought the condemned. They placed him in it, lying on his stomach, and, although he had quite lost consciousness, they continued the punishment on the mangled body, till the surgeon commissioned by the government, and who had followed step by step the execution, gave orders to suspend it, which did not happen till the sufferer was ready to expire. At this moment, two thousand six hundred and nineteen strokes had reduced the body to a hash!

"To strike a dead body in Russia is not cruel enough; it would not inspire the slaves with sufficient terror. The man must live to submit to his sentence.

"They carried the miserable man to the hospital, where, according to custom, he was put into a bath saturated with salt, then treated with the greatest solicitude till he is quite cured, in order that he may suffer the entire sentence. The penal laws of Russia always and everywhere present the most atrocious barbarity. It was seven months before this wretched man was cured and his health re-established; at the end of that time, he was solemnly conducted to the same place of execution, to receive the appointed six thousand strokes. He died at the commencement of this second execution." — *The Knout and the Russians.*

Shocking as these barbarities are, yet let us remember that they are perpetrated under the command of a monarch who pretends to live solely

for the welfare of his people*, and where the nobles are living in unexampled luxury and refinement, affecting even a fastidiousness of manners and feelings which is strangely belied by that which is passing around them. Upon the whole, we rise from the perusal of works on the present state of Russia and the Imperial Government with the firm impression that the motives and policy of the Russian Government may be summed up under two principles:

* The following conversation recorded by the Marquis de Custine, from whose account of Russia we have so often quoted, manifests the deep hypocrisy of the Czar; hypocrisy so great that it is probable he even deceives himself as well as others. "Sire," says the flatterer, "I can truly say that one of the chief motives of my curiosity in visiting Russia was the desire of approaching a prince who exercises such power over men."—*Nicholas.* "The Russians are amiable; but he must render himself worthy who would govern such a people."—*Marquis.* "Your Majesty has better appreciated the wants and the position of this country than any of your predecessors."—*Nicholas.* "Despotism still exists in Russia; it is the essence of my government, but it accords with the genius of the nation."—*Marquis.* "Sire, by stopping Russia on the road to imitation, you are restoring her to herself."—*Nicholas.* "I love my country, and I believe I understand it. I assure you that when I feel heartily wearied of all the miseries of the times, I endeavour to forget the rest of Europe by retiring towards the interior of Russia."—*Marquis.* "In order to refresh yourself at your fountain head."—*Nicholas.* "Precisely so: no one is more from his heart a Russian than I am."—*Custine.*

the one, that of ascertaining what every individual in the empire is about—the other, that of supplying that gorged leviathan, the Russian army, with a perpetual succession of human victims. Whatever the ukase or institution, however ostensibly humane, religious, or politic, one or other of these aims is distinctly traceable. The rules for registering and reporting births—the legal obligation of taking the Sacrament once a year—the difficulties in obtaining a pass, were it only for a native family to move into the next government—the civil formalities which accompany the mere changing of a servant—the very entries in the post-houses, with a host of other regulations, all cloaked more or less beneath the specious garb of public security, will be found to bear upon the first; while the insatiable thirst for soldier-making is so obvious, that to illustrate it we need only mention the maintenance of the foundling hospitals, both at St. Petersburg and at Moscow, upon a scale unprecedented elsewhere, all consideration of their demoralising tendency yielding to that of the constant recruitage thus supplied to the army.

CHAP. III.

THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA.

THE people of Russia are divided by a system called *tschinn* into fourteen classes or ranks. These ranks are not necessarily hereditary, or even for life, but granted as rewards at the will of the Czar. However, to simplify matters, all Russians may be considered as belonging to one of the five classes mentioned in the last chapter. Russia and the Russians may be said to be governed entirely by blows.* In agreement, perhaps, with the Russian proverb, "I love you like my *schabe,* but I beat you like my *boot,*" the nobleman beats his valet for his morning's amusement, the lady her maid as a safety-valve to her temper, the husband his wife, the parent his child, the traveller his coachman in the open streets of

* The Empress Catherine granted to the nobles exemption from personal castigation, to which, till her reign, they had been subject in like manner with the serfs.

thoroughfares, without shame or compunction; the officer beats the soldier, and the police beat all who stand in their way promiscuously. In short, as a somewhat quaint traveller asserts, "Never a moment passes in Russia but that a blow is falling on the head or shoulders of some unfortunate victim," who feels no humiliation from it, nor, perhaps, even pain of body, if we may believe of them as of the eels, that "they feel it not, because they are accustomed to it."

No person of any condition, power, or wealth, in Russia, is ever certain that he will retain his position, rank, or condition in life. He and all that he possesses is entirely subject to the will of the Czar, who, without giving notice of his intention, or even a reason for the same, may reduce the highest prince to a common soldier, or his first minister and nearest friend a Siberian convict, and send him off to life-long labour in the mines, degrading, at the same time, his family with him, without giving him even the opportunity of answering or disproving the charges laid against him.

The Russian, however, of every rank is to a certain degree patriotic. He may not love his yoke, but he loves his country; and is highly sensitive

about the opinion which foreigners entertain of his country. If the tales whispered be true, the upper classes are groaning to throw off the iron yoke of despotism under which they are labouring; for even the nobles have little enough of the liberty of the subject. If a nobleman, after trying hard for years, obtains permission to travel, which he cannot do till he has procured a pass which can be recalled at pleasure, still the Czar retains his watchful care over him, even when he is abroad. "The young Prince Dolgorouski, and Count Ivan Golovin allowed themselves the pleasure of seeing themselves in print at Paris: this incurred the imperial displeasure, and they were recalled. Prince Dolgorouski obeyed, and was exiled for a year. Count Golovin remained; he was too ill to travel. But the Emperor's will could not be resisted with impunity, and Golovin lost wealth and rank; and being judged guilty of high treason, he would be arrested were he to re-enter the Russian territory."

By a ukase promulgated in 1842, these difficulties were greatly increased. Every nobleman going abroad for purposes not connected with the pursuits of trade is only allowed to depart for a certain specified time, not exceeding five years, upon presenting

a donation of several hundred roubles to the treasury of the foundling hospital. The merchant is limited to three years. Those who wish to travel upon the plea of ill health are bound to submit themselves to the inspection of physicians and surgeons in the pay of the Government, who are bound to specify the nature of their diseases and complaints, and to certify to the necessity of travel for the bodily welfare of the patient. Officers of the army, going abroad at their own request, are compelled to resign one-half their annual pay to the treasury of the regiment to which they belong. Every Russian subject must instantly return on citation of the police. If he neglect this citation, or fail to return within the specified period, his property is confiscated, and himself outlawed.

An universal want of honesty in all who have any thing to do with government offices, whether they are of the nobility, bourgeois, or lower classes, seems, as we have said, the pervading sin of the country. Officers, whether naval or military, are all paid ridiculously low salaries; and at the same rate, and with the same paper money as in the time of the Empress Catherine; though meantime provisions of all kinds are far dearer, and the paper money is reduced to one-quarter of its original value. These employés

then are necessitated almost, and certainly expected, to provide by peculation the wherewithal to keep body and soul together.*

The present Czar, like his predecessor, sets his face against these peculations, but without removing the chief cause thereof by raising the pay of the officers. But even the Autocrat, with his unbounded authority and the terrors of unmitigated chastisements, cannot succeed in making the Russians honest.

We pass on to the serfs:—

"This monster institution (I cannot be said to misuse the name," observes the traveller, "when I remember that out of 54,000,000, of whom the Russian population is understood to be composed, 42,000,000 are serfs, and but 12,000,000 free — about 1 in 5).†

The serf is not necessarily a poor man. Many a serf enters into trading speculations, paying a yearly tax for permission to leave the estate on which he

* The tale of the commander of the Baltic fortress, who, when the present war began, was discharged from his situation and sent to serve in the ranks of the Wallachian army, because he had replaced the iron cannon balls placed in store by imitation ones of painted wood, and turned the bastions into flower gardens, will be familiar to all who read our daily papers.

† Shirley Brooks.

was born, and becomes far richer than his lord. Some of these purchase their freedom for a large sum: we read of one, a hatter, who gave as much as 800,000 rubles for his; others cannot obtain it, their lord choosing rather to retain the power of drawing from them a large sum annually as the price for their immunity from actual service at home. If a serf dies his lord can seize any money he has in the bank. The well-known Count Cheremetoukoff claimed and obtained 150,000 roubles which belonged to a deceased serf, though he left a large family of children.

The Marquis de Custine speaks much of the personal beauty and elegance of this race of Russians; and all writers agree in describing them as possessed of a natural gentleness and kindliness of disposition, combined with great shrewdness and tact, though they are at present totally uneducated.

"The merest boy and the lowest peasant is never at a loss for answer; and in this respect offers a striking contrast to the awkward, embarrassed, and boorish manners of the German peasantry. The Russian detects in a moment the weak side of another, and no one can with fewer words turn it to ridicule. If, on the one hand, there is no country where fewer *bons-mots* are perpetrated than in our good Germany, there is certainly none where

they occur more frequently than in Russia. In the streets and market-places, no less than in the highest society, a number of *bons-mots*, old and new, of Russian origin, are perpetually circulating" — *Kohl.*

The Emperor Alexander, when advised to banish the Jews lest by their craftiness they should impose on his subjects, is reported to have replied that he did not fear that any Jew would be sharp enough to overreach a Russian.

Schools for the education of the children of the serfs were established first by the Empress Catherine; though it is recorded that she wrote to one of her favourites, the Governor of Moscow: "My dear Prince, do not distress yourself, for the Russians have no desire for knowledge. If I institute schools, it is not for ourselves but for Europe, in whose estimation we must maintain our standing; but if our peasants should really seek to become enlightened, neither you nor I could continue in our places."

The Emperor Alexander was really anxious to promote the enlightenment and education of all his subjects. He is said to have imbibed from his intercourse with other foreign Princes and European civilisation generally at the close of the career of Napoleon I., views which bore a great resemblance to Protestantism in its best and most admirable doc-

trines, — the fact of the individual responsibility of mankind as to what each one believes and how each one lives, and the consequent necessity for the enlightenment of all classes as to their moral and spiritual state. He permitted the Bible Society to establish depôts and agencies throughout his dominions, allowed Protestant missionaries to reside in certain districts, and encouraged the advancement of learning throughout the whole extent of his Empire. But no sooner did Nicholas succeed to the throne, than every thing of this kind retrograded: the old slavish feeling and customs, the old ideas of repressing education and governing by blind force and not by reason, the old system of priestly domination — these priests being under the control of the Czar — in short, all the old barbarisms of an unenlightened age and nation were renewed, while all the innovations of civilisation which Alexander had laboured so hard and so unremittingly to establish, were put a stop to; and Russia has returned, as far as the will of the monarch can effect it, to the state in which it was before the reign of Peter the Great. Nobility, clergy, bourgeois, serfs, with their rights, fortunes, persons, and liberties, are all trampled under foot; while the only chance for the benefit of an oppressed serf, if he appeal to the Emperor, is, that

by taking his part the Czar may more effectually degrade and wound one of the higher classes.

Although Nicholas thus affects at times to take the part of the serfs in opposition to the nobility, yet that he has little personal consideration for them is evident from the wanton waste of life which he permits*, or, we may say, enforces, when any work which he chooses to be performed requires it. Thus, his former winter-palace having been destroyed by fire,

* "It does not appear from the reports of those who have visited Russia since the year 1826, that any attempt has been made to improve the wretched condition of the slaves throughout the Russian Empire, nor to correct the abuses which then prevailed in every department of the Government. Since the suppression of the Bible Society, which was carried into effect while I was in St. Petersburg, knowledge at every entrance has been excluded from the people. It is said that astronomy has been encouraged at Dorpat, and mineralogy at Moscow, by two kisses imprinted upon the cheeks of an eminent English geologist.

"The consumption of human life during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas has been enormous. He has carried on war with the Circassians uninterruptedly for twenty-eight years, at an annual cost of 20,000 lives on the Russian side alone; making a grand total of nearly 600,000 Russians who have perished in attempting to subdue the independence of Circassia.

"In the two campaigns against Persia, as in the Hungarian campaign and the two Polish campaigns of 1831-32, there are not sufficient data to enable me to form a correct estimate of

he resolved that it should be rebuilt in one year, and so it was: but at what cost? at that of an army of human beings.

"The interior works were continued during the great frosts; 6000 workmen were continually employed; of these a considerable number died daily, but the victims were instantly replaced by the other champions brought forward to perish, in their turn, in this inglorious breach.

"During frosts when the thermometer was at 25 to 30 degrees below 0 of Réaumur, 6000 obscure martyrs — martyrs without merit, for their obedience was involuntary — were shut up in halls heated to 30 degrees of Réaumur, in order that the walls might dry more quickly. Thus, in entering and leaving this abode of death, destined to become, by virtue of their sacrifice, the abode of vanity, magnificence, and pleasure, these miserable beings would

the Russian loss; which was, however, in the Persian and Polish wars enormous.

"In the two campaigns against Turkey, of 1828-9, 300,000 fell; of whom, however, 50,000 perished by the plague.

"The loss of the Russians, in various ways, since the entry of the Danubian Principalities, is understated at 30,000.

"In these calculations, it should be borne in mind that no estimate is attempted to be made of the sacrifice of human life on the side of those who fought for their liberties against the aggressions of Russia. If this calculation were attempted, it is probable that the result would prove that neither Julius Cæsar nor Alexander, nor even Tamerlane, has been a greater scourge to the human race than the present Emperor Nicholas."

have to endure a difference of 50 to 60 degrees of temperature.

"The works in the mines of the Uralian mountains are less inimical to life; and yet the workmen employed at Petersburg were not malefactors. I was told that those who had to paint the interior of the most highly heated halls were obliged to place on their heads a kind of bonnet of ice, in order to preserve the use of their senses under the burning temperature. Had there been a design to disgust the world with arts, elegance, luxury, and all the pomp of courts, could a more efficacious mode have been taken? and, nevertheless the sovereign was called *father* of the people immolated before his eyes in prosecuting an object of pure imperial vanity."—*Marquis de Custine.*

The Emperor Alexander had, during his latter years, expressed his intention of liberating the serfs in great measure, if not entirely, from the heavy yoke in which they are held; and hopes were at first entertained on the accession of Nicholas that he would have fulfilled his brother's intentions. Far, however, from that, it may be said of him that he reiterates the words, or acts on the intention of another despotic king of old; "My predecessor chastised you with whips,—I will chastise you with scorpions." Such, at least, was the tenor of his reply to the petitions which were sent up in May, 1826, by large bodies of these unfortunate individuals. The part of

the country whence the petitions proceeded was inundated with military, while a decree announced the existence of a court-martial to try all offences against the unlimited rights of the nobility over their serfs.

The morality of the lower classes in Russia is very low. Brought up in brutal ignorance, it is not to be wondered at if in many cases they are more than half brutes, while illegitimate births are encouraged by the numbers of foundling hospitals erected in all the towns, and into which any number of children can be received. Drunkenness also abounds to a tremendous extent, this vice being encouraged rather than checked by the priests. "After a funeral," says Maxwell, "the priests and the friends of the deceased meet at his house to enjoy themselves, and the first toast in commemoration of the deplorable event is, 'To the happiness of his soul! for he was a good fellow, and lived gay.'"*

* To these habits of drunkenness may in great measure be attributed the more than decimation of every Russian army by the plague, low fevers, and the cholera, directly they are called into service and exposed to any variation of climate. The truth probably is, that life among the peasants and soldiers is always short in Russia; how short we only know when they are engaged in war, or otherwise brought before the attention of their fellow creatures.

That the result of the present war must be some amelioration of the slavish condition of all classes in Russia, cannot but be expected. That, when a chasm is made in a dungeon light will break in, is a truth which may, as applied to Russia, make even the philanthropist look on present miseries with complacency. Long since, the present Czar and his confidential minister Cancrin were of one mind in the proposition that "all foreign non-Russian influence tended to the injury of the State, and that every deviation from a *statu quo* in the position of a nation was an allurement to revolution." And we cannot but expect and hope that this will prove to be the case. But how, or why, or by what influence the Czar has been induced to set at nought this maxim, and to give reins to the spirit of ambition, so far as to enter on the present conflict, is a mystery beyond our power to decipher. Unless, indeed, it be in this case as in others that the Almighty makes use of the unholy dispositions of men, and permits them to blind themselves as to their true wisdom, that his own ways and his own methods for working out the events that are to come upon the earth, may be brought to pass. In the last days there are "to be wars and rumours of wars." And though civilisation and philosophy, and commerce, and the fine arts and the prosperity of nations,

and the desire and tactics of politicians have all combined to tell us that "there shall never again be "another European war;" still, by the blind violence, by the haughty superciliousness, by the unqualified ambition of one man, war is upon us, and all Europe is more or less engaged in it.

CHAP. IV.

THE FOREIGNER IN RUSSIA.

If the native Russian finds it hard to live; and indeed may not live anywhere without the permit of the Emperor, much more is the foreigner in Russia obliged to render an account of all he does and where he goes; added to which he is surrounded by spies on all sides. His valet is a spy, his interpreter a spy, his landlord a spy; and if he is suspected of writing at all, not even Bramah's locks are effectual to save his lucubrations from the inspection of the police. If he wish to write that which would be offensive to his entertainers,—as did the Marquis of Custine rather too often for the reader's good impression of the honesty of his character,—his only hope is to outwit the cunning of his surrounding spies, and to dispose of these same lucubrations in some unheard-of or rather unthought-of place. But before the traveller can write his observations on the country or its inhabitants, he has to establish him-

self there: and this is by no means an easy process — *vide* the amusing account given by Mr. Sterling of the sufferings he underwent, or rather the fleecing he received, from the *chinovniks*, or officials.

"I was now recommended to bestir myself about my passport, which, from its being for the interior, would take some time as well as trouble to procure. In applying for it, I had an opportunity of observing one of the numerous methods adopted by the government of raising the wind through the medium of stamped papers. All business in the public offices and courts of justice is carried on in writing, and no communication is received by the head of the department unless the document has the imperial eagle upon it. The price of the lowest stamped paper on which the official business is transacted is about sevenpence of our money, and when the extent to which the system of 'bureaucracie' is carried is carefully considered, it will be evident that the sums raised in this manner must form an important item in the revenue. The vexatious delays I had experienced in procuring my Crimean passport were few in comparison with what I encountered on this occasion. The first step it was necessary to take in this intricate affair was to go to the police-office with my 'carte-de-séjour.' Before this document, however, could be forwarded to the police-master it was requisite that it should be accompanied by a petition, and as I could not write Russ, I had to look about the office for one of the numerous scriveners who make a livelihood by inditing these official 'billets-doux.' This was of course drawn

out upon a stamp; and having given in the two papers I departed, with an intimation that I might 'call again to-morrow.' Three hours were consumed in this preliminary step. The next morning, at the appointed time, I was again at the office; and after having had the satisfaction of seeing the hands of the cuckoo clock describe two circles, an understrapper announced to me the agreeable intelligence that I might follow him. Keeping close to his heels, we threaded, or rather pushed our way through the crowd of petitioners, all of the lower orders, until my companion confronted me with a man in green coat with brass buttons — the civil uniform. This was only a *chinovnik* (*i. e.* an under clerk); though, judging by his important manner, he might have been Count Benkendorf himself. I now observed that a third document had been appended to the two I left the day before; this being, as usual, on a stamp, I paid for it; and in the official catechism that followed, the gentleman in green was so preoccupied, that he *forgot* to give me my change. The official jackal now took me to at least ten different persons, who signed and countersigned each paper; and after wheeling in and out of every room but the one I wished to get into, the principal one, I was brought back to my absent friend with the brass buttons; here I had to pay for another stamped paper, and have the change taken out of me 'again'; my silent submission to this roguery procured me a low bow, with a request to leave the papers with him and 'call again to-morrow.' Before I left the office I was informed that this delay was to give the police time to inquire whether there were any claims against me

in the town for debt. The following day I was once more at my post; but this time it was evident that the legal (though not the illegal) forms and demands had been complied with. My papers lay duly arranged upon the table, but the man in green paid no attention to me; and though many applicants were successful, the crowd around him appeared to increase rather than diminish. I soon saw how matters stood; and feeling certain that, unless I followed the example of those who had retired, I should again be desired to 'call again to-morrow,' I put my hand into my pocket, a sign manual which this purveyor of signatures perfectly understood, and we effected an amicable exchange. Handing me the papers, he pocketed the silver with the most perfect 'sang froid,' telling me as he dropped the fifty-two copeck pieces into his pocket, that the 'imperial salary would not keep him in boots.'

"The luggage of all persons leaving the empire must be submitted to the inspection of the officers of the customs.

"These are some of the formalities attending a departure from the country. But the systematic interference of government with the liberty of the subject does not stop here. Every individual in the empire, whether noble or serf, native or foreigner, must have a *permis de séjour*, which is regularly registered at certain specified times. Within every district the name of each inhabitant is recorded by the proper officers in the book kept for this purpose, and any one who neglects to appear at the appointed time, to renew his application for a new registry and a new pass, is sure to be subjected to a heavy

fine and all the annoyances that an ingenious and exacting officer can impose. If the servant has omitted this duty, both servant and master are liable, the latter being considered an accomplice of the former. There is no escape from the payment of these penalties, and instances are known of fines being levied in trivial cases that had occurred many years before, and had been forgotten by all except the magistrate. The fees exacted for the giving and signing of passports, and other papers of this description, are enormous in amount, and a source of considerable revenue to the officers of the police."—*Sterling's Russia.*

But, in addition to passport difficulties, the custom-house ceremonials are not to be despised, and lucky is the traveller who can dispense his roubles freely; though even these will not ensure the admission of his books, if he should be so unlucky as not to have been very careful as to the titles thereof. One traveller, for instance, journeying for scientific purposes, mentions the grievous loss of a work he had with him for reference, entitled "The REVOLUTIONS of the Heavenly Bodies." So ominous a word could by no means be passed over. The Emperor and all his officials were scared by the word revolution as by an incendiary; and the book could by no means be rescued from the flames.

The foreigner finds it as difficult to move about

Russia as to obtain admission to the country. If he wants to go on from St. Petersburg, for instance, in which he will probably have first taken up his quarters, "he must publish his intention of doing so in three consecutive numbers of the *Gazette*, a process that occupies a week or ten days. He then addresses a petition to the governor of the city, which petition, after passing through several departments, reaches the Bureau of the Chief of Police, who grants the passport*;" and if roubles are not at command to hasten these various processes, not days but weeks may be expended in them.

There is now a railroad from St. Petersburg to Moscow, though this has been made very much against the will of the Emperor's chief minister, Cancrin, who is reported to have written in his diplomatic correspondence of railroads — "They are follies; and within twenty years, they will disappear from the face of the earth. Of course, the whole world is against me in my belief, and I know that we also shall have railways, for, like the cholera, they are sure to make pretty well the tour of the globe. The Emperor has set his heart on them, and they will be constructed. When I am dead he will remember me

* Maxwell.

and my reluctance to adopt them.". And Cancrin was right, as far as the policy of the case goes, to discourage the formation of railroads, and to put every impediment in the way of travelling, whether of foreigners or natives, if, as we believe, the great aim and object of the Czar is to retard the progress of civilisation. Liberty must inevitably follow freedom of thought; and freedom of thought must be the inevitable result of intercourse with foreigners, or even of seeing fresh persons, places, and things in one's own country. A man would never become civilised while living like Robinson Crusoe in Juan Fernandez, or as an anchorite in his cell, or at the top of Pompey's pillar. It is with men as with stones or metal; they are polished by friction, though it be of the rough by the rough. In short, great was the wisdom of him who invented the proverb—"Who dies a man must see the world."

CHAP. V.

THE MILITARY POWER OF RUSSIA.

THE army of Russia is raised by conscription. The term of service is fifteen years, during which time the soldier is equipped and maintained by Government. Contrary to what one would have imagined in a nation of serfs, the Russian in general prefers his home serfdom to the tyranny and slavery of the army; and cases have been known of terrible mutilations being self-inflicted to render the sufferer unfit for service.

An intelligent and amusing traveller in Russia writes thus of the Russian army:—

"The slave-soldier, after he has been drawn for the army, is conducted to the depôt; and there, doubtless, his education is commenced upon the most approved principles. His comforts may suffer at first; for, having been accustomed to the shaggy sheepskin, the warmest-looking article in the world, and to a thick cap, he is rendered nearly bald; he has a helmet given him, and his sheepskin is taken away in favour of the apparently thinnest

uniform extant. There cannot be a greater contrast than the sturdy peasant, in the comforting dress I have described, and his shivering compatriot on duty as a sentinel when one of the Black Sea breezes runs a muck at the town. It is the peasant who looks the soldier then, as he grins good-humouredly in the teeth of the wind. I think I agree with the Rev. Mr. Gleig, that the swaggering manner, 'if it does not run wild altogether,' should be rather encouraged in a soldier; if he is to be formidable, he should believe himself so. But as far as I have seen, there is very little of this in the Russian soldier; he looks very meek, and remarkably uncomfortable. In the capital, and round the great head of the army, no doubt, things look differently, or travellers would not go away with such enraptured visions of glorious and gigantic guardsmen, and reviews which do everything but realise Milton's battle of the angels. I merely mention what I see. The soldier is not well fed, but the contrary; and when he is engaged, as he often is, to assist in heavy work, as lifting weights and similar matters, his want of power, compared with the civilian by his side, is not only evident to the eye, but registered in his wages, which are usually lower than those of his companion. I do not know that there is any reason why a soldier should be able to heave a sack easily—a man who cannot carry a load may be very useful in carrying a town; but I know what one of our own brawny and willing guardsmen would say if he saw the apparent calibre of these men. In sickness, I am glad to believe that there is an intention to amend the treatment of the soldiers; a necessary movement, con-

sidering the immense number of the Russian army at this moment in hospital, or unable to appear on parade. There has always been an enormous parade of care for him when sick, and the display of the military apothecary's gilded boxes and the like have always been most satisfactory upon inspection, until the boxes were opened." —*The Russians of the South, by Shirley Brooks.*

Many writers speak of the difficulty which the Russian Government has always experienced in congregrating any large number of effective troops on any given point;—a difficulty not only *moral* from want of monetary means, but *physical*, from deficiency in execution.

In the great war against Napoleon, when, in the heart of their vast empire, they retired on their resources, and resolved at last to make a final stand to save their capital, and fight for independence, one hundred and twenty thousand was the greatest extent of their muster-roll. Neither did they ever exceed this aggregate in the successive invasions of France, in 1814 and 1815. Moreover, the Russian contingent would never have arrived at all but for the subsidies of England.

"I cannot tell," writes a spectator of the military assemblage at Paris after the battle of Waterloo, "what were the impressions of civilians and diplomatists, to whom I had

no access, but happening to be an insignificant unit among many hundreds of military men of all nations who were looking on, I can testify, that as a mere military display we were neither petrified with amazement nor awe. No mistakes are so easily made as calculations on the numbers of troops estimated from a coup d'œil; the general belief was, that on this occasion they did not amount to ninety thousand, and the entire Russian contingent which marched up to Paris, subsequent to the battle of Waterloo and the second abdication of Napoleon, I was assured by an officer of the Russian staff, never exceeded, even on paper, one hundred and ten thousand. At this vaunted review, which had been long in preparation, and lasted three days, little or nothing was done to illustrate strategy or capability of rapid movement. Three days previous to the commencement of the display were required to place them on the ground. On the first day of action, the operations consisted in marching past in review order; on the second they were confined to performing worship according to the rites of the Greek Church; and on the third, the whole force marched off again to the cantonments from whence they had been summoned. Not long after this, in an after-dinner conversation, arising incidentally, the Duke of Wellington proposed to the Allied Sovereigns, as they suggested to him, to show them the British army with their allies in British pay, including the Hanoverian and Danish division, amounting in all to more than eighty thousand men. A representation of the principal manœuvres and incidents of Salamanca, as nearly as the ground permitted, was afterwards

stated to have been the programme agreed on for the evolutions of the day. There was no previous announcement or rehearsal. At nine at night, the orders were sent round to the different brigades, and by eight on the following morning the whole were drawn up in two lines, the left resting on Montmartre, and the right on the Seine, with St. Denis a little in the rear. The Sovereigns, with a gallant escort, comprising many of the leading generals of the day, rode hastily along the front. All were then put in motion; the entire day was occupied in a series of complicated movements, and at seven in the evening the corps marched past the assembled potentates, and returned to their several quarters. The quickness and precision of the evolutions, the martial bearing and exact discipline of the men, and especially the equipments of the horse artillery, excited the loudest approbation. It was a proud day for Britain, as showing a solid exhibition of her power."

And certainly the late experience of the war, both in the Principalities and the Crimea, carries out this view. Soldiers are more easily put down on paper than assembled together in the shape of armies.

The state both of the army and navy, or rather the state of both when the Czar so rashly entered on the present war, was thus described by the Vienna correspondent of the *Times*: —

"The fleet in the Black Sea consists of two 'divisions.' Each division, or squadron, is supposed to contain one

three-decker, eight two-deckers, two of which are of 84 and the others of 74 guns, six frigates, one corvette, and four brigs. Thus the fleet, if complete, would consist of two three-deckers, four two-deckers of 84 and twelve of 74 guns, twelve frigates, two corvettes, and eight brigs. 'To these,' says Haxthausen, 'must be added several steamers and a great many galleys or row-boats.' There may be about 180 of these galleys, which are principally employed on the east coast of the Black Sea. M. Haxthausen, although he writes in a Russian sense, insinuates that the navy appears more formidable on paper than it is in reality. We are told that the galleys have rendered more service than the large vessels. In 1743 Admiral Golovin did not attack the Swedish fleet 'because he had but seventeen vessels to his adversary's twelve.' General Keith, however, in the same year, attacked a Swedish squadron of equal strength, and came off victorious. Under Catherine II. a certain Spridoff acquired some reputation, but the names of the commanders under him were Elphinstone, Greig, and Dugdale. During the war which after the first French revolution desolated Europe, the Russian navy was a mere cipher. When allied with England the fleets of the latter were powerful enough, when opposed to her, Russian vessels were of no avail. The fact that the ships are still principally manned with 'land-lubbers' is not denied, but this is not surprising, when it is considered that Russia has no mercantile fleet worth mentioning. There is a law that the captain of a merchantman sailing under Russian colours must be a native of the country, but this is continually evaded. In

port, the Russian is the captain; but, once at sea, off goes his uniform, on goes an apron, and he figures as ship's cook. The real skipper is generally either a German, a Swede, or a Norwegian, as the English have been unpopular since, during the war, they took a great part of the Russian fleet into 'safe keeping.' The ships are thus manned: — a three-decker and a corvette have a crew composed of 1,100 sailors and marines; a two-decker of 84 and two brigs have the same number of men. A crew of the same strength also suffices for a two-decker of 74 guns and one frigate. The vessels, being built after different models, do not sail well together. English seamen may well sneer at the way in which Russian ships are in general handled. The newer large vessels are of oak, but of such inferior quality that they do not last more than ten or fifteen years; the others are of larch. The Black sea fleet has some good sailors, who are taken from the coasts, and also many Greeks. Of the Cossacks dwelling on the shores of the sea of Azof good boats' crews are formed. The fact that the Black Sea is continually subject to squalls nearly as violent as those near the tropics must not be lost sight of; shallows and dangerous reefs also abound. How many of the Russian ships above enumerated have been damaged or completely wrecked has never transpired, but we often read that, in consequence of a violent storm, a great many vessels have been wrecked in the Black Sea.

"As to Rear-Admiral Kornileff's forty-six gunboats in the Danube, the admirals could take twenty each, and toss up for the odd six. It would be unpardonable to speak

with the same levity of the army. The men are well clothed and armed, and so well disciplined that when properly led on they walk up to the enemy as calmly as if on parade. The Russian army consists of one guard corps, (comprising the whole guard,) one grenadier corps, six infantry corps, and three reserve cavalry corps. At present we have to do but with the infantry corps, which are what under Napoleon were called army corps. Each consists of 49 battalions of infantry and one of sappers, of 32 squadrons of lancers and hussars, and of 32 heavy and 80 light guns. The real strength of the battalions and squadrons is unknown. Until the Hungarian war there was always a vast difference between the nominal and effective strength of the army."

As to the Russian soldiers themselves they are universally reported to be stupid, and clumsy in manœuvring, but at the same time they are strictly subordinate, and obedient to whatever orders they may receive: this obedience sometimes appears almost idiotic in the extent to which it is carried; but the Russian soldier knows that if the enemy is before him, the stick is behind him; from the fire of the enemy he may escape, but from the stick he cannot if he disobeys orders; in short, the fear of the stick replaces the sentiment of honour — 'it gives ardour to the soldier,' said one skilled in Russian tactics, and it is considered the best means for inducing them

to fire. Once, in the Caucasus, when the troops refused to advance, being assailed by the shot of the enemy, the Russian general sat on a drum, and calling some men out of their ranks, had them flogged; after that he commanded the battalion to advance, and the Circassians were beaten. But this obedience to harsh measures has been produced by some terrible examples; knowing that entire regiments have been coolly massacred for mutiny, a Russian soldier will sometimes obey the most unreasonable orders—orders indeed which in any other army would neither be given nor insisted upon, if the risk appeared too great. One strong instance of this blind obedience is thus related: — Some Russian soldiers were ordered to storm a high wall, but as they had no ladders, it was declared to be impossible: 'The order has been given, therefore it must be possible,' was the reply: the soldiers then rushed onwards, and by fixing their bayonets in the crevices of the wall they climbed up. *

The writer of some very interesting articles in Fraser's Magazine on the defences of Russia gives us the following account of the construction of some Russian war ships.

* Christmas.

"The two vessels mentioned as being on the stocks at St. Petersburg—the Orël and Maria—are, in point of materials, examples of the mode of construction now adopted at the New Admiralty. They are pine and larch below, and oak above the water line, with beams and internal planking of larch. The scantlings (according to the Naval Miscellany, *à la Saymonds!*) are stout, the ships are very strongly put together, and in all respects built on the most approved principles and with the advantage of all recent improvements. But there was one thing noticeable which told either of economy or dishonesty. The official account of these ships states that all above water is oak, and yet in the Maria (and, if we remember right, in the Orël also), a proportion of pine had found its way into the bulwarks and portsills. The speed with which the works are urged on in Russian dockyards precludes the idea of their vessels being properly seasoned. And from this and various other causes, a line-of-battle ship usually passes into the hulk phase after ten or fifteen years' service. The three-decker, the St. George, was last summer spoken of as exceptionally old, and she had been launched in or about 1833. This stands in curious contrast with the fact that our Canopus, taken at the battle of the Nile in 1798 (as the Fránklin), was lately in commission, and is still in the effective list. But the Canopus was not built in two years—the average time allowed for constructing a Russian line-of-battle ship—nor is her material fir. At Archangel, ships are usually but one year on the stocks, and the timber used is larch above and red pine below the water line; small quantities of oak for

special and indispensable wants being brought from Kazan and Kostroma."

After explaining the technical meaning of various terms used with reference to guns, the writer proceeds to give, from official statements, the mounting and power of two Russian ships, the Twelve Apostles, 120 guns, and the St. George, 112, comparing them with the English ship, the Queen, 116. He then makes these remarks: —

"In estimating the weight of broadside thrown by each ship, we have allowed for the slight numerical superiority of metal in the Twelve Apostles, so that the preponderance in favour of the Queen is pretty accurately shown. This gives her, as compared with the St. George, an advantage equal to the possession of thirty-two 32-pounders —almost a whole deck—as compared with the Twelve Apostles of nearly five 32-pounders. Nor is this all, for the Queen could, at a distance of 1200 yards, pour her broadside of fifty-eight guns into the Twelve Apostles, who could only reply with thirty-one guns; and the St. George, under the same circumstances, could only reply with seventeen guns! For, on account of their inferior range and length, the Russian upper and main deck battery in the first case, and upper, main, and middle deck batteries in the second, would be almost useless except at close quarters. And further on it will be seen that the gunners of this particular St. George the Conqueror last

year only hit their target at the rate of about twenty-five per cent., so that the British ship would receive but four shots from her enemy. Meanwhile, scarcely a missile of ours would fail to strike the Russian; and, unless we much mistake the powers of British seamen, before the spurry general of the St. George had recovered from the effect produced on him by the explosion of a dozen Moorsom's shells, he would receive a second broadside which would at once afford him facilities for studying the theory of the sinking of three-deckers, and the flag-ship would not only cease to be 'the conqueror,' but would at once be removed from the Navy List. These details, no theoretical conclusions, but the result of simple arithmetical facts, show that the value of such sailing line-of-battle ships as the St. George is, as against the vessels of the Allied fleets, absolutely *nil*."

What he says about the Russian sailors confirms the universal report.

"The Russian Czars have built and equipped ships of war, and sent forth fleets from harbours which they have persuaded the world to call impregnable, and yet their navy remains a phantom without a history and without a glory. Other difficulties may yield to the ambition of powerful monarchs, but the moral unfitness and apathy of a whole nation cannot be overcome by the exertion of a will, however strong and however absolute. The dislike of the Russian people to the sea service is as great and as openly manifested as in the days when Peter was the only

good sailor in his dominions, and the most brilliant naval successes would fail to excite their curiosity, much less to rouse their enthusiasm. The officers of a Russian fleet expect no sympathy in victory or defeat, and they disbelieve in the utility of the institution to which they belong; while the sailors, hating an amphibious life, sigh for the very miseries of a serf's existence, and tremble lest they should be ordered into battle and annihilation. Russian sailors cannot look for encouragement to the past; the memory of the galley fleets which used in old times to ravage the shores of the Euxine, of the fire-ships of Tchesme, of Sinope itself, are not present to the crews who skulk behind the walls of Sebastopol. Even our own invincible sailors would be demoralised by continuous inaction and submission to constant insult. The name of Nelson would cease to animate a fleet which lay snugly in Portsmouth harbour, while the enemy fired guns of defiance from the anchorage of Spithead."

But the reader will be considerably perplexed by the tables of gunnery practice here given, because, as they are Russian tables, they cannot be supposed to have understated their success. On reading the tables, we were forcibly reminded of that gentleman who was complimented on having "displayed such very fine talents for missing." Here is the first: —

Names of Ships.	Guns.	Shots fired.	Hits.	Misses.
St. George the Conqueror (flag)	112	78	18	60
Touch-Me-Not	84	62	23	39
Andrew	84	52	18	34
Emgeiten	84	126	31	95
Memory of Azoph	74	99	12	87
Sisoi the Great.	74	105	23	82
Villagös	74	86	25	61
Kulm	74	51	18	33
Empress Alexandra	84	71	20	51
Ingermanland	74	102	24	78
Amphitrite (gunnery ship)	44	40	21	19

Total Hits - - 27 per cent.
Total Misses - - 73 „

"The targets fired at were 25 feet long by 15 feet high, and painted, like the side of a frigate. A target was moored opposite every ship, at a distance of 800 yards."

CHAP. VI.

STATE OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA.

THE history of any country at any period must be incomplete that does not give at least a slight sketch of the state of national religion.

Perhaps of all Christian Churches that of the Russo-Greek is the most superstitious. Its ordinances were founded on those professed by the Byzantine Eastern Church when it separated from the Roman Catholic; the chief doctrinal difference between the two being that the former believes that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father alone, and not, as the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches believe, equally from the Father and the Son. Thus, the equality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is put in question.

About the year 1588, the Russo-Greek Church separated from the Byzantine, and the right of appointing a separate patriarch for the Russian Church alone was purchased by the Czar Feodor for the money wherewith the Grecian patriarch attained that eminence.

In the time of Peter the Great the patriarchate was first permitted to fall into abeyance by his allowing that office to remain unfilled up during 20 years; and then, in its place, a sacred council was formed, of which the Czar was ever to be the head. And from that time forward the existing Czar has been the real patriarch of the Russian Church.

Next in rank to the Czar in the Russian Church come the three metropolitans of — 1. Kieff; 2. St. Petersburg; 3. Moscow. Below them are archbishops and bishops, and the different grades of inferior clergy. These last are divided into the "white" and "black" clergy, or the pastoral and cloistered respectively. Neither of these are allowed to marry. Both kinds are stated to live in extreme poverty, and to be dreadfully addicted to intemperance. They are said to be ignorant, dirty, superstitious, and dishonest, and to be despised rather than esteemed by people of all classes. This is naturally the result of a priesthood who are merely engaged in the performance of the vain ceremonials of a superstitious religion, and who never attempt to inculcate piety or even mere morality on the people. The performance of mass is conducted with even more ceremonies than in the Roman Catholic Churches, and all the other ceremonials are per-

formed with similar outward vain ceremonials. Even young infants are permitted to take the Communion. The whole nation bow down to images and pictures; a holy picture, for the purposes of devotion, occupying a conspicuous place in every Russian house. To this even a visitor pays his first homage on entering, by making, after the Russian fashion, the sign of the cross before he attempts to salute his host or hostess. The only passport to Heaven is a sealed one from the priest, which is placed on the breast of the deceased in his coffin. This passport is purchased by the poor for different sums of money, according to the wealth of the deceased or his family, — from just spirits enough to make the priest drunk, to large sums of money for lighted tapers and the prayers of the priests.

It will readily be believed that morality is at a very low ebb in Russia. Drunkenness abounds to a degree that is unknown in any other country.

Another prevalent sin in Russia is unchastity. This is fostered in every way by the habits of the people, by the fact that serfs, whether married or single, are subject to be sent away for years from their wives, and by the universal establishment of foundling hospitals. The children brought up in these are the property of the State, and are entirely and completely under the control of the Czar, the

young men being regularly enrolled in the army as soon as they are of an age to bear arms.

Notwithstanding the despotism of the Czar, heretics are not unknown in the Russian Church. There are several different sects holding various different views and doctrines, from the "old Russian" sect who wish to return to the establishment of the patriarchs, to sects very similar to the Mormonites. At different times these several sects have undergone severe persecutions from the different emperors and empresses; and whole districts having been exiled to Siberia for their opinions. Of late years, however, it has been the policy of the proprietors of the several estates to conceal the heretical views of their serfs, as by revealing them to the head of the Church, the Czar, and procuring their punishment, they deprive themselves of their chief wealth, that is the proprietorship over these serfs. Directly any one is exiled to Siberia he becomes the property of the Emperor.

The dreadful persecution of the Polish nuns was carried on from the time when the insurrection in Poland was quelled in 1831 up to 1836, and the tales told of the cruelties which were committed on those unfortunate and long-enduring martyrs are almost incredible. Our own Smithfield and St. Paul's Cross

must have been places of mercy compared with those which witnessed the refinement of torture practised on these unfortunate women. Our pen refuses to dwell on such barbarities. Willingly would we believe the Czar's assertion to the Pope of Rome, when he visited him in 1847, that he knew nothing of them; but, be that as it may, we are thankful that the talons of the Russian Eagle under which such barbarities may be practised are about to be clipt.

THE END.

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